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This dissertation considers the rhetorical use of the term “spontaneity” and action affiliated
with it from the perspective of ethnomethodology, as a dynamic social practice emergent from
concrete interactions among people. I first consider a variety of existing operationalizations of
“spontaneity” in academic research from the perspective of what is ethnomethodologically
accomplished by these operationalizations, i.e., what questions do they answer or attempt to
answer? I then turn to a detailed rhetorical analysis of the term “spontaneity” as an ideograph in
improvisational theatre, a social practice in which enactment of spontaneity is treated as criterial
to identity and recognition of the practice. In this ideographic analysis, I consider both a set of
popular improv method texts and a collection of interviews with improviers who relate narratives
about their experiences or observations of spontaneity. I assess the rhetorical practices in these
artifacts both through the operationalization framework I identify and from a critical perspective,
asking how practices of spontaneity in improv relate to social structures and practices of
privilege, oppression and power.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

This dissertation identifies “spontaneity” as a term used with reference to a wide variety of
divergent concepts and practices which are nonetheless unified in English-language culture
through shared use of the term. The term “spontaneity” and its associations are also commonly
value-laden in cultural practices, and used to rhetorically constrain and justify applications and
structures of power. In the following pages, I view “spontaneity” through the lens of
ethnomethodology, with emphasis on the ways that the term “spontaneity” and concepts/values
associated with it are actually used in social rhetorical practices. In particular, I analyze the use
of “spontaneity” in the rhetoric of improvisational theatre, a practice where orientation to
“spontaneity” is foundational to practitioners’ recognition of themselves as engaged in the
practice at all.
Sooooo….
What is spontaneity? And what difference does it make?
Well, kinda depends what you mean.
Spontaneity is extraordinary. The spark that lights off a revolution in thought or society
emerges spontaneously, out of nowhere, unpredictably. Perhaps it comes of an act of individual
or collective will, a profound choice that changes the world forever. Or perhaps it was
inevitable; the push of the material world or the press of history made it so it had to happen. But
if it was spontaneous, you definitely didn't see it coming, at least not in this particular place,
moment, or way. It surprises you. It means change. It means creation. It means uncharted
territory. It is thrilling. Life began spontaneously in some molecular brew. People spend their
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lives seeking spontaneity, those rare opportunities to escape the strictures of society, or their own
rut of habits, and let their true selves shine through. Scientific luminaries have their signature
insights in sudden, spontaneous moments (usually after deep immersion in a subject of research).
Legendary artists create their best work in the throes of spontaneous inspiration. Taoist spiritual
masters seek to live every aspect of their lives spontaneously, finding and doing the good by
letting things happen instead of forcing them. We crave spontaneity, and when recollecting our
most fond memories, most people will emphasize the pleasure of life's spontaneous moments far
in excess over what they remember as expected and deliberate. Spontaneity is special and
precious.
Spontaneity is ordinary. It is so commonplace as to be pervasive and forgettable. Though
we turn on the stove and wait expectantly, we are pleasantly surprised at the particular moment a
pot of water spontaneously breaks into a boil. Plants spontaneously grow back after dying in the
winter or being ripped up. After settling in, you whisk every day around the corners of your
home without barking your shins, spontaneously, automatically, usually without even noticing
how expertly you do it. We talk with strangers and loved ones and express ourselves,
spontaneously ad libbing as we create everyday conversation together without knowing what
we're going to do. We dance. We make choices, plenty of which are authentic and true to
ourselves. We feel the spark of inspiration almost every day, however often constrained
from/ignorant of how/choosing not to act on it. We live in society, connected with countless
others in unfathomably intricate ways, and more or less manage to figure out how all to be
together and move forward and live our lives. It's always happening all the time.
Overall, we like spontaneity, and we want more of it. Too much can be risky, of course; the
free spirit's other side is the loose cannon. But on the whole, if you've got spontaneity you've got
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something good. You're being yourself. Or what you should be. Or you're free to do what you
want. Or you know what you need to do. Or at minimum, that you're touching that ethereal but
invigorating liminal space where you don't know what's going to happen next. It seems like the
privileged get to have all the fun, get to live spontaneously at the cost of restricting the
spontaneity of others. On the other hand, some might say that anyone who has lived
spontaneously, in any walk of life, is the one who is truly rich. We have a grudging, perverse
admiration for the spontaneity we see in even heinous acts, if they are inspired and effective—
just think of your favorite slick movie villains and what they can get away with. And then, when
you think of it that way, there’s a lot to be said for safety, predictability, and control; we might
even argue that they form the social grounding that makes spontaneity possible, or gives
spontaneity its value for those who value it. But certainly, spontaneity is valued, and we have all
manner of rituals, practices, and attitudinal stances seeking to enable or enhance it. It is also
dangerous, such that we have all sorts of laws, customs, and norms used to channel, restrict, or
discredit what is considered spontaneous.
Spontaneity is slippery. All thrown together, this array of associations seems bewildering.
The examples in turn involve free will and inevitable processes; preciousness and pervasiveness;
control and letting go; individuals and societies; a status valued and prized but also feared, and in
principle accessible to all. But in all of them we can recognize “spontaneity” as a background
that makes perfect sense in connection with the example. Concepts of spontaneity connect with
so many, and so varied, other instances and concepts that addressing a question of “what is
spontaneity?” would seem perturbingly daunting at best. It implies that we should be able to
recognize something coherent across all these instances of spontaneity, identify and describe it,
and apply that description as an interpretive frame to events insofar as they do or do not, or to
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what degree, exhibit this common “spontaneity.” The question may not be overwhelming so
much as meaningless. Spontaneity doesn't seem to work that way.
Considering just spontaneity in human behavior, two general cases immediately trouble any
realist “what” account of spontaneity: Faking it and making it. People can pretend to be
spontaneous, purposefully executing actions and behaviors with the intent of seeming
spontaneous, where the perceived spontaneity of their actions is essential to how they want
others to interpret it. The carefully prepared material to be casually tossed off by a public figure
giving an off-the-cuff interview. The earnest playing along of the honoree who's been expecting
a surprise birthday party. A “sudden” expression of overwhelming emotion to address a longstanding issue in a relationship. In all these cases, social actors deploy codes intended to be read
as spontaneous, to reap benefits from having their behavior interpreted as such. To some degree
they succeed, and their actions are treated as spontaneous by relevant others for all intents and
purposes of the evaluational heuristic for spontaneity applied. There are prices for failure, to be
seen as trying to affect spontaneity when knowingly being non-spontaneous—the public figure is
subjected to media ridicule; the honoree's guests are disappointed; trust is undermined. All these
cases “work” as they do because parties involved treat spontaneity as something real and
valuable. But they also treat spontaneity as a communicative practice for organizing and
evaluating meaning in social behavior. The expression of spontaneity is in many ways more
important for social purposes than the “objective legitimacy” of behavior as spontaneous:
“Couldn’t you have at least pretended to be surprised?”
On the other hand, people can also deliberately plan to purposefully generate spontaneity.
We set up parties, competitions, and political debates. You decide to walk down an unfamiliar
street to see what you'll find. We get together with friends, without any plans but a definite
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sense we all want something spontaneous to happen. To some degree these practices are
successful—we “have a good time,” “get an authentic look at the candidates,” “discover
something unexpected,” “have a random adventure.” Failures to produce intended spontaneity
have prices: boredom, getting stuck in routines, loss of credibility. All these practices work by
virtue of participants treating spontaneity as real and valuable and recognizable. But all also
seem to contain a paradox—“spontaneous” behavior is done on purpose, deliberately channeling
and contriving behavior to produce something desired in large part because it is less purposeful,
deliberate, and contrived. Such practices treat spontaneity almost economically, initially
sacrificing spontaneity to facilitate profiting in it later. Though treated as real, the value of
spontaneity in such transactions is dependent upon, and the product of, participants' interpretive
and evaluative practices for recognizing and distinguishing “spontaneous” experience and
behavior. Participants don't necessarily have overlapping senses of spontaneity, and conflicts
can arise: “That wasn't spontaneous, that was the same old thing we always do, in a different
park.”
In light of these considerations, I suggest that, rather than asking what spontaneity is, a more
productive question might be “How is spontaneity done?” In other words, how do participants in
a culture use spontaneity as an interpretive, evaluative, and performative principle for organizing
their experiences, their relationships, and their actions? Or another way: How do people use
spontaneity as a “method” for making their way through the world? This sort of question
formulation does not imply a concrete, discoverable property of objective reality the way that
“what is” does. Instead, spontaneity happens in specific social settings, and is “produced”
through (or is a byproduct of) specific social actors’ interactive engagements with each other,
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their experiences, and their environment. Spontaneity takes the form of a way of understanding,
and practices employed to recognizably invoke this way of understanding in oneself and others.
Ethnomethodology provides an effective theoretical lens through which to examine the
question of spontaneity formulated in this way. Taken “on the whole,” concepts of spontaneity
are chaotic. Yet clearly it is a commonly-deployed concept that is mostly coherently usable in a
variety of social situations. Ethnomethodology shifts away from viewing social orderliness as
principles or pre-existing social structures to which actors in concrete social situations respond
(with researchers able to analyze those responses). It instead reverses the direction of analysis,
implicating social orderliness as emerging from concrete interactions in specific social situations.
The “reality of social facts” is produced “as an accomplishment of actors’ concerted work in
making social facts observable and accountable to one another in their everyday lives” (Maynard
and Clayman 387). Social members participating in a concrete situation are “from the outset
embedded in contingently accomplished structures of social action consonant with their acting
and reacting to one another in real time” (388).
In other words, individuals in a shared social situation engage in “embodied practices”
(Eberle 290) of interaction and communication that sustain the social situation as “what it is,”
i.e., as something mutually recognizable as a shared situation by the participants involved, that
allows for intelligible action to take place. James Heap identifies the problematic of
ethnomethodology as considering how members of society “go about seeing, describing,
explaining” and “making visible” the “order in the world in which they live” (89). Harold
Garfinkel, ethnomethodology’s founding theorist, describes social structures as “an achieved
phenomenon of order” (6). The “phenomenon of order” that constitutes a structure does not exist
prior to its actual production through the actions of social participants, and ethnomethodology’s
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“standing technical preoccupation in its studies is to find, collect, specify, and make instructably
observable the local endogenous production and natural accountability of…society’s most
ordinary organizational things in the world” (6). The “objects” of analysis—i.e., social
structures—are identical with the methods employed by social actors that embody these
structures in concrete interaction (6-7). For “meaning”—i.e., shared structures—to exist in a
situation, participants must draw on already-shared “methods” to “make their actions observable,
tellable, reportable—or, in [Garfinkel’s] famous wording—‘accountable’ [that is, “able to be
account-ed of/for]” (Eberle 288). Thomas Eberle goes on to posit that from this view, “it is not
actors that produce actions but rather actions that produce actors…[Actors are] identities that are
constructed by situated actions.” “Membership”—i.e., recognition as a participant in a social
situation—is itself a method from which the order of a situation emerges, wherein other
participants deploy methods implicating acceptance of each other as members, and “a member is
who is accepted as a ‘member’ in interaction” (290).
Thus, ethnomethodology assumes an agency view of social participants. In opposition to
“methodological schemes…of imputing algorithms (normative procedures) for a rational
behavior that would determine the ways of performing life-world’s actions” (Genev 297),
ethnomethodology posits the establishment of order through actions that make structures
recognizable for participants. This does not deny that “blind obedience”—the following of
recognized social rules “without ratiocination”—does not occur, but rather, that such “blind
obedience” is itself a method by which structures are sustained in interaction. Unreflexive rulefollowing “does not preclude the ability of reflexivity,” and we cannot take any “existing order”
for granted, for the “immanent reflexivity” of participants, even if latent in a particular situation,
precludes researchers from “ignoring the power of re-ordering” possible at any time (Genev
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297). The always-relevant possibility of reordering in turn precludes application of standing
normative structures as a basis for interpreting situations. Instead, normativity, the “value” of
particular actions in everyday-life settings, is sustained through “participants’ own achievement”
and “is neither prior to nor secondary to the ‘causal world’ since it belongs to the ways whereby
practitioners make sense of their everyday settings” (281).
Produced normativity and order are ubiquitous. The raw, necessary fact of humans’
existence as entities in social relation implies that actors cannot not act, even when a person is
not in direct interaction with others. All behavior is action, and “action is intrinsically
meaningful, not because it is meaningful outside of any concrete situation, but because it is
always embedded in a concrete situation” (Peyrot 272. Unless identified otherwise, all emphasis
in quotes is per the original throughout this dissertation). Peyrot summarizes:
…everyday activities are the same as (“consist of” or “are identical with”) methods for
making those activities “analyze-able” and “account-able.” In other words, actions make
themselves accountable, a feature achieved by their participation in an organization of
activity. The “methods for making actions accountable” are the organizations of activity
which make their constituent actions accountable as meaningful particulars. The situatedly
accountable features of a particular action as a naturally occurring event result from its
participation in this endogenous organization. Actions are intrinsically meaningful because
they unavoidably participate in an organization of activity, not because there is an abstract,
decontexted meaning which they have independent of their occurrence (272).
This claim is not merely definitional, identifying as “actions” a subset of observable behaviors
that are situated with reference to an organization of activity, but goes much further and locates
all observable behavior as “action,” in that all observable behavior is necessarily situated in
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organizations of activity. Mark Peyrot describes ethnomethodology as neither an “objective” nor
“subjective” perspective, but instead a “relativistic” one (278). It is not subjective, for it does not
view meaning as the product of individual consciousness, but is also not objective, if this
“implies that the meaning or accountable features of actions exist independently of the organized
occasions of their occurance.” Instead, from the “relativistic” perspective of ethnomethodology,
“the features of an action are dependent on its relations with the other actions with which it
participates in a mutually constitutive organization of activity” (278).
Application of an ethnomethodological perspective to spontaneity denies a realist approach
wherein spontaneity is treated as a describable property of behavior or experience, with this
description then applicable to specific social interactions and/or reports of experience. Instead,
spontaneity per se has no reality outside of concrete social action that appeals to shared methods
of using “spontaneity” to describe, explain, recognize, and make visible (account-able) the
behavior of oneself and others. The “structures” of spontaneity recognized and deployed in
specific situations establish spontaneity as an “orderly” phenomenon, which is accomplished
through specific interactions, contingent upon those actions, and subject to change as interactions
progress or in different distinguishable settings. While subjective understandings of participants
may be implicated in processes of accomplishment, an ethnomethodology view is concerned
with the order established via action, i.e., observable behavior, and so methods of spontaneity are
directly accessible to research. Such research consists of discovering, collecting, and, through
description, specifying/making visible to others (potentially including the members participating
in the setting considered) the concrete behaviors by which social participants recognize,
interpret, and perform specific orders of spontaneity.
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This does not require that “spontaneity” be explicitly employed as an organizing principle by
observed participants. Spontaneity need not be “foregrounded” in behavior to be accessible to
research. Indeed, one challenging aspect of applying an ethnomethodological perspective to
spontaneity is that, in common shared enactments, explicit awareness of spontaneity makes
action recognized as “less” spontaneous. In such settings, successful accomplishment of
spontaneity demands a certain level of, at least, behaving as though participants do not recognize
themselves as spontaneous, responding to shared, background orders of spontaneity in the
manner of “blind obedience” described above. However, such “blind obedience,” in these cases
as in others, is itself a behavioral method of participant accomplishment. Researchers may
recognize and account of spontaneity in such cases via “breaching” experiments. A researcher
may hypothesize a shared structure of spontaneity emergent from a group’s interactions, and
visibly violate these expectations—for example, by acting in a way that is “clearly” not
spontaneous with respect to the hypothesized order, and then claiming it as spontaneous. The
hypothesis has merit if such a breach interrupts the ongoing flow of taken-for-granted practices
and induces a state of “bewilderment” in which participants are prevented from acting without
explicit accounting of their actions, often becoming “suspicious or angry, because the ‘other’
was no longer acting in accord with shared background expectancies and thus sensemaking and
trust were no longer possible” (Rawls 280-81).
An ethnomethodological account of spontaneity does not deny the relevance of “realist”
researches on the topic wherein a prior account of spontaneity is defined and applied to specific
situations; many examples of this approach are surveyed in Chapter Two below.
Ethnomethodology does not view such researches as unproductive or wrongheaded, but instead
would seek to enfold them within its own perspective, asking researchers employing such

11

approaches to recognize their research work as itself ongoing social action contributing to
practices of spontaneity in concrete settings. The settings involved certainly involve the practical
accomplishment of their own research and published accounts, and may also contribute to
ongoing development of practices of spontaneity in the settings they research (and/or other
settings) to the degree that such research accounts impact the practical methods of spontaneity
accomplishment in these settings. This impact may be direct (the “raw,” immediate impact of
research activity enfolded into the setting) or indirect (by participants having their own practices
and accounts affected by their exposure to products of research).
While not explicitly ethnomethodological, another aligned perspective productive in
theoretically grounding this view of spontaneity is Erving Goffman’s “dramaturgical”
perspective as expressed in The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life. This perspective views
social participants as engaged in making a certain definition of a situation evident to others
included in that situation, and sustaining this definition through their behavior. Various degrees
of success and failure are possible, with consequences for both, and social actors also have
practices for shifting situational definitions. Goffman himself uses the term “spontaneity”
throughout his monograph, with much of the same conceptual slipperiness described above. At
times it is treated as an objectively real quality of behavior (e.g., 50, 207, 216-17, 228);
elsewhere as a “feeling” or impression experienced by participants in or observers of interaction
(8, 200); still elsewhere as a real quality of behavior, but one that actors seek to make evident to
other participants (49, 197); and in other cases as mimesis, with social actors deploying
communicative codes meant to indicate “real” spontaneity, while recognizing themselves that
they are not acting spontaneously in any “real” sense (30, 32, 181).
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Despite this variety of uses, I believe Goffman’s framework offers a valuable toolbox for
considering spontaneity as a social practice. Asking how social actors “do” spontaneity (as
opposed to “be” spontaneous) makes Goffman’s distinction between “sincere” and “cynical”
social performances (18-21) irrelevant. Both actors who seek to dissemble a dishonest
spontaneity, and those who seek to make an honest spontaneity evident, will make use of the
same dramaturgical framework based on social understandings and communicative codes (6566). Goffman implicitly aligns spontaneity with the “ungovernable aspects” (7) of behavior—
what audience impressions treat as “involuntary expressive behavior” (2). However, I below
propose an example of a context—improvisational theatre—where spontaneity itself is
purposefully expressed and recognized/treated as such by audiences.
This shift offers focus within the cacophony of spontaneity’s conceptual deployment.
Spontaneity, rather than being treated as an overarching principle, happens in concrete social,
historical situations. Spontaneity takes on meaning contextually, in relation to frames of
reference of the individuals involved and their shared cultural practices. We overcome the
conceptual slipperiness of the broad view by rooting analysis of spontaneity in how participants
“do”—recognize, evaluate, and perform—spontaneity in a particular socio-historical milieu, a
discernable social group using spontaneity to organize their understandings and address their
concerns. The way they do spontaneity may well imply their treating it as a real, objective
property independent of the participants. Whether they are “correct” in this assessment is
irrelevant from a “do” perspective—the concern is about how they accomplish the maintenance
and deployment of what they treat as spontaneity.
In this dissertation, I offer an example of spontaneity considered from the perspective of how
it is accomplished. First, I apply it to a variety of extant scholarship in which authors make
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explicit use of spontaneity as a descriptive, interpretive, and/or evaluative concept, including
explicit analysis of the term for their purposes. This survey includes analyses of spontaneity
from religion, leisure studies, high-support-needs educational communication, psychology,
psychodrama, psychoanalysis, cognitive philosophy, and research on organizations. In each of
these divergent areas of research, I consider examples of literature making explicit conceptual
use of spontaneity with respect to its field. This overview reveals and brings into focus three
areas for productive consideration in assessing how spontaneity is “done” as a social practice:
(1) spontaneity as ideographic, (2) spontaneity as exemplified in narrative, and (3) critical
assessment of spontaneity as implicated in social power structures.
Second, I will apply these three areas to a cultural practice that explicitly aligns spontaneity
with the practice’s successful accomplishment: Improvisational theatre, or “improv” for short. I
will consider how participants in this practice do spontaneity through analysis of two sets of
artifacts. The first is a group of commonly-used improv method texts that offer interpretations of
spontaneity and practices purporting to increase successful accomplishment of it. The second is
a collection of narratives of spontaneity from improv performers who identify as affiliated with a
specific improvisational theatre organization that has developed over the last seventeen years.
The existing conceptual literature on spontaneity offers a number of examples of the concept
of spontaneity’s deployment as a value-laden or descriptive term. It is operationalized in a wide
variety of contexts, the literature for each of which usually does not cite or seem aware of the
others. In Chapter Two, I assess how these divergent fields apply the concept in different ways,
illuminating a set of questions that various deployments of spontaneity imply or address: Is it a
quality of behavior, or of experience, or of some relationship between the two? Is it binary—
either present or absent—or can it be divided into degrees of greater/lesser? If divisible, can it be
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quantified? What is the relationship between spontaneity and non-spontaneity? What behaviors
and/or experiences are indicative of greater or lesser spontaneity? Is spontaneity treated as
simply descriptive, or is it a normatively positive quality? If positive, is it a potentiality, a
productive force, or a valued end in itself? Can it be increased in frequency and/or intensity in
an individual or group? Why would it be valuable to increase it? If it can be increased, how? Is
it always desirable, or only valuable in certain contexts? What makes a context more or less
appropriate? Are greater and lesser degrees of spontaneity due to inherent subject
characteristics, learned behavior patterns, or environmental/relationship characteristics? Is there
a distinction between individual and social spontaneity, and if so, what is the relationship
between them? How is it identified and recognized in individuals and groups?
In the sometimes quite complicated sets of answers and emphases this variety of
operationalizations gives to these questions, we see some of the many ways that the various
senses of spontaneity can be deployed in productive tension as an interpretive and often valueladen concept. These questions mark the primary dimensions along which spontaneity can be
employed and assessed as an “ideograph” in social practice. Michael Calvin McGee defines an
ideograph as:
an ordinary language term found in political discourse. It is a high-order abstraction
representing collective commitment to a particular but equivocal and ill-defined normative
goal. It warrants the use of power, excuses behavior and belief which might otherwise be
perceived as eccentric or antisocial, and guides behavior and belief into channels easily
recognized by a community as acceptable and laudable…Ideographs are culture-bound,
though some terms are used in different signification across cultures. Each member of the
community is socialized, conditioned, to the vocabulary of ideographs as a prerequisite for
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“belonging” to the society. A degree of tolerance is usual, but people are expected to
understand ideographs within a range of usage thought to be acceptable: The society will
inflict penalties on those who use ideographs in heretical ways and on those who refuse to
respond appropriately to claims on their behavior warranted through the agency of
ideographs. (15-16)
While differing greatly in particular use, the ideographic relevance of spontaneity is clear
across the various research contexts considered in Chapter Two. While not “political” in a
traditional sense, the concept “spontaneity” is used in many social settings to organize and
enforce behavior: religious belief and practices, teaching activity, therapeutic methods,
relationships within organizations—all areas where substantial differentials of role and power
influence interactions. Speaking in tongues and psychodrama techniques might certainly be
considered antisocial in other settings, but are justified through their conceptual labeling as
“spontaneous.” Members of cultures where spontaneity serves ideographically learn to
recognize and respond to social deployments of the concept. And while I see no clear examples
of sanctioning against inappropriate applications of the concept of spontaneity, the settings
considered in Chapter Two abound with rewarding members for accepted enactments of
spontaneity, through encouragement and social inclusion and recognition.
Another significant theme in analyses of spontaneity is illustration through narrative or
exemplary accounts of instances of enacted spontaneity. These can be accounts of experiencing
spontaneity oneself or of recognizing it in others' behavior or experience. These concrete
instances can inform researchers' analyses of spontaneity, or can result from the imposition of a
spontaneity concept upon behavior or experience. In either case, narratives and examples help
make clear what the writers mean by spontaneity or the lack thereof as they conduct their
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assessments. The concretions of experience or behavior described operate metonymically,
providing ideal or paradigmatic instances of the writers' concepts of spontaneity or
aspects/components of them. Most of the perspectives considered in Chapter Two make use of
this exemplary/narrative device. Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi offers narratives of persons who
manage to accomplish spontaneous “flow” experience in even the most constrained
circumstances, such as concentration camp prisoners and persons with highly mobility-limiting
physical disabilities. Hsu-Min Chiang and Mark Carter use examples of an autistic student
asking for cookies in various circumstances to illustrate different “levels” of spontaneity in an
operationalization they analyze (696). Daniel Wiener gives examples of both “good” and
“deficient” improvisation by clients in exercises used for assessment of interpersonal functioning
(60-65), while psychoanalyst Philip Ringstrom (2001a) narrates an account of his own
improvisational behaviors leading to breakthrough moments in interaction with a patient (730,
740-41). Several studies of organizational improvisation are based on detailed case studies of
corporate teams’ discoveries “in the moment” of how to accomplish projected goals (e.g., Pina e
Cunha, Kamoche and Campos e Cunha; Pinnington, Morris and Pinnington; Viera da Cunha,
Kamoche, and Pina e Cunha).
A third significant theme I would like to consider in assessing operationalizations of
spontaneity is a critical perspective. This theme is not purposefully deployed for the most part in
research literature, but is certainly in the background of many cases, with asymmetrical power
relations, and valuations of spontaneity influencing valuation of practices. A critical perspective
on operationalizations of spontaneity would address issues about questions such as: Whose
perspective on spontaneity gets to be enforced in relationships, and how is it enforceable? How
do concepts of spontaneity intersect with individuals’ concepts of identity and group
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membership? What groups, persons, and actions does this intersection privilege or suppress, and
how? How does the interpretation of behaviors as being genuinely and/or appropriately
spontaneous affect the valuation of those behaviors, and how do these interpretive practices (and
who applies them) impact power relations within and among groups? What social practices and
organizations are related to cultures' “spontaneity heuristics,” and how do these social features
act to allow or deny access of individuals and groups to recognized effective performances of
spontaneity?
While the examples considered in Chapter Two rarely explicitly addresses questions like
these, they can be applied to examples of deployments of spontaneity to better understand how
“spontaneity” acts as power in these settings. Among high-support-needs students (Carter 2002,
2003a and b; Chiang and Carter) and psychodrama participants (Kipper and Hundal, Kipper and
Ritchie, Meares), clear asymmetric power relationships are inherent in the interactions involved,
with educators and therapists regulating and policing “genuine” and “appropriate” enactments of
spontaneity by individuals already marked as deficient in this valued quality of behavior.
Participants in religious cultures where spontaneity is recognized as a relevant quality for praised
and/or accepted practice are in a situation where expression of spirituality is channeled into
sanctioned behaviors by members and authorities of their communities (e.g, Bland, Mahmood).
If spontaneity is deployed as a valued principle in an organization, the hierarchy already in place
will no doubt be involved in encouraging and sanctioning members’ interpretations and
enactments of that principle according to what is perceived as being in the interest of the
organization’s (and its backers’) intended accomplishments (consider George and Brief; George
and Jones; Pinnington, Morris and Pinnington). I do not seek here to analyze these cases in
depth, only to point out that a critical view in these cases deepens our understanding of the
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normative functions of spontaneity, going beyond the cultural understanding of the concept to
address how this understanding organizes and impacts power relations within that culture. This
is a third significant perspective in examining social concepts and enactments of spontaneity.
In Chapters Three, Four and Five, I will apply these three perspectives—
analytic/ideographic, narrative, and critical—to spontaneity in the social practice of
improvisational theatre. Improvisational theatre, informally “improv,” is a performance
method/genre wherein performers enact a theatrical-style performance without prior preparation
of specific content. As a broad artistic practice, improv covers a vast array of performance types,
but I will be primarily considering a particular tradition associated with performing to entertain
an audience. This style is often comedy-focused and usually utilizes some form of rules or
structures to organize and orient the generated content. It also generally hails from particular
traditions of improv performance emerging from passed-down and experimented-with practices
and principles usually traced back to teachers Viola Spolin and Keith Johnstone.
This tradition provides a rich ground for assessing spontaneity as a social practice because
spontaneity is explicitly a key element of accomplishing successful improv. Training methods
specifically aim to increase spontaneity in performers, and spontaneity is purposefully deployed
as an organizing value in methodology writings. In the contexts considered in Chapter Two,
spontaneity is usually in the background of the actual social activity the writers consider. With
the obvious exception of psychodrama, those involved are not explicitly seeking to generate
spontaneity as such; rather, they seek some benefits and believe that spontaneity will facilitate
attaining them, or else spontaneity is a concept imposed by the researchers as an interpretation of
certain actions or patterns of behavior. Even psychodrama, while explicitly seeking to generate
spontaneity, focuses its methods on therapeutic practices for persons treated as having low
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capacities for spontaneity, and as such is more corrective than expressive. In contrast, the fullthroated expression of spontaneity is central to improv. Performers and audiences of course
want more than only spontaneity; both also want a show they enjoy, with high-quality
performance skills and compelling content. But this is not enough by itself; the show must also
be spontaneous. This is part of the promise of improv, and a cast that performs a skillful,
compelling show, but one that is not “spontaneous,” has failed or cheated themselves, and
disappointed or defrauded their audience. Improv is a social practice where the generation of
spontaneity is integral to the capacity to successfully accomplish the practice at all, not merely an
effective means to other desired ends. As such, it ought to offer a much starker example of
“spontaneity” deployed in social performance and interpretation than in settings where it is a
smaller and more backgrounded part of the picture.
Chapters Three through Five apply the three perspectives identified above to appropriate
concrete artifacts of improv practice. For the analytic/ideographic perspective, in Chapter Three
I will undertake a deep analysis of the use and deployment of the term/concept “spontaneity”
across a variety of improv methodology texts, written as aids to teaching effective improv for
performers, beginners to veterans, aiming to become more skillful in this craft. In Chapter Four I
will apply a critical perspective to these same texts. For the narrative perspective, in Chapter
Five I will analyze performers' self-reports of experiencing or observing spontaneity in their own
practice as performers. Within this assessment, I shall also address a critical perspective where
appropriate, attempting to make explicit various ways that spontaneity is tacitly implicated in
power structures and relationships among improv practitioners. I choose to concentrate on these
two artifact sets because the methodology texts offer a concrete body of work detailing
spontaneity theory on a broad scale, shared by the collegial community of improv practitioners at
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large, while the narratives will offer concrete perspective on spontaneity theory as understood
and enacted by a smaller improv community with its own distinct history and direct connections
between practitioners.
In Chapters Three and Four, I focus on improv method and theory texts that make explicit
use of the term “spontaneity” in their programs of training and aesthetics. I will assess their uses
of the term in relation to the ideographic and analytical questions identified above. I will also
seek to account for differences and relationships between various uses of “spontaneity” in
improv theory, considering influences from past use and application on successive texts as
improv practices have proceeded historically, as well as how those practices influenced and were
influenced by prevailing theories of spontaneity as they developed. The founding texts of both
Viola Spolin, in Improvisation for the Theatre, and Keith Johnstone, in Impro: Improvisation
and the Theatre, devote extensive sections to spontaneity. Later texts making conceptual use of
spontaneity include Johnstone's Impro for Storytellers, and the longform theory text Truth in
Comedy: The Manual of Improvisation (Halpern, Close and Johnson). More recent texts
continuing this methodological tradition include Mick Napier's Improvise: Scene from the Inside
Out and Carol Hazenfield's Acting on Impulse: The Art of Making Improv Theatre, and most
recently The Improv Handbook (Salinsky and Frances-White) and Process: An Improvisor's
Journey (Scruggs and Gellman).
A number of other improv texts exist, but this set will ground my examination of improv's
concepts of spontaneity. All are highly popular in the improv community; any improvier who
has studied theory has likely been influenced by one or more of this set of texts. All are texts
that offer a broad-based philosophy of improvisational theatre as opposed to simply listing or
presenting various improv “games” or training exercises, like Abbott, Fox, or Gwinn. While the
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examples of improv practices collected in such volumes can provide valuable additional
illustration to an examination of spontaneity, they do not address spontaneity as an
improvisational principle explicitly or in detail; instead, it is backgrounded to the descriptions of
practices, and if mentioned at all, is assumed to be transparent in meaning to the reader. These
eight central texts also largely focus on improv as a “performance product in and of itself”
(Napier 1) rather than developing their theory with an eye toward applying improv skills and
practices to other areas—especially common in improv books for scripted theatre performers
(e.g., Atkins, Cassady, Diggles) and business professionals (e.g., Gee and Gee, Hough, or
Koppett).
They also represent a somewhat parallel structure of both major “threads” of the
development of improv methodology. The development of improv work descending from the
respective early practices of Spolin and Johnstone intersects greatly, and the two traditions have
borrowed from each other extensively in both theory and practice. Nonetheless, later writers on
improv methodology tend to identify strongly with one or the other of these traditions, explicitly,
or by dint of emphasizing examples from one line of descent. These later writers were also
influenced through the process by which improv is learned almost entirely in a gradual turnover
with later performers learning directly from working with earlier ones, and so on, with explicit
textual methodology emerging only long after the establishment of practices. After the founding
works, Impro for Storytellers and Truth in Comedy, both coming out in the 1990's, emerged from
the Johnstone and Spolin traditions, respectively. In the mid 2000's, Improvise came from a
Spolinesque (sometimes called “Chicago”) tradition, while Acting on Impulse aligns itself with
Johnstonian practices; the same is true with Process (with Spolin) and The Improvisor's
Handbook (with Johnstone) in the late 2000's. The “other” improv tradition is almost never
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treated antagonistically, but is overwhelmingly backgrounded or elided. So with this set of texts,
we get roughly historically-parallel examples of two closely-related performance traditions, but
with each having a strong identification as distinct in its association with its “lineage”.
Chapters Three and Four offer an in-depth analysis of the explicit deployment of
“spontaneity” as theory in the improv community's shared principle method texts. As a
counterpoint to this textual analysis, and complementing it, in Chapter Five I consider examples
of concrete narratives of spontaneity offered by members of a specific self-identified improv
community, with its own traditions of practice, identity, and value (though certainly influenced
in no small way by formal improv methodology). These narratives will come from members of
an improv organization founded in 1998, in which I have performed and directed since 1999.
Cult of the Stage Monkey (COSM) was founded in Lafayette, LA. Members of this original
ensemble later formed other ensembles deriving their name from, and identifying with the
community of the original; in order of founding these other ensembles were in Hattiesburg, MS;
Chicago, IL; Washington, DC; Carbondale, IL; and San Diego, CA.
This organization provides a valuable ground for consideration of spontaneity in an improv
community for several reasons. COSM consists of a large number of individuals with greatly
variant experience with the group, but is small enough and has emerged recently enough that
members have a largely personal sense of themselves as a community. Significant divisions in
interaction among members are present, especially between the geographic branches, but all
members have a general sense of themselves as participating in a larger community (which is
also reinforced through practices such as occasional national conferences). It also provides a
parallel example, on a smaller scale, of the longer traditions relating to Spolin and Johnstone
from which formal improv methodology largely emerged: Early COSM members had little
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knowledge of improv practices, and developed their form experimentally while only later
influenced by theory. Finally, on the practical level, my own longtime experience with the group
will facilitate access to participants and sometimes allow me to fill in relevant information or
context derived from my own work with COSM. A narrative approach to the meaning of
“spontaneity” for COSM will counterpoint the treatment it receives in formal method texts, by
providing an example of a community that makes use of spontaneity as a social practice, but has
not codified the concept in formal social artifacts of methodology or aesthetics.
To collect these narratives, I contacted members of COSM directly or through social media
and request volunteers to proffer examples of their own experiences or observations of
spontaneity in their performance work with the organization. Volunteers were given the option
of offering narratives in writing, or through an audiorecorded personal or telephone interview.
The guiding questions and a statement of focus for the interview were submitted to participants
in advance. The guiding questions of these interviews are:
1.) Can you share a story or example of a time when you felt especially spontaneous when
performing improv with Cult of the Stage Monkey?
2.) Can you share a story or example of a time when you observed performance by other
members of COSM that seemed especially spontaneous to you?
3.) Can you share a story or example of a time you felt especially non-spontaneous when
performing improv with COSM, or observed a performance by other members that
seemed especially non-spontaneous to you?
4.) Can you share a story or examples of COSM ensemble practices that you believe
especially encouraged spontaneity in yourself or other members?
5.) Can you share a story or examples of COSM ensemble practices that you believe
especially inhibited spontaneity in yourself or other members?
6.) Can you can you share a story or examples of relationship dynamics and interpersonal
behaviors among members of the ensemble that you believe especially encouraged
spontaneity in yourself or other members?
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7.) Can you share a story or examples of relationship dynamics and interpersonal behaviors
among members of the ensemble that you believe especially inhibited spontaneity in
yourself or other members?

Participants may answer any or all questions, as they like. I will be glad to expound upon or
clarify questions as requested. However, I will not provide my own examples of spontaneity as a
way of explaining “how” a participant might effectively answer a question—the whole point is to
see what spontaneity “means,” as expressed through narrative, to the participants, without my
imposing a prior concept of what I am “looking for” when I ask about spontaneity. When it
appears it may be productive, I will follow up on narratives and examples offered in response
with additional questions to glean more detail or to expand or clarify background and context,
and explore reasoning about “why” described experiences or observations are viewed as enacting
spontaneity. I believe this set of questions adequately covers the range of issues addressed by
ideographic operationalizations of spontaneity, as discussed above.
In comparing these narratives, I will look for “themes” of spontaneity along the following
lines: What characteristics do performers associate with spontaneity? Are there divergent
examples among narratives, and if so, how can it fit into a larger “social milieu” of spontaneity
in this organization? What sorts of action or behavior are contrasted as especially nonspontaneous, and how do they relate to high spontaneity? What similarities and contestations
can be found among interpretations of spontaneity-encouraging or -inhibiting practices and
relationships? Do reported themes of spontaneity differ along lines of work with different
branches of the organization, historical period of membership, or roles in the organization—and
if so, what might account for it? All these questions boil down to a vague but encompassing
overall question guiding inquiry into these narratives: “How do members of this group USE
spontaneity to interpret and enact accomplishment of their craft?”
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The two artifact sets of Chapters Three through Five give examples of operationalization and
deployment of spontaneity in a concrete context, making them amenable to critical consideration.
Where it appears relevant, I will assess these examples with an eye toward how spontaneity is
implicated in power relationships. How is “spontaneity” recognized, indoctrinated, and
enforced? How is it used to privilege or suppress various improv practices? How does
enactment of spontaneity affect individual members’ capacities to perform “good” or
“acceptable” improv? Along what lines is spontaneity contested, and how do participants contest
it? I will apply these questions to the methodological ideography of spontaneity with relation to
the historical record, and to reports from COSM participants about how they perceive practices
and relationships to have encouraged or inhibited spontaneity.
“Spontaneity” in general use is a broad and slippery concept, difficult to define from its
various uses in such a way that it can be analyzed and studied without artificially imposing a
prior account of spontaneity onto the analysis that privileges some uses and elides others.
However, this difficulty can be overcome by narrowing the issue to analysis of spontaneity in
concrete social settings, to see how this slippery concept is actually deployed by social actors
invested in its use. Doing so, we can identify three significant aspects in spontaneity’s use as an
organizing social principle. The first is analytic/ideographic, a way for members of a social
group to (often implicitly) make the vague concept of spontaneity coherent and approach a
unified and shared (if to some degree contested) meaning. The second is narrative/exemplary:
accounts of concrete recognized instances of spontaneity (or lack thereof) as a way of grasping
the meaning of the concept, and expressing or explaining that meaning to others. The third is a
critical perspective, which considers how the use of spontaneity in a concrete setting acts as a
practice for organizing power—to enable/encourage or suppress certain actions, attitudes, or
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behaviors by persons participating in that setting, or to facilitate or restrict access of persons to
that setting, or their acceptance in it. I will apply these perspectives to the social practice of
improvisational theatre, both in the abstract through its methodology texts and the concrete
through accounts of spontaneity’s use by members of a particular improv organization. This
project will support a deeper understanding of spontaneity, by shifting its analysis from a broad,
general conceptual use to consideration of particular use by members of a culture where it is
valued and considered essential to the successful accomplishment of practices in that culture.
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CHAPTER 2
MANY SPONTANEITIES

In this chapter, I analyze and compare existing conceptual literature on spontaneity in order
to identify the issues addressed, and the techniques for doing so, by researchers who have
undertaken such a project in their fields. This approach, at first glance, may seem at odds with
an ethnomethodological account of spontaneity. Harold Garfinkel states in no uncertain terms
that “EM is not in the business of interpreting signs. It is not an interpretive enterprise. Enacted
local practices are not texts which symbolize ‘meanings’ or events. They are in detail identical
with themselves, and…[in these witnessable details] constitute their own reality. They are
studied in their unmediated details and not as signed enterprises” (8). Examining existing
conceptual literature would seem to lead away from an ethnomethodological direction, as such
scholarly production is all-but-necessarily “in the business of interpreting signs.” Whether the
research defines and imposes a concept of spontaneity on observed phenomena, or goes the
opposite direction—developing a definition of spontaneity from observations or examples of its
use—it nonetheless treats behavior as a sign of spontaneity. If we accept this view of
ethnomethodology, it would seem that assessing existing analyses of spontaneity is a
distraction—an ethnomethodological account would call for beginning with grounded
observations of concrete behavior in a setting where members make explicit use of the term, or
practices that the group recognizes as associated with the term.
However, I would argue that making such a hard division is problematic, and that the
literature review that follows constitutes a useful initial approach to understanding spontaneity
from an ethnomethodological view. First, practices of producing analytic research partake in the
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concrete settings toward which they are oriented or from which they are derived. The actual
published research is an artifact produced in relation with concrete social activity. The very fact
that researchers choose to explicitly analyze “spontaneity” for their purposes is indicative that
spontaneity is recognized as a relevant produced order of phenomena by participants involved in
the activities the researchers address. The actual observed behavior is in the past, and cannot be
accessed directly, but analyses yet stand as artifacts of examples of concrete social action
wherein spontaneity is relevant to participants’ shared understanding. At minimum, researchers’
own use of “spontaneity” as a target of analysis shows that it is an organizing principle
recognized by researchers as relevant to their own participation in the settings they consider.
Second, even to the extent that we treat such analytical literature as simply imposing prior
concepts of spontaneity upon behavior, the practices implicated in such literature are themselves
relevant to accounting for spontaneity as a social practice. The production and publication of
research is itself embodied, real-time behavior by participants in concrete social settings, though
the social action involved often plays out slowly over months or years. The behavior of
producing conceptual analyses of spontaneity is in itself a clear example of concrete social action
in which spontaneity is explicitly implicated as a method of understanding or making
recognizable. That is exactly what the researchers are explicitly seeking to accomplish through
this behavior. The body of work below may be approached ethnomethodologically by viewing it
through the lens of the question “how do conceptual analysts of spontaneity do their analytic
behavior?” Much, of course, is elided by the artifact of the publication; on the other hand, access
to such artifacts offer some concrete remnant of spontaneity-implicating behavior otherwise lost
to the past. Moreover, it seems reasonable to assume that these publications were intended to
influence the spontaneity-implicating practices of those who encountered them. To the extent

29

that readers actually reacted to their encounter with the literatures, and the relevant ripple effect
of these responses on others, the publication artifacts remain implicated in real-time interactions
that draw on methods of spontaneity.
James Heap supports this view in his account of descriptive validity in ethnomethodology.
He describes ethnomethodology’s “task” as “description of possible properties of courses of
reasoning and action in society” (87). Any actual example of reasoning or action is a possible
example, and falls within the scope of ethnomethodology (99). One problem with describing
“action” is the indexicality (context-dependence) of behavior—specific, “literally describable”
behaviors are dependent for “meaning” on their context. A second problem is reflexivity. For
behavior to constitute “action” requires that participants to some extent experience themselves as
“doing something,” i.e., engaging in a (however tacitly) projected accomplishment. This
experience is by definition inaccessible to the observer, who is dependent on context to account
for “action”—and that context is in part produced by participants’ inaccessible reflexive
understandings (88-89). The upshot for my purposes is Heap’s stipulation that description in
ethnomethodology is “always being oriented to or through materials…observable things” that are
“audio/visually available” and “can be read, seen, and/or heard again” (91), and that “the test of
correctness or adequacy of description requires orienting to or through materials” (100). I refer
collectively to such materials as “texts.” Conceptual analysis of spontaneity texts are, like other
forms of account-ing, “irremediably tied for their sensibility and coherence to the social settings
that occasion them or within which they are situated, for they are, in innumerable ways, part of
the very settings they describe” (89).
Heap greatly troubles the distinction between literal and interpretive description, but allows
for a “principled distinction” whereby interpretive description means that “in describing some
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action, reference is made to the actor’s self-understanding of his/her action” (93). Selfunderstanding can be brought into the realm of the “literal” by keeping in mind the constraints of
language and signs in making behavior recognizable “as something,” i.e., as implicating
“meaning.” The conventions of signs and language offer “a range of possible interpretations of
an action,” a range that is “indefinite, but not infinite.” Heap argues that “the criterial status of
self-understanding is a permit to mean some particular thing or set of things, in and by an action,
within the range of possible ‘meanings’ constituted in and by language. The fact that observers
can share that language provides the possibility that they can warrant their interpretive
descriptions as adequate, i.e., as describing one of the possibilities” (94). That the shared
language of, at minimum, the research writers and their peer-reviewers allows for the shared
recognition of conceptual analyses of spontaneity as such indicates that these participants are
warranted in treating these analyses as possible valid descriptions of spontaneity.
Crudely speaking, behavior can be literally described, whereas “action” can only be
interpretively described. What we can do, however, is offer literal description of behavior that
involves interpretation on the part of the actor—which is exactly what conceptual analyses
exemplify. A conceptual analysis is recognizable as such in part by virtue of the constraints of
language that necessitate the implication of interpretive behaviors in the production of
conceptual analysis. The above considerations allow for viewing conceptual analysis texts on
spontaneity as falling within the scope of ethnomethodology, heeding Garfinkel’s warning that
“EM…is not an interpretive enterprise” (8).
My method for assembling this particular set of research artifacts was straightforward. In
addition to a small set of sources with which I was already familiar, I simply did a broad search
for the term “spontaneity” among peer-reviewed sources in Academic Search Premiere and
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Project Muse. Separately, I also searched the term “improvisation” in these databases and
included non-duplicated results from this search term in my pool of potential textual artifacts.
While the two terms diverge somewhat, as in uses of “improvisation” that emphasize a “making
do” within limited possibilities, it is very common for “improvisation” to refer to behavior that is
understood as spontaneous to some extent. It also seems appropriate to include this search term
because the terminology of “spontaneity” and “improvisation” does so clearly overlap in the case
of improvisational theatre, my primary field of consideration in Chapters Three to Five below.
The great majority of results were examples where the respective terms were backgrounded,
or where their meanings were treated as transparent and left unanalyzed. However, a number of
disciplines included examples of research featuring explicit analysis of spontaneity and/or
improvisation. Some of these examples propose definitions of spontaneity, while others seek to
refine the concept with respect to related terms and concepts, and still others identify it as a
feature of particular social settings and seek to describe it in those settings, or bring attention to
its relevance. There is great variety, but all share the common feature of deliberate, explicit
analysis of spontaneity and/or improvisation as used and/or usable concepts.
Overwhelmingly, these various subject areas do not appear to be in dialogue with each other;
they do not cite each other and generally seem to have developed their accounts of spontaneity
without influence by other disciplinary areas that take up the subject. This is sometimes true
within disciplinary areas as well. This allows for a certain ability to treat each disciplinary area
discretely, as a specific example of the operationalization of spontaneity, rather than treating
them as a collective “pool” of shared-but-divergent examples of spontaneity. Individual areas
will of course be influenced by “shared” cultural understandings of spontaneity in the “broader
cultural milieu” that encompasses all these examples. However, this relative discreteness of
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disciplinary areas offers an opportunity to better understand concrete applications of
“spontaneity,” showing how researchers in distinct disciplinary settings make use of the
term/concept to address specific questions and concerns relevant to the discipline.
In the following, I assess examples of such operationalizing research on spontaneity in
approximately eight distinct areas. Considering religious studies, I address examples of
spontaneity as a normative property of behavior. This is contrasted with leisure studies, which is
more concerned with spontaneity as a property of experience. I then turn toward more specific
operationalizations of spontaneity, beginning with an account of “communicative spontaneity” as
a desired end for high-support-needs students, who are interpellated as deficient in this desired
behavioral form. In contrast, I then examine psychological testing efforts to develop a
corroborable account of “normal” spontaneity across the general population. This is followed
by analyses of the role and concept of spontaneity in two psychological-therapeutic practices,
psychodrama and psychoanalysis. I then consider the conceptual concerns addressed by
cognitive philosophy regarding spontaneity as a feature of “thought.” Using behavioral
psychology research on random number choice, I then connect spontaneity for this “cognitive
self” with spontaneity as a socio-cultural practice, the social performance of a “spontaneity
heuristic.” Finally, I consider examples of “social spontaneity” wherein spontaneity is described
or analyzed specifically with reference to groups or organizations. Moving through these
different areas, I identify the specific issues explicitly or implicitly addressed by the research
strategy of operationalizing spontaneity, illuminating connections and divergences among these
various operationalizations. In my conclusion, I summarize the various issues that researchers
may seek to resolve though the practice of operationalizing spontaneity.
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Spontaneity as Action
“Action” in these cases implies an agent, some will-ing being; “spontaneity” can be a
property of that agent’s acts. “Event,” in contrast, implies some sort of non-agential action. The
distinction is particularly significant in that spontaneity with respect to acts has a normative
dimension not present in the “spontaneity” of events. When connected to an agent, spontaneity
can be a quality that creates inherent value in action, while when connected with events it has no
inherent normative value, but is rather a descriptive property which may inhere in the event itself
or in interpretations of it. The various possible senses of spontaneity I consider will quickly
trouble this distinction, but it provides a useful starting point for examining them.
Philip Ivanhoe distinguishes between three senses of normative spontaneity. Actions
representative of the first, “untutored” spontaneity, "must arise more from basic instincts and
inclinations than any sort of training or reflection....Actions that display this quality...are thought
to be motivated by deep, standing, innate dispositions” (4). Associating it with Daoist thought,
Ivanhoe also (23) equates this form of spontaneity with a western sense, "proceeding 'entirely
from natural impulse',” (1). This sort of spontaneity is called for in such invitations as “just act
natural,” or “just be yourself.”
Acts in Ivanhoe's second category, cultivated spontaneity, "seem to flow or erupt out of the
agent...with all the ease, confidence, peace, and comfort that is claimed for cases of untutored
spontaneity” (8), but in fact arise "out of a sustained course of training” (9), becoming a sort of
acquired “second nature” (8). Such acts, associated by Ivanhoe with Confucianist notions of
spontaneity can be the course of conscious, deliberate training—the chef who can make breakfast
without a second thought, the jazz musician who, after years of training, can “spontaneously”
create new, original music on the spot. These acts can also represent subconscious enculturation;
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while there may be nothing inherently “natural” about certain ways of behaving, our immersive
experience with the patterns of our own endogenous culture tends to lead members to act
“spontaneously” (in the cultivated sense) in accordance with impliedly appropriate behavior
patterns. An example would be the automatic tendency in most cultures, ceteris parebis, to
return a greeting upon being greeted (c.f. Heritage 106-8). We invoke this sense of spontaneity
in such cases as encouraging another or oneself with, “c’mon, you know how to do this.”
Ivanhoe identifies a third sense especially with Western thought. I here refer to it as
“unconstrained” spontaneity, and it occurs “when we have the freedom to exercise and follow
our will” (23); acts are spontaneous in this sense to the degree that they are done without
necessity, constraint, or coercion. This is the sense ascribed to acts that are considered
“spontaneous” in that they are done in a spirit of play, leisure, or creativity.
These three normative senses have in common that "all of them hold that spontaneity
involves the absence of constraint or coercion and that it represents an important human good”
(25). However, the form of constraint or coercion differs with respect to each sense. For
untutored spontaneity, enculturation and other enforced tendencies of behavior contrary to the
fundamental impulses of one’s “true” being represent the constraint to be overcome. It is nearly
the opposite for cultivated spontaneity; in this case, inadequate experience, learning, or
enculturation represents the obstacle to spontaneous behavior. In the case of unconstrained
spontaneity, it is precisely the overcoming or negation of some constraining influence upon our
will that makes the action spontaneous as such.
For all three senses, spontaneity has significant extrinsic value for promoting effective and/or
aesthetic action, but in all senses also appears to have significant intrinsic value regardless of the
action’s results. Ivanhoe offers as evidence of this last point that we tend to appreciate “even
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foul things that are done in a skillful and spontaneous manner. For even as we consciously reject
such actions, we are drawn to the fluid ease and comfort with which they are performed” (20).
This is one reason people may admire talented, effective villains—though despising what they
do, we appreciate a person who can accomplish challenging acts well and easily.
Note, however, another similarity across all these senses: In all cases, spontaneity is worked
towards, something one makes efforts to accomplish. Ivanhoe describes how Daoist
practitioners must “go back” to a state where untutored spontaneity is possible through a long
process of shedding enculturated ways of behaving (5). One must exert effort to remove the
various possible obstacles preventing acts of unconstrained spontaneity, and one must undergo a
course of training and experience to be able to exhibit cultivated spontaneity. In no case does
spontaneity “just happen”—it always comes to be as the result of some accomplished process.
One might argue an exception in those acts of cultivated spontaneity made possible through
unconscious enculturation. However, in keeping with my ethnomethodological view, I would
argue that learning to act in accordance with social behavior patterns without explicitly
recognizing them as such is itself the result of sustained engagement in social interaction, and
however unconscious, the learning is a practical accomplishment.
These points are paralleled by thought on the normative relevance of spontaneity in other
religious traditions as well. Edith Scholl, surveying the use of the term in Christian thought,
identifies it as a sort of extraordinary “willingness” whose “opposites are necessity, necessitas,
and compulsion, invitus” (41), the exercise of which involves the possibility of making “wrong”
choices (42). While sin undermines the possibility for freedom in willing beings, giving oneself
up to conversion “may be looked upon as beginning a process of regaining our original
spontaneity” (44). Supplication of one’s will to the will of the divine might hardly sound like
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“freedom;” but Ivanhoe too describes both untutored and cultivated spontaneities as involving “a
sense of giving oneself up to or ‘losing oneself’…being guided and carried along the proper path
by forces greater than oneself” (16). The Christian tradition Scholl identifies intertwines
elements of untutored and unconstrained spontaneity, a freely-undertaken process to regain an
essential, “original” spontaneity.
The importance of spontaneity in a more concrete Christian setting is assessed by Dave
Bland, considering the practices of one charismatic church with roots in Pentecostal traditions.
In this community, enactment of “spontaneity” is considered an essential component of the
services and group members’ participation in them. Spontaneity “stands in opposition to form
and ritual” and is treated as the characteristic “most indicative of a person’s sincerity” (8).
Innovative expression and emotional expression is privileged as indicative of spontaneity, in
contrast to prepared expression—“that which springs forth from the lips at the spur of the
moment is a more genuine expression of the heart than that which is planned in advance” (9).
One practice especially associated with spontaneous expression is “speaking in tongues,”
paralinguistic expression that uses syllabic components of language; though not corresponding to
any language, it “has meaning for the speaker…in the area of emotions” and signifies change,
connection to God, joy and praise, and group distinction and cohesion (7-8). In this group, we
see spontaneity expressed by certain conventional behaviors as conveying sincerity, with
emotional expression opposed to ritualistic or planned action. Some ethnographic researchers
see these expressions as themselves learned and instructed, and would consider them a form of
cultivated spontaneity (6). The community’s own account reads the phenomenon as more
associated with untutored spontaneity, the product of giving oneself up to a higher power, a more
natural way of being that expresses a more genuine self than is expressed through deliberated or
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ritual behavior (7). Interestingly, Helen Berger documents a similar approach to the valuation of
spontaneity in group ritual among Witch and Neo-Pagan groups, which especially contrast
central bureaucracy and orthodoxy against the valued creativity and spontaneity in individual
group creation of ritual (55). Representatives of these groups also express concerns about
gradual deterioration of spontaneity as traditions are developed and formalized, and taught in that
form to children and new members (60-61).
Saba Mahmood argues that the experience of purposefully induced “spontaneous emotion” in
prayer for Muslim women “simultaneously problematizes the ‘naturalness’ of emotions as well
as the ‘conventionality’ of ritual action, calling into question any a priori distinction between
formal (conventional) behavior and spontaneous (intentional) conduct (828).” Mahmood’s
accounts include practices by which women purposefully develop appropriate desires to
consistently pray “through the performance of seemingly unrelated deeds during the day” (831).
One must constantly renew these practices of ethical formation, for acting virtuously calls not
only for right action but also the right attitude and intention (838); maintenance of these attitudes
calls for vigilant “performances of conventional behavior that are aimed at the development and
formation of the self’s spontaneous and effortless expressions” (844). In this account, we see
inseparable elements of both untutored and cultivated spontaneity—conventional practice is
needed to access natural, fundamental emotional expression.
In addition to these three normative senses of spontaneity, we might add a fourth nonnormative sense of spontaneity in action, corresponding simply to “unpredictability” of behavior.
It may be more appropriate to treat this sense as a form of spontaneity in events rather than acts;
events may involve actor-like figures such as people, but the spontaneity in them “just happens.”
It is there not by virtue of coming to be via some process; rather, such events are called

38

“spontaneous” because their observers have inadequate understanding of the process by which
the event came to be. A paradigm example of this form of spontaneity is the case of radioactive
decay. The decay of any particular unstable particle is, apparently, random and cannot be
predicted. Nonetheless, the regularity of half-life measurements indicates some structural order
to the process. With respect to this process, individual events of particle decay are
“spontaneous” in that they cannot be predicted prior to their occurrence. Any individual act of
human behavior is the same to a certain extent; we may be able to create effective predictive
models for the dispersion and prevalence of some human behavior, but often cannot predict
individual instances from this model. And of course, far more sorts of behavior do not lend
themselves to such modeling. This sense is related to the unconstrained sense in that it calls acts
“spontaneous” when they lack direct causal antecedent—if we oppose causality to freedom, then
lack of evident causality might be taken as evidence that an act is done “freely,” though this
fourth sense does not attach any normative valuation to this quality.
Of course, once we have the evidence of actual action, we can discern a variety of “causes”
for acts. Consider a psychological experiment calling for “spontaneous” responses of subjects to
some stimulus. These acts are spontaneous in that experimenters cannot predict them in
advance, and indeed neither can their actors themselves, unless they know the nature of the
relevant stimulus in advance, or have time to “deliberate” their response to it. These events are
still assumed to have explanations which may be further sought after the fact, e.g., “why did you
react that way?” Still, in these cases the actors’ behaviors are treated as “spontaneous,” where
spontaneity is an interpretive frame imposed upon events, holding that the event could not have
been predicted prior to its occurrence, or that the cause is unknown and perhaps unknowable. If
we accept a property actually inhering in acts corresponding to this interpretive frame, this
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implies a fourth, non-normative sense of spontaneity of acts, covering those acts which are
simply “unplanned” or “unpredictable,” without attaching any inherent valuation to this
characteristic. As opposed to our three normative senses, this sort of spontaneity does not involve
an overt process, it is not something that is worked toward; rather, it is “spontaneous” exactly by
virtue of its lack of an evident process of development. Note that our behavior can be
unpredictable to ourselves as well as others.

Spontaneity as Experience
At this point the complexity of the ontological question of spontaneity in action should be
apparent. We have in play at least four different property-senses of “spontaneity,” all of which
are to some degree incompatible with each other. As one example of this incompatibility, let us
consider spontaneity among students engaged in what Peter McLaren calls the “streetcorner
state” of behavior, where students informally interact outside of the school where they spend the
day, characterized by play and joking. McLaren unproblematically treats this mode of behavior
as “spontaneous” in character, in opposition to the “formal, technical, mechanical…student
state” (94), in which children are expected to conform to established, enforced norms of
classroom behavior. Behavior in the streetcorner state can be seen as spontaneous in the
untutored sense, in that the kids are acting expressively and from their “own inner resources”
(94). But they are also acting in a cultivatedly spontaneous manner, by virtue of their long
involvement in the cultural environment that supplies the tropes engaged in this state, and the
prevalence of their deployment of archetypal character symbols (88). Also, the kids are acting
“freely” insofar as the streetcorner state is not policed by authority’s formal expectations. Thus,
all of Ivanhoe’s senses of spontaneity are in play in this state, in addition to the generic sense by
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which actions are simply more un-planned/predictable (a greater variety of behavioral variables
are in play than in McLaren’s classrooms).
However, all of these senses of spontaneity, while they can clearly be simultaneously present,
are in tension, being to a certain degree conceptually incompatible with each other. To the
degree that one acts in a structure-cultivated manner, it would seem that the less one acts from
one’s own inner nature. Though these two can overlap, as sought by Mahmood’s worshippers, it
is hard to imagine they would do so entirely—what is “enculturation,” after all, but the
subsumption of one’s personal impulses in favor of competence acting in a culturally supported
manner? To the degree that one acts from one’s own fundamental impulses, one does not act
“freely” but rather in thrall to the calling of some inherent self. And to the degree that one acts
“unconstrainedly,” one does not act in accordance with cultural-structural exigency or with the
dictates of one’s “true,” inherent self. Finally, to the degree that one acts with any of these
normative senses of spontaneity, one does not act “unpredictably”—at least not in one’s own
experience! For the more one experiences oneself as acting spontaneously in any normative
sense, the more one has an “explanation” for one’s actions, i.e., the nature of one’s true self,
one’s training or enculturation, the opportunity to exercise one’s will.
I suggest that taking a turn to treating spontaneity as a property of experiences, rather than
acts/events, may offer a foothold toward resolving this tangle of incompatible-yet-connected
properties. McLaren parallels the action of the streetcorner state as “spontaneous” with the
“flow” state of experience (94), in this latter following Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi (McLaren 88,
109). The flow state—which Csikszentmihalyi equates to the experience of genuine enjoyment
(as opposed to “pleasure”, the mere “feeling of contentment one achieves whenever information
in consciousness says that expectations set by biological programs or by social conditioning have
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been met,” 45)—is characterized by the experience of a challenging, skill-based activity with
clear goals and timely feedback, in which the actor experiences deep but effortless involvement
with the activity, a sense of control, a loss of sense of self followed by a strengthening of sense
of self, and the distortion of the experience of time (49).
This description encompasses experiential equivalents of each of our four act-property senses
of spontaneity. The importance of unpredictability is underscored especially by the experience
as a “challenging” one. Csikszentmihalyi describes flow as occurring in the space between
anxiety and boredom, between where a task is predictably either too easy or too difficult (74-5),
that is, in a place where the outcome of effort is in meaningful doubt. Cultivated spontaneity’s
importance to the flow state is emphasized by the stress on the activity as skills-based, and
incorporating feedback. Cultivated spontaneity is accomplished through development of skill,
and it is the various forms of feedback that make such development accomplishable. These
forms of feedback are with reference to “clear goals.” This evidences the import of untutored
spontaneity; an “appropriate” goal would be in keeping with one’s true nature, and the better one
“knows oneself,” the clearer the goal can be. Both untutored and cultivated spontaneity can be
seen at play in the process of “loss of sense of self followed by a strengthening of sense of self,”
depending on whether we treat each “self” as the “natural” or the “cultivated” self. Finally, deep
but effortless involvement and a sense of control over the activity evince forms of unconstrained
spontaneity; one feels free, as if exercising one’s will, doing what one wants.
So, if we treat spontaneity as a property of experience strongly associated with the flow
experience, this offers us an intelligible common ground in which we can treat this set of actionproperties, individually incompatible with each other, as simultaneously experienced in
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productive tension—each distinguishable from but mutually supportive of each other, rather than
standing in contradictory relationships that need be conceptually “resolved.”

Spontaneity as Ethnomethod
While the above view offers us coherence, we are still treating spontaneity as a property
structure. Even assuming that some format can be constructed which allows reliable access to
experience evaluable as spontaneous or nonspontaneous, any findings from the deployment of
this format would be “not so much discoveries elicited by the deployment of the format, but
versions of sociological phenomena organized through the efforts of researchers to meet the
constraints of the format” (Benson and Hughes 122). Such a form of analysis, they argue, “sets
the conditions for sociological description in advance so that we look at the phenomena through
a grid that we impose upon them, irrespective of whatever properties the phenomena might
otherwise display” (125).
That is, while the above synthesis offers us distinguishable and functionally-reconcilable
properties, it still treats spontaneity as a fixed object, and fails to attend to spontaneity as a
developing, historical phenomenon. It also fails to address what spontaneity does, as a social
function and interpretive lens. In keeping with my ethnomethodological view of spontaneity, we
might ask such questions as, “How and why do actors perform spontaneity?” “How is the
perceived character of acts/events as in some way spontaneous used as a sense-making schema in
social action and interpretation?” “How does one accomplish ‘acting spontaneously,’ and what
are the context-sensitive social implications of such accomplishment?” My initial approach to
answering these questions considers a variety of existing empirical “models” of spontaneity,
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operationalizations of the general principals outlined above which may purposefully or tacitly
recognize or emphasize different dimensions of spontaneity.

“Communicative Spontaneity”: An Operationalization of Spontaneity Deficiency
Mark Carter and Greg Hotchkis have synthesized analyses of a dimension of behavior they
call “communicative spontaneity” of particular concern to researchers of “individuals with high
support needs” (168). Communicative spontaneity is considered a “critical aspect of functional
communication…gives individuals greater control over their environment… reduces dependency
on partners to anticipate communication” and is “recognized as a desirable goal for individuals
with high support needs” (168). For the considered group at least, spontaneity is a normative
concept, partaking of aspects of unconstrained spontaneity (“made by individuals of their own
volition”) and unpredictability (“not purposefully elicited,” 169).
Many studies have treated communicative spontaneity as if it were an absolute property of
behavior, evaluating it as “either spontaneous or not spontaneous” (169), where “the common
characteristic of all definitions [is] the treatment of spontaneity or initiation as a binary variable
such that communicative acts were either initiations or responses” (172). Carter and Hotchkis
collect a variety of binary operational definitions of communicative spontaneity (170-71), and
categorize them as drawing from four dimensions of interactive behavior: 1) “sequence of
interaction”—whether the subject initiated the communication, 2) whether the communicative
act included topic introduction, 3) the time between previous communication and response or
new initiation, and 4) whether specified prompts are present or absent preceding considered
communication (172).
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In these binary conceptions, spontaneity is recognized in communicative behaviors that
display what is understood as novelty, self-motivation, and relative lack of orienting antecedents.
Various operational combinations of these behavioral dimensions give us a range of actions
considered either “spontaneous” or not, depending on whether they meet observers’ criteria.
Carter and Hotchkis more generally associate “the process of developing spontaneity” in binary
conceptualizations with “transfer of control from defined antecedents” (172). But they critique
such models as lacking justification for choices to treat certain antecedents as indicative of either
“initiated” or “reactive” behavior, and for inadequacy of their accounts in “determining exactly
where control should be transferred” (173).
They offer, as an alternative, “continuum” models of spontaneity wherein “a level of
spontaneity would be ascribed to a communicative behavior…judged in terms of the
intrusiveness or obviousness of controlling stimuli” (173). In these cases, spontaneity is defined
as “the degree to which an observer can discern controlling conditions” (174). While the goal of
developing spontaneity would work toward a capacity for communication “controlled by less
intrusive stimuli,” it is recognized that “different levels of spontaneity may be appropriate in
particular situations” and “that, ideally, an individual would be able to generate an appropriate
communicative act to the full range of stimuli on the spontaneity continuum” (174). In other
words, all else being equal, an increased capacity to communicate free from orienting stimuli is a
positive thing, but the real goal is the ability to act with a range of degrees of spontaneity,
depending on the appropriateness of spontaneity in given social circumstances.
In the continuum models Carter and Hotchkis consider, antecedents to communication are
hierarchized by their perceived intrusiveness on subject experience. Communication is
considered “most spontaneous” when undertaken in relation to “contextual or interoceptive cues”
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(175) or “natural cues,” “those that have a high probability of being present in the environment
of an age-matched non-disabled peer and that are likely to occasion communication” (179).”
Communication is “least spontaneous” when occasioned by “standard prompting strategies” such
as physical guidance or modeling (174), or “direct prompts” by an interlocutor “specifying the
content and/or form of the behavior required” (182). Intermediate levels of spontaneity are
indicated by antecedents that (verbally or nonverbally) highlight contextual cues or prompt openended responses, without cuing a particular type of response as correct or more appropriate (175,
179-82). The considered dimensions comprising these general hierarchies can also be broken
down by their perceived intrusiveness, with greater and lesser degrees of spontaneity assigned
based on variables such as number, familiarity, and role of potential listeners; the settingsensitive proximity and behavior of listeners; and the proximity, visibility, and density of
possible environmental cues. Communication is judged to be more spontaneous with more
listener options and with listeners who are less familiar, less proximal, or less engaged with the
subject. Similarly, spontaneity is judged higher with more environmental cues and greater
density of “irrelevant” cues, with cues that are less proximate and visible, and depending on the
type of cue—actual objects most intrusive, representations less and language least (176-78).
While Carter and Hotchkis argue the superiority of a continuum model due to its greater
coherence, explanatory power, and recognition of a wider range of variables (183), they also note
several limitations. First, it does not account for multiple stimuli to which a subject may be
acting in relation, nor address the desirability of being able to act with respect to a variety of cues
at different levels of spontaneity (183). A second problem is the lack of normative accounts
addressing the appropriateness of spontaneity in different circumstances; this data is as lacking
for others as it is for individuals with high support needs, leaving researchers without a
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normative group for comparison (184). Without a normative model for comparison, a continuum
account simply identifies a range of spontaneities from greater to less, and asserts that, ceteris
parabis, greater spontaneity is “better”.
But that “all else being equal” is important, for all else rarely is. Carter elsewhere (2003a)
notes that greater spontaneity is not always desirable, and that in some cases it may “indicate an
inability to maintain appropriate social interaction” (150). In a friendly social interaction, for
example, greater spontaneity would likely be desirable, but it could be disadvantageous in, e. g.,
a variety of interactions in professional settings. We generally would prefer that, say, lawenforcement officials or air-traffic controllers act in highly predictable and minimally
spontaneous ways when carrying out their professional duties! We can identify a variety of
particular situations calling for greater or lesser spontaneity, but no overarching account to
organize our intuitions on the matter. Nor can we readily tease out such an account from
analysis of role expectations. For example, while some aspects of being an effective doctor call
for low levels of spontaneity (such as choosing what to examine or what procedures to follow in
a given case), others, such as an effective “bedside manner”, generally call for greater
spontaneity. These aspects of acting in the role of doctor are not separable or independent from
each other—the results of bedside manner interactions affect choices of procedures for handling
a case, and expectations about and results of examinations affect a doctor’s more “personal”
interactions with any particular patient.
Appropriate levels of spontaneity may also change depending on the degree of spontaneity
displayed by those with whom one interacts. In some cases, it may be more appropriate to
“match” levels of spontaneity with interlocutors as a way of displaying equality or shared
participation in a situation, whereas in others it may be more appropriate to purposefully display
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more or less spontaneity than others. To some extent, this can be determined from the situation.
In a meeting among equal representatives in an organization, matching spontaneities would be
appropriate. When acknowledging and showing understanding of instructions given by an
authority, one would generally be expected to display lower levels of spontaneity than the
instructing figure. A motivational speaker would generally want to display more spontaneity
than their audience. But many cases are not so clear and must be determined in the process of
the interaction itself. Consider attempting to make friends with a reticent individual. You may
want to display higher degrees of spontaneity than the other as a way of inviting them towards
freer interaction. Or you may want to display lower levels of spontaneity than your
conversational partner, as a way of making them feel safer and more in control of the situation.
Or you may want to try to match the other's level of spontaneity in order to display equality and
balance between yourselves. There is no way to predetermine which strategy will be most
effective; the only way to know is to observe reactions to displays of spontaneity in the course of
interaction and progressively adjust accordingly. Often, over the course of an interaction it may
be most effective to display different relative degrees of spontaneity at different moments.
Empirical research of high-support need students supports arguments for the need to enact a
range of spontaneity in behavior. Carter (2003b) finds that with respect to requests, “more
spontaneous communicative acts were less likely to result in delivery of the requested item or
activity” (165). While at first glance this might indicate that more-spontaneous communication
is actually detrimental for this population, Carter goes on to note that the greater effectiveness of
less-spontaneous requests appears to be in large part due to the lower likelihood of partners
perceiving or anticipating more-spontaneous requests (165-66). This finding also appears related
to the coding definition for “delivery” of a requested item: a request was treated as having been
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“delivered” upon only if the delivery occurs before the next coded communicative act by that
student. Thus, requests are not treated as delivered upon if the delivery is delayed, even though
the request may be acknowledged and acted upon later, or the student’s partner may ask for
clarification of the request prior to acting on it (164-65). This consideration illustrates the
importance of capacity for a range of communicative spontaneity in Carter’s subjects. On one
hand, less-spontaneous requests were more effective at immediately acquiring requested items
due to being responsive to partner expectations. On the other hand, these less-spontaneous
requests were more effective because of the limited options presented by partner prompting and
in the partner’s relatively high level of control over the interaction. More-spontaneous requests
may have a lower rate of immediate gratification, but have the virtues of being able to reference
options not deliberately presented to the student and of inviting clarification by interlocutors,
thus increasing both the range and precision of possible requests.
The “communicative spontaneity” of Carter and other researchers in his field is clearly a
normative concept; that high-support needs individuals often lack a capacity for spontaneity is
definitely marked as problematic, and increasing this capacity is unproblematically marked as
desirable. The normative dimension of this concept draws from “unconstrained” senses of
spontaneity, where greater unpredictability of subject's actions is taken as indicative of an
increase in self-willed behavior and more-intrusive antecedents are seen as restricting free choice
through their influence. However, the concept (at least in its “continuum” forms) not only calls
for increasing “raw” capacity for spontaneity, but ties the value of greater raw capacity to the
more general desirability of being able to enact a range of degrees of spontaneity with reference
to appropriateness in different situations. This more nuanced consideration shows that this
concept of “communicative spontaneity” also draws from “cultivated” senses of spontaneity, in
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that subjects must also develop the learned capacity to effectively distinguish and enact the
degree of spontaneity most appropriate in various recognizable social situations.
This operationalization of spontaneity is also treated entirely in behavioral terms.
Researchers do not attempt any insight into cognitive or psychological processes as they relate to
their subjects’ capacities for or enactments of spontaneity. Instead, as noted above, the degree of
“controlling” conditions discernable by observers marks an act as more or less spontaneous, with
degree of spontaneity inverse to prevalence of controlling conditions. Spontaneity is thus treated
as an observable event, though located in the actions of agential subjects. In concrete research
situations where observers evaluate subjects’ actions as more or less spontaneous (or, in binary
conceptions, as spontaneous or not), observers look for behavior displaying characteristics
operationalized as indicative of spontaneity. Behaviors indicative of greater degrees of
spontaneity include: 1) the introduction of new topics or foci into a communicative interaction,
2) communication not preceded by an intrusive antecedent which orients immediately
subsequent communicative choices, 3) communication apparently in response to “natural” cues
(i.e., internal cues, or environmental cues not introduced into a setting with the intention of
eliciting particular types of communicative act), and 4) communication that appears more
targeted in a setting with a wider range of possible interlocutors and/or objects of
communication. Certain linguistic features of communication in speech have also been
associated with spontaneity, including lack of time to “edit” utterances, use of both verbal and
nonverbal components in face-to-face interactions, smaller amounts of information per phrase or
clause, as well as “fragmented syntax” and simpler grammar and vocabulary than written
language (Chiang and Carter 695).
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Though spontaneity in this context is operationalized in terms of observable behavior,
subjects’ psychological and cognitive situations are nonetheless relevant to researchers. It is
essential to remember that this operationalization of spontaneity considers subjects who are
marked as a population which overall has a substantially lower frequency of enactment of our
listed behaviors than the population of communicating persons at large. While the value of
particular displays of spontaneity depends on setting and situation, researchers’ normative stance
seems to be that, overall, a greater prevalence of more-spontaneous behavior is a positive
tendency for a subject. The lower prevalence of such behavior displayed by the research
population is thus ascribed to a lower capacity for such behavior, and in the process of seeking
ways to increase prevalence of spontaneous behavior, researchers attempt to identify causes for
this lower capacity.
Proposed causes can relate to characteristics inherent to subjects themselves or to
environmental factors influencing them. One proposal is that decreased spontaneity is rooted in
inherent characteristics of individuals with high support needs (including those with intellectual
disability and autism), related to difficulties with selective attention and a decreased ability to
distinguish between relevant and irrelevant stimuli, which “implicates the development of
appropriate stimulus control, such as communicative spontaneity” (Carter 2002, 227). Softer
versions of proposals for causation by inherent characteristics refer to symptoms often associated
with high support needs. Carter (2002) identifies “learned helplessness” as a possible cause for
decreased communicative spontaneity in this population, the decrease being an aspect of a
general pattern of passivity that “develops when outcomes are independent of the individual’s
voluntary responses” (230). High-support-needs individuals are often “necessarily dependent on
assistance from others;” the learned passivity stemming from this condition can persist as a
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powerful habit even long after dependence has been reduced, and is “reflected in a lack of
spontaneity or initiated behavior” (231).
A tendency toward “stimulus overselectivity” may also contribute toward decreased
communicative spontaneity in this population. High-support-needs individuals tend to respond
to a narrower range of available stimuli, which often “may make it difficult for individuals to
identify the subtle, complex, and often multiple cues that are critical to social and communicative
interaction” (Chiang and Carter 701). Spontaneity in communication may be inhibited in such
cases because of difficulty attending to subtle co-stimuli in a social situation, the difficulty of
attending to less-intrusive stimuli when more-intrusive ones are present, and the potential for
increased intrusiveness of irrelevant stimuli (701). A proposed related phenomenon impacting
communicative spontaneity is called “weak central coherence,” which argues that “more
spontaneous communication involves the evaluation and integration of many relatively subtle
aspects of the stimulus environment, rather than attending to a single salient stimulus” and that
high-support-needs individuals tend to have decreased capacity for this integrative ability (701).
Environmental factors proposed for decreased spontaneity particularly consider educational
practices. Highly-structured teaching programs for high-support-needs individuals have been
blamed for difficulties with communicative spontaneity, implicating the artificial relational
circumstances of communication instruction in such programs (Chiang and Carter 698-99) and
learned dependence on certain cues and prompts to initiate communication (Carter 2002, 228).
However, Carter (2002) argues for the limited applicability of this charge, citing his own
research observations of similar difficulties with communicative spontaneity in an instructional
environment featuring a high preponderance of far more “natural” communicative interaction
(229). An inverse position, instead of arguing that decreased spontaneity is caused by highly
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structured teaching strategies, expresses concern about programs’ “failure to systematically and
actively program for spontaneity” (Carter 2002, 234). Carter connects this failure to the
prevalence of binary conceptions of spontaneity, under which “spontaneity can simply be
achieved by transferring stimulus control from the defined discriminative stimulus” (235).
Adopting broader goals of increased range of spontaneity in communication and increased
capacity to respond to less-intrusive communicative cues would imply an approach to
spontaneity in education allowing for the development of “technology” for instruction of
spontaneity itself (236). Some success with methods employing the continuum conception is
reported, through such means as ensuring the availability of augmentative and alternative
communication systems, and systematic reinforcement of more-spontaneous communication
(Chiang and Carter 699) such as “out-of-routine requesting” and less-prompted question asking
(Carter 2002, 235-36).
The concept of “communicative spontaneity” developed in this body of research offers one
illustration of an operationalization of spontaneity. Spontaneity in this case is considered only
with respect to communicative acts, and thus always takes place in interpersonal interaction (note
it is never suggested that one cannot be spontaneous unless interacting, only that non-interactive
behavior is outside this operationalization’s scope). Spontaneity is analyzed in terms of
communicative behaviors, and does not attempt to consider subject cognition or experience.
While spontaneity can be treated as an absolute, present-or-not property of behavior, strong
arguments are presented for the greater utility of treating it instead as a continuum wherein
different communicative acts are treated as displaying greater or lesser degrees of spontaneity,
based on the intrusiveness of orienting stimuli as discerned by observers. Spontaneity is
considered valuable, indicative of greater independence and expressive ability, and aiding
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subjects in accomplishing desired goals. However, spontaneity itself has only extrinsic value;
greater spontaneity does not equal greater value, as different social situations call for different
levels of spontaneity display. What is intrinsically valuable is capacity to enact a range of
degrees of spontaneity and to discern the level of spontaneity most effective or appropriate in a
concrete social situation. This capacity is considered something that can be learned, developed
and increased. The population under consideration is marked as generally showing substantially
decreased capacity for more-spontaneous communication, and so efforts to develop this capacity
tend to focus on developing ability to communicate on the higher end of the spontaneity-degree
continuum. This decreased capacity is attributed to causal influences rooted in both certain
psychological characteristics typical of high-support-needs individuals and the impact of
educational practices on these individuals.
This operationalization is arrived at from consideration of practical concerns for increasing
certain behaviors in a population wherein these behaviors are typically exhibited far more rarely
than they are in the “general population,” i.e., the implicit “normal person” with respect to
prevalence of and/or capacity for these behaviors. The researchers consider these behaviors to
be valuable and learnable, and consider it problematic for individuals to display them rarely, and
particularly problematic for an individual to be unable to display them more often. They identify
a paradigm group as appearing to systematically tend toward inability to display “normal” levels
of these behaviors, collectively called “individuals with high support needs” and orienting
strongly towards individuals identified with intellectual disability or autism. These behaviors are
collectively considered “communicative spontaneity” and initially their precise constitution is
largely intuitive. However, since the goal is to increase their prevalence in a population,
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researchers seek to identify clear behaviors indicative of “spontaneous” communication, so as to
be able to reinforce them.
While still under development, the current operationalization of the concept “spontaneity” for
these purposes is outlined above. This operationalization has been derived from observations of
“spontaneity” in individuals considered deficient in this capacity. However, a significant
concern of researchers is the lack of normative data on spontaneity, i.e.: what does “normal”
spontaneity look like, the norm or ideal against which they compare their subjects? Apparently
developed independent of the above account (I do not find either body of literature cited in the
other), a contrasting operationalization of spontaneity has been developed by researchers and
practitioners of psychology and psychological therapy, seeking to assess the “normal” character
of spontaneity and the experience of highly-spontaneous individuals.

Operationalizing the “Normal” Experience of Spontaneity
Hannah Kellar et al. also treat spontaneity as normative. Seeking to codify work developed
from that of psychologist J. L. Moreno, they attempt to go beyond efforts to loosely associate
spontaneity with good mental health by developing a scale that seeks to accurately measure
spontaneity as a personality trait. While some earlier efforts made assessments of spontaneity as
a component of traits considered related, like playfulness or intuition, their research marks an
effort to develop an instrument for measuring spontaneity specifically and independently (36).
Their basic understanding is that behavior is spontaneous if it is novel and creative, immediate,
adequate and appropriate, effortless, done with total involvement by the actor, and done nonimpulsively (by agents in control of their actions) (37). In order to test the validity of their
measurement construct, they tested for (and found as hypothesized) correspondence with other
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personality traits considered related to or opposed to spontaneity. They considered their test to
have higher validity if it corresponded positively with measures of self-actualization,
playfulness, extroversion, and self-perceived creative capacity, and if it corresponded negatively
with measures of depression and neuroticism (38-39, 43). In keeping with earlier versions of the
instrument, the researchers found a small but consistent tendency for men to have higher
spontaneity scores than women. As this did not appear to be an artifact of the measurement
design, they hypothesize that it may result from cultural expectations encouraging greater risk
taking in men than women (36-37, 44). Their reliability testing indicates fairly high reliability
with this construct, and that the stability of the measured traits seems relatively high (44).
David Kipper goes further with his development of a measurement for spontaneity. He
acknowledges the demonstrated therapeutic value of spontaneity in the psychodramatic tradition,
but argues that the concept has not been subjected to investigation or clarification. He identifies
the central characteristics of spontaneity in the classical theory as “energy that could not be
conserved (nonaccumulated) but rather is spent on the spur of the moment in an all-or-nothing
fashion” but which can be observed and developed, is “associated with healthy living…and inner
discipline,” and whose opposite is anxiety and a repetitive way of living (2000, 34). He
proposes to initially investigate this theory by comparing it against the reported experience of
psychodrama practitioners, a group trained to be highly spontaneous, whom it is reasonable to
assume “represent, at the least, the average of the spontaneous individuals” (40). At issue is
whether spontaneity is a readiness to act or an observable response to stimulus, the amount of
spontaneity needed for good health, whether the opposite of spontaneity is pathology or a generic
collection of nonspontaneous states, and whether spontaneity can be expressed while at rest or
alone (34-37). He asks his participants about their experience of spontaneity in temporal relation
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to action, the frequency and duration of their experience of both spontaneity and nonspontaneity,
their degree of spontaneity as they age, and their experience of spontaneity in relation to the
presence of others and when engaging in activities of low physical intensity (37-38).
His responses strongly indicate that, contrary to the classical theory, spontaneity is
predominantly experienced while acting, not as a potential to act (38). Also, in a challenge to the
“veridicality of the traditional notion that the more spontaneity the better the quality of one’s
life,” a substantial majority of participants indicated that they typically felt spontaneous for less
than an hour per day, and felt nonspontaneous for multiple hours per day, supporting the view
that nonspontaneity can be perfectly healthy and should not be easily equated with pathology
(40). Participants “overwhelmingly (83.6%) indicated…that they became more spontaneous
with age and experience,” supporting the classical theory that spontaneity can be learned and
developed (41). The experience of an overwhelming majority also supported the traditional
contentions that one could feel spontaneous while at rest or alone, though others' presence was
generally seen as contributing to greater spontaneity (41-42). He suggests that the incongruity
between theory and experience stems from artificial distinction of the internal preparatory phase
for creative activity from the observable activity itself (42), and from the privileging of
spontaneity as a mode of problem-solving against modes involving reasoning or memory (43).
Nonspontaneity can positively include these latter modes as well as pathological states; while
“inability to produce spontaneity frequently is related to pathology,” it probably cannot be
considered a sole criterion (44).
An interesting finding among his respondents was that quantitative experience of
nonspontaneity correlated negatively with level of psychodramatic training, but spontaneity
showed no correlation—less time spent feeling nonspontaneous did not correspond to more time
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spent feeling spontaneous. Kipper takes this to mean that “spontaneity and nonspontaneity are
not opposite qualities that may be viewed as two ends of one continuum” (41) and later develops
this idea in collaboration with Jasdeep Hundal. They design an inventory system distinct from
the PAS-II to measure spontaneity—the Spontaneity Assessment Inventory (SAI)—and
administer it with a corresponding inventory for Spontaneity Deficit (SDI) (Kipper and Hundal
2005, 121). The SAI associates spontaneity with such feelings as “energized,” “uninhibited,” “in
control,” “happy,” “alive,” “do whatever, within limits,” and “free to act, even outrageously”
(Kipper and Shemer 128, 131). They administer both inventories as a way to explore the
relationship between the two, especially whether the two are positive and negative ends of the
same continuum, or “independent psychological states representing separate continua” (Kipper
and Hundal 2005, 122). Both inventories are correlated against results from the FWBS,
measuring well-being and emotional stability (124). The participants were psychology students
from high school seniors to graduate students (121).
As expected, the SAI corresponded positively with the FWBS, and the SDI negatively
(Kipper and Hundal 2005, 126). While the overall relation between the SAI and SDI indicated
high spontaneity and nonspontaneity to be opposites, Kipper and Hundal found that when they
broke scores down into ranked segments and compared equivalent segments, they could no
longer find correlation between a participant’s scores on each test, though an overall tendency
remains for high scorers on the SAI to score lower on the SDI (125). They interpret these results
to support a view of spontaneity in which, while “the two cannot coexist simultaneously in a
given moment…the ability of a person to be spontaneous in one situation does not necessarily
predict his or her being nonspontaneous in another situation and vice versa” (127). A
spontaneous person is not one with a personality dimension such that they are always
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spontaneous, but rather one “who is able to become spontaneous often, whenever appropriate,
but who, in many situations, may act nonspontaneously” (127). Spontaneity and nonspontaneity,
then, are not opposite ends of a continuum but rather two separate continua, wherein “the
spontaneity continuum addresses various degrees of a state of mind associated with the readiness
to act in a novel way, whereas the nonspontaneity continuum addresses a separate issue and
represents various degrees of characteristics associated with routine behavior” (127).
Later studies support and clarify these findings. Andruella Christoforou and David Kipper
clarify their concept of spontaneity as action not only free of constraints or premeditation, but
also adequate and appropriate, and that it is a “driving energy,” a “state of mind or a quality of
readiness that sets the individual to respond...with unpremeditated openmindedness and
readiness to respond to internal and external stimulations” (24). They reconfirmed Kipper and
Hundal's findings about lack of inverse correlation of SAI and SDI scores except for the highest
SAI scorers (32-33). They also found significant negative correlation between the SAI and a
measure of anxiety as both a general personality trait and in response to particular situations; a
positive correlation held for the SDI (26, 29). The same correlations—negative for SAI, positive
for SDI—held for a measure of obsessive-compulsive behavior (30, 32). Finally, they showed
strong positive correlations between SAI score and present temporal orientation—a tendency to
focus “on the here and now”—and SDI scores with past temporal orientation; neither SAI nor
SDI showed correlation with other temporal orientations, including future orientation (32).
A slightly modified version of the SAI (the SAI-R) was later introduced, deleting two items
over translatability concerns and using a five-point Likert scale, so that respondents could
indicate cases where they “might have difficulty characterizing their feelings as spontaneous or
not” (Kipper and Shemer 129). Using a broader range of participants (134), the researchers
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found that the SAI-R correlated to well-being similarly to the original SAI, and that SAI-R
scores also correlated negatively with participants' experience of stress (132-33). Further
research found the SAI-R to correlate positively and strongly with “perceived self-efficacy,” a
sense of confidence in one's coping ability across a range of challenging situations (Davelaar,
Araujo and Kipper 123-24). It also correlated positively, though somewhat less significantly,
with intrinsic motivation, a tendency to take action for its own experienced value instead of
external rewards (120-22), and with self-esteem, “feeling of affection for oneself” (123-24).
They also raise the issue of how spontaneity can be “both a free-flowing energy and a
controlling drive at the same time”—for it appears to be an “unpremeditated drive”, but as a
positive aspect of personality, assumes a certain degree of control of its adequacy (125). They
argue that this can be explained by reconceptualizing spontaneity. Traditional views have treated
spontaneity as both independent of and superior to intelligence and memory; in contrast, they
argue that “adequacy of response” is both exterior to and inseparable from spontaneity:
Specifically, we suggest that there are three interrelated factors that govern one's response
to a situation or people: (a) intellectual ability expressed through rational thinking and core
beliefs; (b) past experience driven by memory; and (c) spontaneity. Accordingly, the first
two factors act as the mechanism that controls spontaneity. They set the parameters that
determine whether the expression of spontaneity is or is not adequate. They serve as a
screen, or a tunnel that guides spontaneity to be expressed in a manner consistent with one's
core beliefs and memories of relevant past experience. Thus, both intellectual ability and
memory guide spontaneity toward appropriate or inappropriate response (125-26).
This interpretation appears supported by later research by David Kipper, Perine Davelaar and
Stefanie Herst which finds significant correlation between spontaneity and “executive
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functions,” a “broad set of cognitive skills responsible for the planning, initiation, sequencing,
and monitoring of complex goal-directed behavior” contributing to “the ability to ward off
cognitive interferences and inhibit intrusive stimuli” (330-31). They consider the executive
functions to represent a positive aspect of inhibition, and spontaneity was also found to correlate
negatively with maladaptive forms of emotional inhibition “characterized by reduced
expressiveness, unemotional language, and shyness” (332-33). They also argue for
conceptualizing spontaneity “as an experiential state of mind rather than either energy or a skill,”
and specifically compare it to the flow state described by Csikszentmihalyi, but distinguish it
temporally: the spontaneous state “exists prior to the onset of the creative act” whereas flow
describes “one's feeling during the act itself” (330).
The most recent published research on this construct reinforces this view of the relation
between spontaneity and creativity, finding significant positive correlation between them as
aspects of personality (Kipper, Green and Prorak 45). The researchers also find a complex
relationship between spontaneity and impulsivity. Though both are sometimes described as
“acting without forethought,” they are “completely different personality constructs” (42). Both
also have positive and negative connotations. Spontaneity positively manifests as “overt
behaviors characterized as honest, uninhibited, and free, and in accordance with one’s natural
tendency” or is considered negatively as “uncontrolled and uncensored response…expressed
with disregard to social conventions and cultural mores” (39). Impulsivity’s “positive facets
refer to a risk-taking behavior driven by sensation and seeking novelty, adventure, and
boldness,” but it negatively refers to “uncontrolled and unpredictable behavior marked by acting
without thinking, deliberation, or reflection” (41). However, the SAI treats spontaneity only as a
positive concept (40), while a related measure of impulsivity includes both positive and negative
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aspects. Indeed, they correlated negatively, “outward manifestations nonwithstanding,”
spontaneity correlating positively with creativity and impulsivity showing no correlation to
creativity (48). But interestingly, the “sensation seeking” subscale of the impulsivity test,
referring to “tendency to seek out novel experiences and a willingness to take risk to attain them”
correlated positively with both spontaneity and creativity (49).
This body of research takes a different approach to spontaneity and reaches different
conclusions about it than does the concept of communicative spontaneity analyzed above. It too
treats spontaneity as normative; it is associated with good mental health a priori, and the validity
of developed instruments of measurement is assessed in terms of positive correlation with other
measurements indicative of good mental health and desired behavior, and negative correlations
with measurements indicating poor health or undesired behavior. Researchers considered it
evidence for the accurate character of their construct that tests attempting to measure it showed
positive correlations with tests held to measure playfulness, extroversion, creativity, well-being,
present-time orientation, and ability to respond effectively in novel or challenging situations.
Negative correlation with tests of depression, neuroticism, anxiety, obsessive-compulsive
behavior, past-time orientation, and stress is also taken as evidence for the accuracy of the PASII or SAI-R. Indeed, spontaneity is conceptualized only as a positive quality, with its negative
meanings in more colloquial contexts instead associated with constructs like the negative aspects
of impulsivity.
However, these negative correlates are not the opposite of spontaneity, such that they
represent one end of a continuum having high spontaneity as its other end. Instead, spontaneity
is treated as a positive continuum—low spontaneity, a little good; high spontaneity, a lot of good.
Its opposite is “nonspontaneity”—not a minimal spontaneity, but a collection of behaviors or
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feelings, both healthy and pathological, associated with routine. This concept, though treating
spontaneity as a continuum, makes use of the binary concept of spontaneity, asserting that
spontaneity and nonspontaneity cannot be experienced simultaneously. However, they are not
simply complementarily opposites, i.e., the more of one the less of the other. They measure
opposing but separate personality traits. In later testing of the SAI, correlative testing with the
SDI was dropped, leaving a single-continuum concept like that of communicative spontaneity.
However, the opposite of high communicative spontaneity is an undesired sort of behavior;
researchers want students to move away from these undesired behaviors and toward behaviors on
the higher end of the continuum. Traits opposite to spontaneity for psychodrama researchers are
still often positive and desired; in fact, rational thinking, core beliefs, and memory, though all
distinct from spontaneity, are held to orient spontaneity such that it can operate “appropriately,”
i.e., with desirable outcomes.
Psychological testing also measures a far different phenomenon than communicative
spontaneity. The latter takes spontaneity to manifest in overt behavior in interaction with others.
Spontaneity as measured by the SAI, however, is operationalized as an experience rather than a
behavior. It is assessed by asking people to assess their own thoughts, feelings, and behavior;
test-takers are considered reliable to assess and report on their own experience, in contrast to
Carter’s “high-support-needs individuals,” whose communicative spontaneity is assessed by
researchers interpreting their visible behaviors. Spontaneity in psychodrama is also associated
with a much wider variety of behaviors than communicative spontaneity. It specifically
acknowledges spontaneity when alone (not in communicative interaction) and when thinking
(not displaying overt behavior), which are both outside the scope of communicative spontaneity.
Though spontaneity is characterized as an experiential state preceding the “flow” state, the fact
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that a preponderance of psychodrama practitioners reported feeling spontaneous while acting
suggests that the states are not clearly distinct but overlap, with progressive feedback from a
creative activity contributing to an ongoing spontaneity state which in turn contributes to further
creative activity (c.f. Kipper 2006, 119-22).

Increasing Spontaneity as a Therapeutic Aim and Method
The PAS-II and SAI-R are considered valid across a sample of the “general population”, in
this case a set of persons who collectively represent an average distribution of spontaneity as an
experiential tendency. Psychodramatic therapists have practiced with particular concern for
individuals with lower spontaneity, but unlike the high-support-needs individuals considered by
communicative spontaneity, they are not necessarily considered a paradigm model of those with
difficulty displaying spontaneity. Instead, the test intends to represent an instrument measuring
one against the average of individuals, and aid the practices of psychodramatists in helping
individuals develop their capacity for spontaneity, which can be learned and increased just as
communicative spontaneity can be “actively programmed” for. Kipper and Hundal (2003)
specify that therapeutic theory “holds that spontaneity leads to creativity. Hence, the overall goal
of the therapy is to train the protagonist to become more spontaneous” (142). They define
psychodramatic treatment as “a therapeutic method based on the dramatization of human
experiences by means of role-playing enactment under a variety of simulated conditions
(concretized scenes)” (143). Role-playing and enactment is especially privileged, and often
treated as better than verbal interaction in practice, though spontaneity can be experienced with
rest and thought as well as emotion and action (Kipper 2005, 52).
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The basic model of a psychodramatic session is a group enactment, mostly centering on a
single person (“protagonist”), working with other group members who help facilitate the
enactment of facets of the protagonist’s life. The other group members focus on roles “related to
the protagonist’s presenting problem(s),” though they may indirectly gain personal insights from
their portrayals (Kipper and Hundal 2003, 142). Sessions are organized into three progressive
stages: warm-up (preparation for spontaneity), role-playing and enactment, and sharing and
processing of the preceding experiences (142). Charmaine McVea and Don Reekie describe the
purpose of the warm-up phase as “investigating the area of concern so that the client is energized
and engaged in the process.” Enactment explores possibilities and integration promotes
“equilibrium, consolidation and embedding new roles into existing ways of being” (295-96).
Spontaneity is a form of “role flexibility”, “the freedom to mindfully generate and direct
responses to meet a situation with vitality, creativity, originality, adequacy and flexibility,”
where “role” is “understood holistically as a person’s specific way of being himself or herself in
any given situation” (295). Kipper elsewhere (1998) clarifies that “productive (functional) roles”
are transient—they “change constantly”, and may disappear altogether (like situation-specific
roles), or change slowly over time while persisting (like long relationships with others) (119). In
contrast, “destructive (dysfunctional) roles…tend to lose their transient quality…They
stubbornly remain functional, regardless of the changes that occur in the protagonist’s internal
and external circumstances” and a central aim of psychodramatic therapy is the dissolution or
completion of such roles (119-20). Spontaneity, as active role flexibility, partakes of principles
of untutored spontaneity, invoking a natural, essential, or authentic being that can nonetheless
adapt its attitudes and behaviors to changing circumstances.
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Some specific techniques identified as “primary” to psychodramatic therapy include “role
reversal,” “role-playing,” and “doubling” (Kipper and Ritchie 14-15). In role-reversal,
protagonists begin the enactment as themselves, but then switch roles with another person
portraying the role of someone else—themselves, or another person present or absent from the
session (15). In role-playing, the “actors remain in their own identity during the entire enactment
without changing their identities” (15). In doubling, protagonists remain in their own identities
while another person portrays the “persona” of the protagonist, “acting alongside as a double
(15-17). Adaline Starr and Helene Weisz identify several other common techniques: “Future
projection” asks the protagonist to enact an anticipated situation, while “mirror” and “behindthe-back” help protagonists see themselves as others see them, the first by having others perform
the protagonist while she or he observes and reflects, the second by having the protagonist leave
the group visibly but remain listening while the group talks candidly among themselves about
that person (146-47). Bradley Anderson-Klontz, Tian Dayton, and Laura Anderson-Klontz also
identify the “social atom”, a visual representation of role relationships as currently experienced
and anticipated/desired (116-17), and “regressive drama”, a reenactment and reformation of past
experience with the aim of coming to new perspectives or understandings of the present (118).
In psychodrama’s therapeutic context, low levels of spontaneity are related to loss of ability
to show flexibility in the way one acts as oneself in different situations, and inability to show
effective adaptations in behavior when encountering new circumstances. Spontaneity is
increased, allowing for greater adaptability and role flexibility, through embodied, enacted
exercises in which a “protagonist” enacts unfamiliar roles or engages with new perspectives on
his or her own role behaviors. The roles with which a protagonist engages—whether others, or
embodiments of the protagonist’s own roles—are themselves enacted by participants in the
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therapy, whether a therapist or other members of a therapy group. These exercises tend strongly
toward full-bodied activity and away from primarily verbal or cognitive activity. Though
psychodramatic theory argues for equal legitimacy of spontaneity experienced while alone or
when thinking, these dimensions of spontaneity seem largely minimized in therapeutic practice.
However, the concept of psychodramatic spontaneity, like communicative spontaneity, is still
developing in relation to other concepts and practices, among them more cognitively oriented
practices of psychological therapy. Thomas Treadwell and V. K. Kumar note that
psychodramatists have incorporated techniques of cognitive behavioral therapy (CBT). They
identify CBT with a more “directive” role for the therapist, but both practices emphasize “the
‘discovery’ process…the emphasis on the ‘here and now,’ role playing, and experimenting with
new ways of thinking and behaving”, and they hope that “the combination will facilitate the
development of a new perspective—the perspective that psychodrama is primarily
psychotherapy” (51-52). Kipper (2002) describes a specific adaptation of application of
cognitive practices in psychodrama, the “cognitive double”, a variation of traditional
psychodramatic doubling, where the double’s role is “more restricted, focusing on eliciting and
clarifying cognitive contents,” whereas the traditional double is “unrestricted, focusing on
affective reactions…emotions and cognitions are inherently intertwined,” but emotion is
considered the broader category (96). Treadwell and Kumar associate psychodrama’s conceptual
terminology with theatre (e.g., “director,” “protagonist”) in contrast to “the usual psychotherapy
terms of therapist and patient or client” (51), though a theatrical conceptual orientation has also
appeared in other practices such as assessment of psychosocial functioning (Wiener).
From a psychodramatist’s perspective, Lars Tauvon draws strong contrasts between
psychodrama and psychoanalysis, a practice traditionally more explicitly aligned with
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psychotherapy. In particular, psychoanalysis is associated with determinism, seeking to identify
causes and origins for patients’ behaviors and patterns of thinking, while Moreno’s basic concept
of spontaneity emphasizes “the momentary freedom to make new choices and to free ones
creativity to find new solutions” (333-34). Another significant difference is in their senses of
self, where psychoanalysis views the self as “a structure characterized by continuity and unity”
wherein “the basic conflict is between the needs of the individual and the environment.” In
contrast, psychodrama’s emphasis on interpersonal relations and roles views the self as “more
polycentric and changeable. The self is thus described as a function of the actual situation and is
ascribed a great potential for change. The basic difficulty for the individual is a lack of
spontaneity and an insufficient role-repertoire” (337). A third difference is the treatment of
bodily action and enactment—in psychotherapy both are purposefully minimized, while they are
the essence of therapy in psychodrama (339-41, 348-49).
Despite all these contrasts, recent thought has taken a turn toward the value of spontaneity in
psychoanalytic practice. Philip Ringstrom (2001a) raises the issue of the importance of what he
calls the “improvisational” in psychoanalytic therapy; though he does not reference
psychodramatic literature, he borrows the “theatrical” conceptual theme used by psychodrama,
drawing especially from the model of improvisational theatre. The “improvisational” is held in
sharp contrast with the “classical” model of treatment, which is defined by a set of givens and a
clear delineation of the therapist’s role and how to act in accordance with this role (731-33),
while being improvisational means “remaining open to the patient and unfettered by theoretical
consideration” (734). Despite the “safety and predictability” supported by traditional technique,
“improvisation potentiates the development of trust in a fashion that conventional technique is
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not always capable of doing…it is not always either necessary or helpful that the analyst reflects
at length about his reaction before sharing it” (742).
Russell Meares later argues that the therapeutic behavior Ringstrom advocates is better
termed “spontaneity” than “improvisation.” He argues the latter “has connotations of the
makeshift, of the ramshackle, of flying by the seat of one’s pants,” while spontaneity carries
meanings of self-contained causation or unconstrained will—“freedom is a central issue” (756).
Meares identifies several dimensions of spontaneity in psychoanalysis. The first finds it in the
relational interchange of therapist and patient “in conversational play in which both partners
behave as two parts of a single system” (759). A psychoanalyst’s choice to follow the nonlinear
indications she or he finds as this relationship develops has significant potential for both benefit
and risk (760); successful interventions are “based on his empathetic understanding of his
patient’s experience…empathy underpins an effective spontaneous response” (762). A second
type is “truly ‘self-contained’ and represents an attempt on the part of the therapist to break free
from the constraint, the entrapment imposed by the patient’s form of relating” and is also both
potentially beneficial and risky—therapists step out of their professional role and express as “a
real person” (762-63). He also warns against “psuedospontaneity,” expressions that may be
spontaneous to the therapist but for the patient are “repetitions of the traumatic past” wherein the
influence of the partners’ interrelational dynamic acts with “a faint sense of coercion” such that
“the expression is not freely made” and produces “a subtle form of alienation” between them.
The same risk exists when “play and spontaneity are ‘prescribed’ [and] the therapist plays out the
role of playing—like the child told to ‘go out and play’” (764). For Meares, spontaneity is both
interrelational and individual: “the therapeutic task is directed toward emergence of personal
being, the therapist’s goal…to foster a nonlinear form of mental activity that resembles the shape
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of the stream of consciousness” and “the conversation in which spontaneity is evident is a state
toward which therapy is directed” (765-66). While developing this communicative relationship
with the patient, “the therapist tries, against the constraint of the intersubjective field, to maintain
his or her own ‘aliveness’ and spontaneity” (766).
Ringstrom (2001b) replies that Meares’s “substitution of his preferred word spontaneity ends
up being virtually synonymous with how the rest of us [forum authors] are discussing
improvisation” (802). However, he does agree with a distinction proposed by Alan Kindler:
Spontaneity refers to the subjective sense of freedom and lack of constraint associated with
any action or response. This subjective quality of spontaneity defines and distinguishes it
from improvisation, which embodies the idea of a cooperative effort at keeping the play, or
creative conversation, going forward. Improvisation is based on the rules of engagement of
the relationship and spontaneity refers to the subjective experience of the individual…Our
improvisational facility and freedom in a particular relational context permits us to respond
without preparation, and with a creative orientation toward form, procedure, or role…Both
dimensions, the formal and the improvisational, are present in every interaction to varying
degrees (Kindler 222-23).
Ringstrom (2010) agrees, adding:
Being spontaneous involves acting from a natural feeling, one expressed without constraint,
effort or reflection, occurring through internal causes. Improvisation certainly involves
spontaneity, but, more important, it plays off of and with patterns emergent in both
parties…In being spontaneous, one can emote with nothing further coming from the other.
Improvisation, however, requires playing with something that arises between two or more
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people. Thus, working improvisationally involves ensemble work, wherein both parties play
off of and with one another’s spontaneous gestures (239).
Their distinction between spontaneity and improvisation strongly approximates Meares’s
distinction between individual spontaneity and interrelational spontaneity—“spontaneity” is an
individual subjective experience while “improvisation” is a necessarily social interaction.
Psychodrama concurs to the experiential nature of spontaneity, while its concept of “creativity”
roughly corresponds to psychoanalysis’s “improvisation.” Though one need not be in direct
interaction to behave creatively, creative action creates products, physical and/or informational,
that then enter into the social milieu and can influence future creative acts and experiences of
spontaneity by others. Though it acknowledges spontaneity when alone, psychodrama is
oriented on a relational model of self, while psychoanalysis orients on the individual and unified
self. As such, psychoanalysis gives far more attention to processes of “nonembodied,”
nonenacted experience and cognition, and thus finds a useful distinction between individual
mental experiences of spontaneity and social enactments (improvisation) associated with that
experience. If we accept this analysis, psychoanalysis’s distinction holds that one can act as
“individually spontaneous” through mental or cognitive behavior as well as “socially
spontaneous” in interactive, role-related behavior.

Cognitive Spontaneity and the Social Self
A reasonable paradigm of non-embodied, “individual” spontaneous action would probably be
thinking or a similar purposeful cognitive activity. Galen Strawson, however, argues that this
sort of “self-contained,” cognitive spontaneity is largely illusory—if spontaneity is “connected in
some constitutive way with action: voluntary, intentional, and indeed free action” (227), than
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none of the contents of our experienced consciousness is in that sense spontaneous. Considering
a variety of proposed cases for actional modes of thought including attention, following a
sequence of reasoning, choice and decision, imagination, and belief-formation, Strawson
concludes that the role of action in cognition is limited to the “prefatory”, “catalytic”, or “acts of
priming” (231), what he calls “mental ballistics.” Cognition itself is instead the product of
“waiting, seeing if anything happens, waiting for content to come to mind…Mental action in
thinking is restricted to the fostering of conditions hospitable to contents’ coming to mind” (23234). Such ballistic activity can be successful because “human minds are powerfully governed by
deep, natural, non-agentive principles of operation” (248). Only in the sense of following these
principles such that their control of thought is ideally “as involuntary as the spontaneous,
effortless control with which we normally maintain balance and mastery of our limbs in walking
or running” (254) can there be “any spontaneity in reason, thought or judgment” (251).
Spontaneity in thought is thereby involuntary. Significantly, in the sense of voluntary and free
action, “one cannot be spontaneous…if one is trying or intending to be. The project is selfdefeating” (250).
If so, then entreaties to practitioners or recipients of therapy to “develop” their capacity for
free and self-generated thought are incoherent; any “self” is involved only below the level of
conscious cognitive experience. However, Andrei Buckareff responds that Strawson’s analysis
treats the process of thought too narrowly, as if it proceeds from its own momentum once
oriented, leaving the individual an observer to the cognition. In contrast, Buckareff calls
attention to the “causally sustaining role” of mental experience in cognition. Intention does not
merely initiate action, but “must play a guiding role, with the agent controlling his behavior via
the intention, remaining responsive to feedback in the execution of the action” (85). Thinking is
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not different in kind from an overt, embodied action like driving—though many components of
driving may be habitual and automatic, the complex action is throughout “caused and causally
sustained by a proximal intention I formed when I commenced driving.” Reasoning and other
cognitive processes are like this: one “must be aware of what is going on, sensitive to
information that comes to mind as I continue to reason about some problem or how to act” (86).
If free, self-generated action can both initiate and sustain complex individual actions, we get
a picture of spontaneity that closer resembles psychodramatic models wherein spontaneity and
creativity overlap and feedback into each other. But the voluntary, free character of spontaneous
acts is also identified with “intentionality,” calling for a coherent and unified self as in
psychoanalysis. This has an important implication for cognitive spontaneous action. Like
embodied action, it must be sustained by some intentionality cohering a complex action out of a
series of other activities (both voluntary and not). This intentionality serves to coherently orient
the various actions involved upon some projected accomplishment.
As the complex activity of driving is directed toward a projected destination, complex
cognitive action also attempts to “get somewhere.” This model of cognitive spontaneity is
highly similar to the view proposed above by Davelaar, Araujo and Kipper wherein spontaneity
is guided and channeled by reasoning and memory, which make “appropriate” responses
possible as such. For something to be constituted as a cognitive accomplishment, it must be
established with respect to social phenomena such as reason and/or memory. One can only
evaluate if cognitive efforts are succeeding by virtue of models and practices of reasoning,
feeling, choosing and so on gleaned from social experience. And the outcome of a cognitive
process can only be understood as an accomplishment because that outcome has some relevance
in its introduction to a social milieu. This means that even the most minimally embodied,
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exclusively “cognitive” spontaneous acts are still a form of “improvisation” in the
psychoanalytic sense of a progressive development of interrelational meanings and behaviors
enacted between multiple persons.

Social Enactment of Spontaneity
Thus, even in its least “communicative” form, spontaneity operates as a social, interpersonal,
dialogical phenomenon. The experience of spontaneity depends on recognition of what can be
considered spontaneous, as does the enactment of spontaneous behavior. What’s more, because
spontaneity is considered desirable (if potentially inappropriate or risky), people will often want
their own behavior to be recognized as spontaneous. Michael Kubovy and Joseph Psotka report
revealing results on the social enactment of spontaneity through experiments on spontaneous
number choice. When asked to “give the first number that comes to mind between 0 and 9,” an
overwhelming preponderance of respondents (28.3%) name 7 (291-92). However, it does not
appear more than other single-digit numbers when the requested range is from 6-15 (292). Its
appearance is dramatically reduced when included in the 0-9 request as an example of a typical
response (293), or when the range is given as 70-79 (294). They suggest that “7 might
predominate because it appears to be the most ‘appropriate’ response to the request for a
spontaneous choice” (292). It is not an “automatic” response, and decreases greatly when
marked as typical. 7 also decreases if “designed to…appear obvious and easily explicable;” as
“spontaneity implies freedom from obvious causality, we expect respondents who seek to appear
to comply with the request for the first response that comes to mind to shun a trite response”
(293). They conclude that:
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The experimenter’s request is essentially a request for a spontaneous response, and the
subject is placed in a paradoxical situation—only if he does not try to comply can he comply.
But then his might not appear to be in compliance because of its commonness or
obviousness. So, if he wishes to appear to comply, the subject must carefully select his
response and thus fail to comply. We believe that this is what subjects do (294).
Kubovy later argues that for a response to carry the impression of spontaneity, “the most
appropriate heuristic rule…would be to choose the response which is the least related to external
stimuli or constraints” (359). A “spontaneous” number may come from short-term memory if it
has been subtly made available by “priming”: e.g., the request for “the first one-digit number
that comes to mind” yields a substantial increase in responses of “1” almost directly at the
expense of “7” (360). However, if the number is distinctively mentioned in the request (e.g.,
“one-digit number like 7”), that number “is rejected even though it is in short-term memory
because the experimenter would appear to have caused the response” (363). In the limited
scopes of response considered by these experiments, either spontaneous or non-spontaneous
mental processes can lead to the response, and if either a digit is unavailable in short-term
memory, or if it is but has an obvious causal antecedent, then subjects appeal to the “apparent
spontaneity heuristic,” which involves “norms of impression management…which enable us to
seem spontaneous when we are not” (363-64). The limited scope of possible responses in digit
choice makes for stark results of the use of the spontaneity heuristic in that case: Kubovy and
Psotka argue that 7 seems clearly the “oddest” digit, as 2/4/6/8 and 3/6/9 form groups, while 0
and 1 are endpoints and 5 a clear midpoint (294).
In keeping with my ethnomethodological viewpoint, I agree that it is meaningless to describe
individuals as “being spontaneous” by purposeful choice, or by embodying some property
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through their actions. What they can do is perform a “spontaneity heuristic,” a way of making
their actions recognizable as spontaneous in a concrete social situation wherein they are called
upon to act spontaneously. Researchers of communicative spontaneity, psychodramatic
practitioners and researchers, and Bland’s charismatic congregation are all social groups who
have developed detailed concepts of spontaneity and ways of evaluating the behavior of others as
spontaneous or not, with implications for those evaluations. Though spontaneity is enacted
socially within their operationalization schemas, these schemas all treat spontaneity as an
individual quality, whether experience or behavior. Another conceptual operationalization of
spontaneity, which treats it explicitly as a social phenomenon, is called “organizational
spontaneity.”
Jennifer George and Arthur Brief treat organizational spontaneity as “extra-role behaviors
that are performed voluntarily and that contribute to organizational effectiveness” and identify
five sorts of such behavior: helping co-workers, protecting the organization, making constructive
suggestions, developing oneself, and spreading goodwill (311). They distinguish this facet of
organizational behavior from “citizenship behavior” and “prosocial behavior,” in that
organizational spontaneity includes only functional actions with respect to organizational ends,
does not include role-prescribed behaviors, and includes only “active” behaviors (313). These
behaviors correspond strongly with “high positive mood states” described in terms like “active,
elated, enthusiastic, excited, peppy, and strong,” in opposition to, e.g., “drowsy, dull, sleepy and
sluggish” (315-17). Mood can influence levels of organizational spontaneity at the level of
individual affect, prevailing moods in a primary work group, and environmental influences (31723).
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In addition to the psychological influence of mood, organizational structures and contexts
can affect organizational spontaneity at various levels. Individuals have more opportunities and
inducements to perform organizational spontaneity behavior with higher skill levels and sense of
their own skills, with broader role definition, better interpersonal relationships, and greater
willingness to ask for help (George and Jones 158-60). Individuals are also affected by group
norms encouraging innovation and creativity, high interdependence among group members, and
goals not demanding highly role-prescribed behavior (161-63). Less mechanistic organization
structures, an organizational culture valuing innovation over predictability, inducements for self
development, and reward systems not tied to role-prescribed behavior are all organization
features that can promote organizational spontaneity (164-66). Finally, organizations tend to
become more similar as they interact, and imitate each other's effective practices, so
organizations finding success with organizational spontaneity will promote it at the
interorganizational level (167-68).
Though performed in the context of organizational activity, organizational spontaneity is still
a matter of individual action (George and Jones 156). A similar concept (though not referencing
work on organizational spontaneity), called “organizational improvisation,” treats spontaneous
behavior more as a matter of the group at large. The social structure of an “improvisational”
organization process model “consists of a minimal set of behavioral norms and communicative
codes respected by all players during a collective performance” drawing from “technical
structures” consisting of “shared grammars or templates [i.e., ways of expressing and/or
interpreting meaning], which are reinterpreted to create new meanings” (Pinnington, Morris and
Pinnington 14). Performances of improvisation can also be facilitated and constrained by the
relational structure among participants, including organizational and economic hierarchies,
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organizational expectations of employee dispositions, and accepted positions expressible within
those expectations (22-26). While improvisation is still treated as a matter of individual action, it
is the social context that facilitates the very possibility of “organizational improvisation”:
Individuals are central to the structure and process of improvisation because their
performances are enacted and embodied. Participants rely on their subjective differences in
order to innovate and create anew; and, conversely, they rely on a degree of homogeneity in
order to work cooperatively. The participants in the improvisation are situated within a
context that offers liberties and constraints on their action (27-28).
Organizational improvisation, as a purposeful process, is most often occasioned by
increasing degrees of “turbulance”—changing, unexpected, or unpredictable occurances or
environment, whether the result of outside events or internal drive for change (Pina e Cunha,
Kamoche and Campos e Cunha 36). Improvisation as a process “can be described as discoverydriven action aiming to explore unknown or unexpected opportunities or to neutralize unforseen
threats” and is facilitated by “a minimal structure mostly resulting from explicit and irrevocable
goals and deadlines,” “a small set of working rules,” and “simple and flexible resources” (3637). It is also facilitated in “experimental cultures,” those that “promote action and learning by
doing—as opposed to reflection and planning—as a way of understanding and dealing with
reality” (37).
Based on grounded field observations, researchers argue that organizational spontaneity is
most emergent when a task is perceived as important by members, occurs in an environment of
neither very high or low turbulence and organizational structure, and is confronted with simpler
resources (Viera da Cunha, Ken Kamoche, and Pina e Cunha 579-81). Improvisation was more
successful when group perception of a task and its importance was highly cohesive, and when
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tasks were clearer and less complex (581-82); successful improvisations led to more efficacious
future action and higher group cohesion (583-85). Organizational improvisation calls for a
leadership style where the leader “needs to be able to make a synthesis among apparently
conflicting or dissonant styles, such as planning and acting behaviors, directive and permissive
styles, providing guidelines, rules, and procedures, while allowing individual discretion for goal
attainment” ( Pina e Cunha, Kamoche and Campos e Cunha 39). Successful improvisational
leadership is based in the skill of “simultaneous integration of apparently contradictory
behaviors, values, and beliefs in the process of leading a group” (39). Despite the importance of
the leader in the group's relational structure, it is only one role among many playable in a group
enacting organizational improvisation. The degree of improvisation in a task is not dependent
only on individual behaviors; rather, organizational improvisation is considered with respect to
the group at large, even as some individuals may act with a low degree of improvisation.
While researchers of organizational spontaneity and organizational improvisation have
focused their interest on profit-oriented business or product-development settings, similar claims
for the value of an “improvisational” approach can be found in discussions of public
administration. Susan Fitzpatrick particularly associates “improvisational” approaches which
“call upon memory and learned skills” with the “imagination” required to “invent variations on
the spot” (652). Improvisation, as organizational action, partakes of the imaginary to “resist the
‘given’ nature of institutions” (644). Swan Hua Xu also invokes the “imaginary” as an approach
to the spontaneous in public administration, drawing the concept of spontaneity from Taoist
writer Zhuangzi. Spontaneous action is contrary to “instrumentally rational action” instead being
“action that responds to situations, changes in environment based on one’s instinct or even
unconsciousness. [It] is not led by pre-identified purpose and is not bound by pre-existing rules
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or judgmental thinking; it focuses on the process rather than the end” (284). Put into practice in
public administration, this attitude toward action implies that governance should orient toward
“facilitating” rather than leading or presenting public good (286) and that leadership within
administration structure should be deemphasized in favor of co-participation among a
community working toward “the art of just, rather than heroic, leadership” (287).
These various accounts of spontaneity in organizations provide examples of how a
"spontaneity heuristic" can be identified by or deployed among group members in concrete social
settings, wherein spontaneity is marked as a desirable trait for the organization itself and not just
for its individual members. Where spontaneous number choice gives an example of performing
a generic “spontaneity” when called for, spontaneity in organizations marks certain attitudes, and
the desires and behaviors they are supposed to generate, as valuable. These valued behaviors
contribute to organizations’ efficiency or the accomplishment of goals. They are not necessarily
beneficial for individuals within the organization, nor are these behaviors ends in themselves.
Instead, certain attitudes are identified with the positively-marked concept of “spontaneity,” and
the display of behaviors associated with these attitudes is privileged as an effective
“performance” of spontaneity.

The Use of Spontaneity As an Analytic Concept
Employed in the context of explicit scholarly analysis, spontaneity as a social practice largely
takes the form of a term used by researchers. The term’s “meaning” (in the sense of definition,
relevance, or both) is the object of researchers’ inquiries, and it seems reasonable to assume that
among the “projected accomplishments” implicated in the practice of such inquiry is the
establishment of the term’s definition and/or relevance. In accounting of the general practice of
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producing conceptual analyses of spontaneity, a key guiding question would thus be, “To what
questions of definition or relevance is researchers’ use of the term ‘spontaneity’ oriented?”
Asked another way, “What issues related to the use of the term ‘spontaneity’ do researchers raise
or attempt to resolve in their writings about it?” Or again, “What questions do analyses of
spontaneity concepts seek to answer?”
The questions that guide these analyses reveal the parameters of the projected practical
accomplishments implicated in researchers’ analytic behavior. The different fields make
sometimes widely divergent uses of the term, framing its relevance in terms of concrete concerns
for the field in question. But this slate of examples provides insight into the various issues of
spontaneity treated as relevant for the purpose of researchers. The synthesis above gives a
number of examples of how such issues are tacitly implicated across these divergent fields, even
as different fields give greater emphasis or focus to some issues over others. Many of the
relations between these issues across different fields are discussed above; my purpose is not to
resolve these issues but simply to identify them as relevant issues to practices of analyzing and
accounting of spontaneity.
One such issue is the ontological status of spontaneity as a property. Is it a property inhering
in observable behavior, and thus (at least in principle) “literally describable” in Heap’s terms?
Or it instead a property of persons’ experiences, and thus only interpretively describable?
Accounts such as Ivanhoe’s “untutored” or “cultivated” spontaneity, Carter’s “communicative
spontaneity,” or George and Jones’s “organizational spontaneity” would align with the first
category. The second category would include accounts such as Ivanhoe’s “unconstrained”
spontaneity, Csikszentmihalyi’s “flow experience” and the “cognitive spontaneity” debated by
Strawson and Buckareff. Many accounts also posit the spontaneity property as inhering in some
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relationship between behavior and experience (e.g, psychodramatic and psychoanalytic accounts,
Mahmood’s prayer practices, or Kubovy and Psotka’s number-choice experiments). An
ethnomethodological view would of course reject any realist account that treated spontaneity as
an actual property of anything, independent of the way it is used by social participants.
However, when viewing spontaneity as ethnomethod, the fact that participants commonly treat
spontaneity as a real property of behavior and/or experience is highly relevant to any account of
the concrete use of “spontaneity” as an analytic term.
A second issue concerns whether spontaneity is binary or gradable. Are
behaviors/experiences of spontaneity all-or-nothing, with the spontaneity-property treated as
either simply present or absent? Or does spontaneity occur in degrees of greater and lesser? The
first view includes accounts like the binary models critiqued by Carter and Hotchkis, Strawson’s
model of mental action that leads to his rejection of cognitive spontaneity, and in the Flow
experience. The second includes Carter and Hotchkis’s continuum models and the spontaneity
measurement tools developed by Kipper and collaborators. Many other areas do not clearly
address this issue.
Acceptance of a continuum account also raises the issue of the relationship between
spontaneity and non-spontaneity: are they opposite ends of a continuum, as in Carter and
Hotchkis, or related but distinct and separable continua, as in Kipper and Hundal’s SAI? These
two models also raise the question of quantifiability in continuum accounts. Kipper and
Hundal’s measurement tools suggest a holistic view of spontaneity as a general pool of
behaviors/experiences, numerically scalable based on subject self-reports. In contrast, Carter and
Hotchkis’s continuum is broken down into tiered categories, with greater and lesser degrees of
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spontaneity only evaluable by coding specific behaviors and comparing between tiers, without
any smooth quantifiability possible for “overall” subject behavior.
Whether the account is binary or continuum, the question of present/absent or greater/lesser
spontaneity leads to the issue of grounding a basis for making such evaluations. This issue asks
for descriptive guidelines of what behaviors and/or experiences are indicative of greater or lesser
spontaneity. In ethnomethodological terms, what conventions of sign and language do analysts
treat as bounding the flexible-but-finite range of shared meaning that makes recognition of
spontaneity as a social order possible in their contexts? The reviewed literature above uses a
variety of tactics addressing this issue—typologies of behaviors, exemplary narratives, general
accounts of activity patterns such as “role flexibility,” characteristics of the reported experience
of subjects, correspondence with other behavioral/experiential characteristics treated as
relationally affiliated with or opposed to spontaneity, etc. This issue is central to the projected
accomplishments of spontaneity-analysis as a social practice; every item reviewed above
addresses this question to some degree.
The question of spontaneity’s value-status is also at issue. Some accounts treat spontaneity
as only descriptive, associated with unpredictability, but do not assign any value to this property,
as in the above numeral-choice experiments. However, most of the accounts above treat
spontaneity as a normatively-positive property whereby behavior/experience, all else being
equal, is “better” by virtue of being spontaneous. If we treat spontaneity as normatively positive,
this raises the issue of why it is so. Is it intrinsically valuable as an end in itself? Ivanhoe’s
typology offers a useful categorization of bases for treating spontaneity as intrinsically valuable,
as does Csikszentmihalyi’s association of it with flow experience. Spontaneity can also be
treated as extrinsically valuable, a productive force valuable not in and of itself, but because it
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supports the accomplishment of other valued ends. Examples of such ends supported
extrinsically by spontaneity include good mental health or role flexibility in psychotherapeutic
applications, increased independence for high-support-needs individuals in Carter, or increased
organizational efficacy for writers like George and Jones, Fitzpatrick, or Xu. Finally,
spontaneity can be seen as valuable by treating it as a potentiality, neither valuable in itself nor
extrinsically leading toward other ends. In this view, spontaneity’s value is derived from role in
setting the conditions that make other desired ends possible, without necessarily directly leading
to them, as in some psychodramatic accounts of creativity or the desired religious attitudes
described in Mahmood or Scholl.
Especially in accounts that treat spontaneity as normatively valuable, the issue whether
spontaneity can be increased in frequency and/or intensity is relevant. Accounts like Strawson’s
would see this as an incoherent fool’s errand, but almost all other accounts above conclude or
even presuppose that spontaneity can be increased. The related question of why it would be
valuable to increase it is answerable in terms of the normative account of its value, as just
discussed. This naturally leads to the issue of how to increase it; answers to this question range
greatly with the researchers’ particular applications. Some accounts are very broad, like “the
shedding of enculturated learning” or “the practice of enculturated skills” for Ivanhoe’s
untutored and cultivated spontaneities respectively, or the increased awareness and orientation
toward flow experience of Csikszentmihalyi. Other accounts suggest general types of behavior
or mental attitude but not specific activities, such as accounts of organizational spontaneity or
Ringstrom and Meares’s approaches for improved improvisational relationship between
psychoanalysts and patients. Still others offer specific activities aimed at increasing spontaneity,
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such as examples of psychodramatic techniques, or the cultivation of spontaneous prayerful
attitudes through daily tasks described by Mahmood.
Accounts that do not treat spontaneity as intrinsically valuable may raise the issue of the
context-dependence of spontaneity’s value. If spontaneity is not valuable in and of itself, in what
contexts is it of normatively positive value, and are there contexts where it may be normatively
negative? If so, what determines which contexts are positive or negative? Carter’s assessments
of communicative spontaneity address this issue most explicitly, but its relevance can also be
seen in examples like Kipper’s emphasis on “ability to become spontaneous” as indicative of
mental well-being for psychodramatic practitioners, or Meares’s cautions about the role of
spontaneity in psychoanalytic practices.
To the degree that frequency and/or intensity of spontaneity is gradable, and increasing it (at
least in certain contexts) is considered valuable, the issue is raised of what accounts for greater or
lesser degrees of spontaneity. One possibility is the inherent subject characteristics of
individuals; some persons are treated as “naturally” more or less capable of spontaneity than
others, by virtue of fundamental qualities of personality or experiential/cognitive capacities.
This possibility is especially considered in Chiang and Carter’s account of high-support-needs
individuals, as well as at the level of general human cognitive characteristics in Strawson’s
critique of cognitive spontaneity.
A second possibility, relevant in most of the accounts above, is that greater or lesser degrees
of spontaneity can be accounted for in terms of learned behavior patterns, which can both
promote and inhibit spontaneity. In Ivanhoe, “untutored” spontaneity is inhibited by the learning
of enculturated patterns of behavior; in contrast, the learning of such behaviors is critical to the
development of “cultivated” spontaneity. Chiang and Carter give more credence to this
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dimension; it is also highly relevant in psychodrama, which identifies unhealthy, repetitive
behavior patterns as stymying spontaneity, while advancing active-participation therapeutic
techniques intended to increase spontaneity through practice.
Concrete environmental characteristics may also affect spontaneity levels, as with the
availability of communicative tools to Carter’s subjects, the influence of environment on
employee mood considered by George and Brief, or the spontaneity-promoting effect ascribed to
working with “simple and flexible resources” by Pina e Cunha, Kamoche and Campos e Cunha.
A subcategory of environmental characteristics relevant to many researchers above is the
influence of relationship characteristics among involved individuals. Examples of relationship
features treated as inhibiting spontaneity include the highly-structured teaching techniques
critiqued by Chiang and Carter, the professional formality of the therapist-patient relationship in
psychoanalysis, or the centralization of public-administration authority criticized by Xu. On the
other side of the coin, the mutually-supportive protagonist-focused contributions of a
psychodrama group, the “shared structural expectations” of Pinnington, Morris and Pinnington,
and the “experimental cultures” of organizations that promote action by learning and doing
instead of reflection and planning (Pina e Cunha, Kamoche and Campos e Cunha) are all
examples of relationship characteristics that promote or encourage spontaneity among
participants.
A final issue concerns the distinction between spontaneity for individuals and spontaneity
among groups of participants in shared social activity. Is spontaneity a quality only of
individuals, of groups, or of both? Carter and Hotchkis’s analyses connect spontaneity with
specific individual behaviors, and thus treat it as individual, as do Kipper and collaborators in
measuring spontaneity as an individual personality trait. On the other extreme, writers on
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“organizational improvisation” understand it specifically as a trait of a group. Many take some
middle ground. “Organizational spontaneity” is understood in terms of individual behaviors, but
with that behavior located in a concrete interactive organizational setting. Psychodrama treats
spontaneity as individual experience and capacity for behavioral flexibility, but locates its
practical relevance in situations of interpersonal interaction. This issue is perhaps most visible in
the discussion involving Ringstrom, Meares, and Kindler, where the debate over the appropriate
use of the terms “spontaneity” and “improvisation” in psychoanalysis hinges on exactly this
question.
If a distinction is made between individual and social spontaneity, this raises the question of
the relationship between them. It may be simply additive, as in George and Brief, with group
spontaneity simply a matter of collected individual acts of spontaneity. More complex
relationships are also suggested in some cases, such as Davelaar, Araujo and Kipper’s account of
the relationship between individual spontaneity and the social phenomena of rationality and
memory, or the individual number-choice responses filtered through the performance of a social
“spontaneity heuristic” in Kubovy and Psotka’s experiments. Depending on the relationship
advanced, spontaneity may be identified and recognized differently in individuals and groups.
In conclusion, the following questions summarize the issues at stake to some degree or
another in analyses of spontaneity; researchers’ address of these issues indicates the scope of
projected accomplishment implicated in their analytic action. Is spontaneity a quality of
behavior, or of experience, or of some relationship between the two? Is it binary—either present
or absent—or can it be divided into degrees of greater/lesser? If divisible, can it be quantified?
What is the relationship between spontaneity and non-spontaneity? What behaviors and/or
experiences are indicative of greater or lesser spontaneity? Is spontaneity treated as simply
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descriptive, or is it a normatively positive quality? If positive, is it a potentiality, a productive
force, or a valued end in itself? Can it be increased in frequency and/or intensity in an individual
or group? Why would it be valuable to increase it? If it can be increased, how? Is it always
desirable, or only valuable in certain contexts? What makes a context more or less appropriate?
Are greater and lesser degrees of spontaneity due to inherent subject characteristics, learned
behavior patterns, or environmental/relationship characteristics? Is there a distinction between
individual and social spontaneity, and if so, what is the relationship between them? How is it
identified and recognized in individuals and groups?
While certainly not exhaustive of potential issues related to accounts of spontaneity, I take
the above list to summarize a number of the key issues relevant to practices of accounting for
spontaneity as an achieved phenomenon of social order. In the following chapter, this set of
questions will guide my rhetorical analysis of the term “spontaneity” in methodological writings
on improvisational theatre. Specifically, they form the dimensions along which I consider
improv writers’ uses of the term as an “ideograph,” a heavily value-laden but loosely-defined
term, the meaning and relevance of which is a matter of contestation within the cultural
communities where it is recognized and used.
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CHAPTER 3
SPONTANEITY AS AN IDEOGRAPH IN IMPROV METHOD

In this chapter, I assess the rhetoric of “spontaneity” as an “ideograph” in the culture of
improvisational theatre practitioners, with particular reference to a set of improv-training
methodology books which have had substantial influence on the ideals and practices of members
of this culture. In his foundational essay on the concept, Michael Calvin McGee defines
“ideograph” as:
an ordinary language term found in political discourse. It is a high-order abstraction
representing collective commitment to a particular but equivocal and ill-defined normative
goal. It warrants the use of power, excuses behavior and belief which might otherwise be
perceived as eccentric or antisocial, and guides behavior and belief into channels easily
recognized by a community as acceptable and laudable…Ideographs are culture-bound,
though some terms are used in different signification across cultures. Each member of the
community is socialized, conditioned, to the vocabulary of ideographs as a prerequisite for
“belonging” to the society. A degree of tolerance is usual, but people are expected to
understand ideographs within a range of usage thought to be acceptable: The society will
inflict penalties on those who use ideographs in heretical ways and on those who refuse to
respond appropriately to claims on their behavior warranted through the agency of
ideographs. (15-16)
Some briefer formulations by later writers employing the term may be helpful in establishing
an initial formulation for my purposes. Hugh Miller describes ideographs as “guid[ing] behavior
and belief into channels easily recognized by a community as acceptable and laudable, or
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not…ideography invokes coherent patterns and recognizable formulations. There is a sense in
which ideographic patterns regulate power and weave the texture of reality” (469-70). Jeffrey
Bridger calls them “words or short phrases that represent an orientation to an abstract ideology”
which “serve as a kind of ultimate justification for specific actions;” when used, “we assume that
their meaning is self-evident and channel behavior accordingly” (357). David Coogan treats
ideographs as not “arguments,” but “ideological icebergs: the visible bump of what lies
beneath,” i.e., inscribable, culturally-recognizable symbols of commitment to organizations of
power and normativity in a society (670). Below, I examine in depth how the term “spontaneity”
also operates in this way in the rhetorical practices of groups recognizing the term as indicative
of value-orientation.
An ideograph operating in a culture has both “diachronic” and “synchronic” dimensions
relevant to any analysis of it. Tracylee Clarke defines the diachronic structure of an ideograph as
representing “the full range and history of its usage for a particular culture” (51); Brent Saindon
expands this understanding to include all possible “meanings of the ideograph available to the
present situation, which functionally means the totality of all previous meanings conferred upon
a particular ideograph over time” (94). In contrast, the synchronic structure of an ideograph
addresses “the relationship between the ideograph and the other ideographs operating in society”
(Saindon 94), or more specifically, “how an ideograph is used in relationship to other cultural
ideographs in a specific situation or particular circumstance” (Clarke 51). Broadly speaking, the
diachronic dimension of an ideograph is the collective history of all uses of the ideograph
recognized within the culture where it is used, while the synchronic dimension is the particular
purposes for which an ideograph is deployed in a concrete event of social activity.
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The default understanding for ideographs tends to view their use as being in the service of
entrenched dominant power structures in a culture. Saindon argues that McGee’s concern is with
ideographs as a form of “myth” that “constructs subject positions and controls populations.
[They] are not just symbolic resources for the world making practices of humans, but tools of
securing certain narratives of structural inequality” (93). From this perspective, ideographs serve
to reinforce dominant ideologies by establishing cultural “unity” on the terms of social discourse
for matters to which the ideographs in question relate. However, many commentators have
assessed ideographs as a field for social contestation on equal footing with their role in
reinforcing structures of inequality. Clarke notes that “when an ideograph is broken down and
used in particular situations, its abstract nature can set up a situation that allows for multiple
interpretations and diverse actions to be taken. If those actions conflict…then contention is
created, and those involved are divided not unified” (60).
Ideographs act as fields for ideological social contestation in the interplay between their
diachronic and synchronic dimensions—their ranges of recognized uses, and the contraction,
expansion, or variation of these ranges asserted by members of culture in their concrete uses of
ideographs in particular situations. Disagreements over acceptable uses of ideographs are not
merely inevitable, they are integral to the process of establishing “meaning” for an ideograph.
However, disagreement is not with respect to “truth,” i.e., a “correct” or “accurate”
characterization of the ideograph (though discourses of contestation may certainly be framed in
these terms, as terms like “truth” or “correctness” are themselves ideographs with important
synchronic relationships to others!). McGee asserts that “Ideographs can not be used to establish
or test truth, and vice versa,” for “truth,” in its “ideal metaphysical senses, is a consideration
irrelevant to accurate characterization” of ideographs (9). Instead, “disagreements about an
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ideograph are not discrepancies over its formal properties but its formative power to contain our
commitments” (Coogan 671). Saindon argues that ideographic discourses “do not emerge ex
nihilo, but rather from a dense web of competing interpretations” (102). Contestation over
ideographs is not a matter of rhetorical response by marginalized persons or groups against a
standing dominant ideology. Instead, the reverse is the case—dominant ideology emerges as one
highly-visible effort to impose unity where unity is absent, and thus, in discourses of
contestation, whether engaged in from a “dominant” or “marginalized” perspective, “ideological
claims are a product of dissensus, not consensus” (108).
Researchers using ideographic analysis offer a number of examples of such ideographic
contestation in concrete rhetorical discourses. Saindon includes an extended analysis of the term
“equality” in the deployment and reception of Peter Singer’s ethics on animal rights (95-106).
Miller explores the synchronic relevance of the concepts “free will” and “determinism” to the
ideograph of the “individual.” Bridger assesses the centrality of ideographic concepts of
“community” with respect to debates over land use and zoning regulations in Lancaster County,
PA. Clarke examines divergent uses of the concept “tribal sovereignty” in debates over an
arrangement to store spent nuclear waste on the Skull Valley Goshute Reservation in Utah.
While most ideographic analysis is focused on broad conceptual terms like those above, other
researchers have also considered examples of more specific, concrete cultural artifacts as objects
of ideographic contestation. Robert Branham gives an historical overview of the use of the song
“America” (“Of Thee I Sing”) as an ideograph to both support and undermine dominant
ideologies of power in the U.S, while Janis Edwards and Carol Winkler examine the use of the
iconic Iwo Jima flag-raising image in political cartoons as an example of a visual image, rather
than a term, that functions ideographically. Michael Altimore demonstrates the power of
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ideographs to act toward excluding subdiscourses in contestation over issues, showing how
science journalists writing about recombinant DNA overwhelmingly elide “philosophical” and
“political” discourses of morals and power structures in favor of “technical” discourses about the
safety and possibilities of R-DNA experimentation. Through the set of methodology texts
examined below, I offer a detailed example of “spontaneity” as used in rhetorical ideographic
practices for improvisational theatre, showing these same features of diachronic history and
synchronic association over a contested, value-laden term.
The above examples of contested ideographs tend to focus on the synchronic dimensions of
their subjects. However, the diachronic dimension is also critical in holding such discourses
together. The efficacy of ideographs as cultural tools is derived from their simultaneous
ambiguity and universal recognition in a culture as relevant and carrying justifactory power.
Even as conflicts over the meaning and appropriate use of ideographs play out, the ideograph
continues to unify the society where such conflict occurs; indeed, they make the particular points
of contestation in question possible. Saindon describes the process of public discourse as not a
simple dynamic of a dominant ideology against countervailant marginalized voices, but instead
“a dispersed, multiplicitous public sphere containing a cacophony of vernacular voices: they
strive for social cohesion, but in relation to voices of conceptual extension, conceptual
distinction, and outright dissent.” But within this cacophony, we can identify specific “multiple,
vernacular publics: temporary social groups brought together over a common concern, and that
compete with…other public discourses for increased cultural attention” (110). In these cases, we
see the unification function of ideographs at work even in dissensus.
In her analysis of the public debate over nuclear waste storage on the Skull Valley Goshute
Reservation, Clarke summarizes that “those involved in this controversy are united by
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sovereignty as an ideograph and separated by disagreement as to its particular meaning.” The
disagreement is a product of both the legal ambiguity of the term (diachronic dimension) and the
competing agendas of involved persons and groups (synchronic dimension). Nonetheless, the
abstract ideograph “act[s] to unify, creating a harmony among its users” (59). The use of
“harmony” in its literal musical sense is instructive here: It does not mean “agreement” but
rather “concord,” and literally refers to multiple voices, producing different notes, that
nonetheless unify as a coherent chord. In the same way, ideographs serve to unify elements of
Saindon’s “cacophony of vernacular voices” in particular situations , not through agreement as
such with each other, but rather through their shared allegiance to the importance of certain
ideographs, which unifies disparate voices into a coherent discourse. Below, I discuss in detail
how “spontaneity” operates similarly in improvisational theatre rhetoric as a unifying ideograph
even as uses, synchronic associations, and advocated practices diverge widely among
methodologists.
A contemporary example might be current discourse over voter ID laws recently enacted by
legislatures in a number of U.S. States, many of which have been challenged in the courts.
These laws require certain limited forms of photo ID as a requirement to vote in-person at a
polling site. Supporters of such legislation rely primarily on the argument that such laws are
good for society through their function of safeguarding the “integrity” of elections by preventing
in-person voting fraud. Opponents of these laws tend to focus on the concern of
disenfranchisement of legitimate voters who, though voting entirely legally, will be prevented
from voting as a result of lack of appropriate ID. The discourse of both supporters and
opponents of these laws, however, is bound together by mutual, largely unquestioned respect for
the key ideograph (or “God” term, as McGee calls them, 7) “democracy.” The disagreement is
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over interpretation, with voter ID supporters synchronically affiliating “democracy” more
strongly with “securing the integrity of valid elections,” and opponents affiliating “democracy”
more strongly with the “enfranchisement and access to election participation of legitimate
voters,” both with solid diachronic historic bases for their associations.
The mutual recognition and acceptance of “democracy” as a shared ideal of U.S. culture is
what makes the terms of dissention possible with respect to this particular issue wherein multiple
competing synchronic associations operate in relation to a higher-order ideograph uniting them.
The same sort of dynamic can be seen in dissention over the meaning of concrete cultural
ideographic artifacts. The song “America” (Branham) and the iconic Iwo-Jima flag-raising
image (Edwards and Winkler) have both been used as ideographs to rhetorically uphold
dominant power structures. Both have also been parodied and caricatured to rhetorically
interrogate or protest such power structures. But both sides of the ideographic use of these
artifacts are effective due to the shared attitude of discourse participants in recognizing and
respecting these artifacts as important value-laden cultural symbols. Attempts to undermine the
dominant-ideology synchronic associations of these symbols still uphold their importance as
symbols; otherwise, parodies of them would not be recognizable as parodies. The only way to
truly undermine their actual relevance of the symbols (instead of merely seeking to change their
synchronic associations) would be to ignore them. But even such active ignoring is itself a
rhetorical response that acknowledges the power of the symbols as something important enough
to be worth ignoring.
This consideration, of the relevance of “ignoring” or “being silent” with respect to
ideographs, relates to a third key dimension of ideography later introduced by McGee:
ideographs’ “influence.” Saindon describes this dimension as being added in McGee’s later
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theoretical shift to “discourse fragments;” it considers how, when introduced into discourse, “the
fragment gains attention through its cultural prominence (circulation and repetition)” (95). The
introduction of this dimension acknowledges the unpredictable effects of ideograph usage. The
efficacy of rhetoric in this view is no longer evaluated as a cause-and-effect relation between a
speaker’s rhetorical actions and the ability of those actions to directly impact the actions of
others. Instead, “influence” designates “the ability of a fragment to receive attention from other
textual fragments circulating in the culture. The measure of success is not compliance, but
citation, whether that occurs in assent, response, or extension of a fragment’s meaning” (95-96).
This consideration of the “reception and appropriation of the fragment” offers an
evolutionary view of ideographic operation: “Fragments that matter will be remembered and
‘structured into our experience’…Rather than the ideograph representing dominant social
interests, a fragment begs to be engaged, denied, or transformed” (104-05). This view is more
amenable to treatments of ideographs as supporting discourse of dissention or contestation, for
“this aspect of a fragment (its ability to insinuate itself in a multitude of different
contexts)…requires a de-emphasis on the intent of the speaker in favor of tracing multiple, often
contradictory, effects of discourse” (106-07). To account for the continued relevance of power
implications in a society viewed through this lens of fragmented discourse, Saindon introduces
the term “ideographic fragment.” Ideographic fragments “serve as a medium of exchange
between speaking subjects. Their respective familiarity with certain terms and conditioned
respect for a term’s value (though empty in itself) creates a magnetic relationship between the
‘ideographic fragment’ and other fragments circulating in the culture.” Like a “sound bite,” an
ideographic fragment’s influence is “no longer determined by the truth it posits, but instead
performed through its repetition or iteration.” The “path of least resistance” for promulgation of
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ideographic fragments is to “gain attention in popular culture by attaching to something familiar
and desired, then attempt to mutate the significance of the term, changing its association with
other fragments” (109).
In sum, an ideograph is a term with a poorly defined meaning but widely recognized in a
society as value-laden, related to normativity, and functioning as justification for the exercise of
power and/or expressive behavior. Members of a society collectively recognize ideographs as
highly relevant to claims involving morality or other forms of value, even as members disagree
over the meaning or appropriate application of invoked ideographs. In this way, shared
ideographs help to unify a society by providing a rhetorical “common ground” that coheres
dissenting voices into frameworks from which participants can establish what disagreements are
“about.” The “meaning” of an ideograph is not established with respect to “truth,” but rather
with respect to the ideograph’s efficacy in influencing behavior. Analysis of particular
ideographs considers three dimensions: 1) the diachronic, including the totality of historical uses
of an ideograph; 2) the synchronic, addressing relationships with other ideographs, either tacitly
implied or explicitly evoked, in specific social actions and settings; and 3) their influence, taking
into account the actual outcomes and changed prominence of ideographs resulting from their
deployment in concrete social action. In the following sections, I show how the rhetorical
concept of the ideograph can be understood within an ethnomethodological framework and be
deployed as practices among a group that treats “spontaneity” as ideographic.

Ideography from an Ethnomethodological Perspective
Though originating from and employed primarily as a concept of rhetorical analysis, the
principles of ideography share many important affinities with an ethnomethodological

97

worldview. Such a worldview would reverse the traditional direction of analysis, but largely
retains the relevance and character of elements identified with ideographic theory. Most research
explicitly addressing ideographs does view them as “signs” of underlying social order, as in
Coogan’s “ideological iceberg” account above. An ethnomethodology perspective, of course,
would instead view ideographs as “methods” emergent from concrete social interaction. Their
role in upholding dominant normativity and organizations of power is largely due to practices of
“blind obedience” as described in Chapter One, reflected in claims like Bridger’s that “we
assume that [ideographs’] meaning is self-evident and [will] channel behavior accordingly”
(357). Ethnomethodologically speaking, such “blind obedience” that allows for predictable
response to the use of ideographs does not implicate social participants as mere dupes to the
ideology underlying ideographs they encounter. Instead, this “blind obedience” emerges as a
method whereby social participants make their actions intelligible, and can recognize the actions
of others as intelligible, in social interactions where ideographs are implicated. “Blind
obedience” is thus viewed not as a result of automatic responses to ideographs, but rather as a
concrete method by which the association of “dominant” accounts of an ideograph’s “meaning”
are reinforced in particular social-historical moments.
Such methods are by definition subconscious, for recognizing oneself as acting in blind
obedience constitutes an immediate “breach” of blind obedience as a social method implicitly
emerging from concrete interactions. But they are no less methods because they are
subconscious—their subconscious character is integral to effective accomplishment of methods
of blind obedience. As such, any explicit rhetorical deployment of an ideograph constitutes a
breach of the methods of blind obedience by which dominant meanings are reinforced, and it is
these breaches that allow rhetorical analysts to account of the emergent social structures
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implicated in concrete use of ideographs. Through disruption of the method of blind obedience
to dominant meanings for ideographs, explicit deployment of an ideograph for the purpose of
upholding dominant power structures is every bit as much a breach of the default, subconscious
methods that make responses predictable and intelligible, as are deployments that explicitly seek
to undermine, change, or interrogate the meanings of that same ideograph.
The synchronic dimension of ideographs is thus heavily emphasized when considering them
ethnomethodologically, as this dimension is focused on the concrete use of ideographs through
observable behavior in specific social situations. Ethnomethodology’s focus, though, is on the
“how” of synchronic ideograph use—i.e., the concrete behavioral methods whereby social actors
reinforce, question, muddle, change, expand, etc., the relations among ideographs. This includes
not only explicit behaviors of ideograph use, like parodies or justifications for moral views, but
also “negative” behavioral methods like silence and “blind obedience” to the “automatic”
associations with higher-order ideographs that cohere participants in events of explicit
ideographic dissention. The diachronic dimension of ideography remains important, however.
The “totality of historical uses” of an ideograph bounds “the range of possible ‘meanings’
constituted in and by language” for that ideograph, the “indefinite, but not infinite” range of
possible interpretations for actions that makes recognition and intelligibility possible (c.f. Heap
94). The explicit use of an ideograph already breaches the methods of blind obedience
implicated in reinforcing that ideograph, but such explicit deployments must themselves fall
within the ideograph’s diachronic range of recognized use, lest a participant’s use of an
ideograph breach the recognized methods for use of that ideograph, inducing “bewilderment”
instead of intelligible synchronic action. Such breaches, of course, accrete to the ideograph’s
diachronic dimension and may over time change or expand the range of recognized methods for
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synchronic action relating to the ideograph, and thus the dimension of “influence” also remains
relevant from an ethnomethodological perspective. As discussed below, “spontaneity” in improv
practices shares a special relationship with methods of blind obedience, in that successful
enactments of spontaneity to a certain degree require unawareness of their success. Thus, the
explicit deployment of “spontaneity” by methodological writers operates as the sort of “breach”
described above, offering a point of access to the synchronic ideographic practices of
“spontaneity” in improv while remaining bounded by the limits of recognition established by its
diachronic history.
Like action (i.e., “purposeful” behavior) generally in ethnomethodology, ideographs are
culture-bound. However, ethnomethodology would tend to view cultures less as “writ large”
and more in terms of concrete social situations involving “the operation of a certain cognitive
style that is shared” among participants, representing a “finite province of meaning” that allows
recognition by participants of both intelligibility and breaching with respect to a particular
ideograph (Eberle 291). An ethnomethodological “culture” of shared recognition methods for an
ideograph will tend toward high levels of “blind obedience” behavior in their intracultural
interactions, and greater explicit deployment of the ideograph in their interactions with other
ethnomethodological cultures, i.e., others who do not share the same implicit “cognitive style”
that allows for shared methods of intelligibility and breaching. The “vagueness” of an ideograph
in culture “writ large” derives from the widespread currency of a shared term across many
groups who have different “methods” for making use of that same term intelligible and
breachable.
Heather Stassen and Benjamin Bates write that although ideographic “terms appear vague at
the surface, members of a community will be able to understand the ideograph’s exact nuances

100

and subtleties as understood within that community” (1). Such an “ideographic community”
would form a “culture” in an ethnomethodological sense with respect to a specific ideograph,
though of course members of that community have countless other social roles, positionalities,
and senses of themselves that may be relevant in any concrete action involving the ideograph in
question. Where relevant in the following, I will use the term “ideographic community” to refer
to this ethnomethodological sense of “culture” as established through shared practices of
intelligibility. This will distinguish the term where necessary from “culture” in the “writ large”
sense, which is shared by Saindon’s “multiple vernacular publics,” i.e., multiple, distinguishable
ideographic communities whose members are also implicated in countless other social orders.
This culture writ large provides fields for methods of “higher-order” ideographic action that
coheres ideographic dissensus between and within ideographic communities. Because of this
expansive process, ideographs do indeed become “vaguer” the more we view culture in the broad
sense, even as members of specific ideographic communities have extremely high shared levels
of tacit understanding that allow for their ideograph to be largely “taken-for-granted” and dealt
with through methods of blind obedience within the community. While “spontaneity” is a highly
vague ideograph in culture writ large, in the ideographic community of improv practitioners it
takes on a much more concrete practical character, taking on criterial relevance and allowing far
more to be taken for granted about its relevance to related community practices.

Improvisational Theatre as an Ideographic Community and the Rhetoric of Spontaneity
As an ideographic community within a larger culture is defined ethnomethodologically by its
shared practices of ideograph recognition, so too can it be defined in terms of shared activities,
the performance of which reinforce allegiance to certain ideographs. A cultural group that views
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itself as cohered through shared engagement in a particular recognized form of activity will have
its own key ideographs or “God” terms relating to that activity, i.e., high-order ideographs that
cohere the group as an ideographic community by virtue of members’ shared engagement with
an ideographically-associated activity. In such cases, the key ideographs will be those that
members associate with giving the activity normative relevance. A group united by participation
in a voter-registration drive, for example, cannot help but be united by shared positivelynormative associations with the ideograph “democracy”—otherwise the performance of voterregistration-drive behavior would not be account-able as a normative activity associable with
ideographs. Other ideographic associations are of course possible—the group may be registering
voters for “fun,” perhaps, instead of to advance democracy. But this orientation to a different
key ideograph changes the very nature of the activity, and how participants account of and
evaluate it. If registering voters ceases to be “fun,” a group orienting to this ideograph will likely
cease the activity, while a group orienting to “democracy” as a key ideograph will likely marshal
along. Conversely, a group orienting to “democracy” will likely stop registering voters if they
come to see the activity as detrimental to democracy (perhaps viewing it as legitimizing a corrupt
electoral system), regardless of how much “fun” they are having.
In this way, activities that are highly similar in the observable behaviors that perform them
can nonetheless take on quite different characters in different ideographic communities within a
culture. But if a shared activity is experienced as normative by participants, it must tacitly or
explicitly appeal to some “God” term or terms used as practices to account-for that activity’s
normativity and allow for shared intelligibility among participants. In some cases, however, this
centrality of key ideographs can be taken a step further. Adherence to a normative orientation
toward an ideograph may not merely be a practice of justificatory accountability for an activity,
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but may be experienced and treated in practices as definitional of the activity itself. That is,
allegiance to the relevance of certain ideographs may instantiate in practices as essential to
recognition of an activity as the activity it is recognized to be. The activity cannot be what-it-is
without at least tacit allegiance to a normative order produced through ideographic practices.
For example, runners in a foot race must at least tacitly affiliate their activity with an ideograph
like “competition.” Practices of positive-normative orientation to “competition” are prerequisite
for members’ activity to be recognizable among themselves as racing. Participants may
observably be running as fast as they can along the same route, but without this ideographic
orientation to “competition,” such behavior cannot be seen as endogenously productive of the
meaning of “racing.” To be racing and not merely running fast with others, one must experience
oneself as being in “competition,” and, at least insofar as the activity of racing goes, must have
normatively-positive associations with this ideograph, for the race qua race would not be
possible at all without this orientation. Heap describes such activities as the “most pervasive
contexture of indexicality and reflexivity,” in which “the actor’s self-understanding of his/her
activity is to some degree criterial for the identity of practices” (102).
I argue that improvisational theatre (“improv”) is another such activity, with the ideograph
“spontaneity” as criterial. The successful accomplishment of improv as such, even if of “poor”
quality, implicates an orientation toward spontaneity as an ideograph, for without spontaneity, a
performance is not improv but something else, as running in a group without a sense of
competition is not a race. As I did in broad overview in Chapter Two with scholarly analyses of
spontaneity, I will below do in detail with “spontaneity” as a term in improv, through the artifact
of a set of methodology texts for practitioners produced over the course of about 40 years, with
attention to the dimensions of analysis described at the end of Chapter Two.
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Improv principles and practices have been applied to a wide variety of different purposes.
Besides those discussed in Chapter Two above, improv has also been used as a method for
developing scripted performances (Scholte), for social activism (e.g., Boal, Park-Fuller), and for
education, of groups as diverse as actors, preschoolers (Lobman), health-and-wellness students
(Boria, Welch, and Vargas), grouped children with various disabilities (Bernstein), classroom
teachers themselves (Coppens, Wright), business teams (Gesell), trial lawyers (Lubet and
Hankinson), counselors (Tromski and Doston), and social workers (Walter). However, the texts
on which I will focus belong to a tradition focused on improv as “a performance product in and
of itself” (Napier 1), a theatrical approach primarily oriented to entertaining an audience.
Modern theatrical improv traces its roots to commedia dell’arte (Schmitt 68-70, Seham 9), a
style most popular from the mid 16th to 17th centuries, utilizing general plotlines without specific
dialogue, stock character archetypes, and lazzi, bits of comic business that could be dropped into
a variety of performance situations (for detailed examples and analyses of practices, see e.g.
Anderson, Brockett 144-49, McGill, Pietropaolo, Tylus). The jumping-off point for
contemporary improv is generally ascribed to the Compass Theatre in Chicago in the 1950’s (see
Coleman, Patinkin, Seham, and Sweet for detailed historical accounts). The Compass’s early
work included many “scenario plays,” with their structure of a plot outline without scripted
dialogue drawn directly from commedia, though they did not use stock characters and covered a
wider array of genres (Coleman 88, 104). They also performed open improvised scenes based on
audience suggestions. In 1960, a number of Compass alumni founded Second City in Chicago;
Viola Spolin, mother of director Paul Sills, trained the original cast using the performance
“games” she had developed and would later collect into Improvisation for the Theatre, the first
time she had used them to teach adults. Second City has operated since 1960, with many branch

104

theaters and travelling casts, and serves as a major training ground for improviers, though its
productions are primarily scripted work developed through improv rather than improv itself
(Patinkin).
Without knowledge of Spolin’s work, Keith Johnstone (Impro and Impro for Storytellers)
also developed an improvisational theatre praxis through his work as a children’s teacher and
director in the U.K. He founded Theatresports in Calgary, Alberta in 1978, which has since
spread through Canada, much of Europe, Australia and New Zealand, as well as into the U.S.
The organization is highly decentralized and local details can vary greatly, but the shared format
is a competitive show where teams of improviers compete at performing games (similar to
Spolin’s, but with greater emphasis on audience suggestions and behavioral rules), with a group
of “judges” (other improviers) evaluating and nudging along the action (Foreman and Martini).
Carol Hazenfield (Acting on Impulse), and Tom Salinsky and Deborah Frances-White (The
Improv Handbook) are also affiliated with Theatresports branches in the U.S. and U.K.
respectively.
Meanwhile, “longform” improv was developing in Chicago, and was made central at the
ImprovOlympic (later IO) in the form of the “Harold” under the organization of Charna Halpern
and Del Close (Truth in Comedy). Longform, rather than the atomistic style of scenes and games
in improv, is instead an arrangement of connected scenes, but with far less structure than a
scenario play, generally not prefiguring plots or characters. A wide variety of longforms have
since been developed at IO and by other improv companies (Kozlowski 71-89). Mary Scruggs
and Michael Gellman’s Process works toward a half hour scene in a single space in real time.
Mick Napier (Improvise) worked with both Second City and IO before founding the Annoyance,
another influential improv theatre and training center in Chicago.
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Through these many influences and others, improv has taken on a wide variety of forms and
practices, but its practitioners are held together as a community recognizing itself as engaged in a
shared activity. The wide variety of improv practices are unified through an allegiance to some
sense of “spontaneity” as prerequisite for performers to be able to do improv, as such, at all.
Improv has a long history of promulgation primarily through direct teaching and experience, and
this factor has likely been far more influential on the whole than methodology writings. But of
course, it also highly diffuse and difficult to trace, and so I take the set of texts discussed below
as a helpful entry point into the ideographic rhetoric of spontaneity for improv, on the same
ethnomethodological basis as the conceptual scholarship on spontaneity in Chapter Two.
In assessing the rhetoric of spontaneity in the following eight texts I will be considering the
analytic dimensions emergent from Ch. 2. Based on authors’ analysis, treatment, association,
and illustration of the term “spontaneity,” I assess each author on how their use of the term
explicitly or tacitly answers the issues raised in each guiding question, as best as can be based on
the textual evidence available. Is spontaneity, as a fundamental component of improv, treated as
a matter of improviers’ performance behavior, the experiences they have while performing, or
some relation between these aspects? Is spontaneity absolutely present or absent in a moment, or
is the spontaneity of an improv performance treated as a matter of degree? How are binaries or
degrees of spontaneity assessed by improviers, i.e., what behaviors and/or experiences indicate
greater or lesser spontaneity in improv? Is spontaneity always treated as normative for improv,
or can it be simply descriptive? When explicitly normative, why is it valued? Does
spontaneity’s value take the form of a potentiality, a productive means, or an end in itself? Is
spontaneity universally valuable, or seen as potentially problematic in some contexts? What
attitudes or practices are seen as able to increase prevalence or intensity of spontaneity in a
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performer and/or ensemble? How are individuals and groups affected in their capacity
for/prevalence of spontaneity by their inherent subject characteristics, their learned behavior
patterns, and the environmental/relational characteristics of an improv situation? Is there a
distinction between spontaneity for individual performers and spontaneity for an ensemble, and
if so, what is the relationship posited or implied between them? How do individual performers
and ensembles make their improv perfomances visible, recognizable, and account-able as
spontaneous?
In addition to addressing these analytic dimensions, I also assess the authors’ synchronic
associations with spontaneity, the other ideographs and concepts with which spontaneity is
associated, whether by positive affiliation or by negative contrast. The texts are presented below
in their publication order, with the exception of Keith Johnstone, whose two books are closely
related in their accounts and are discussed together. Where potentially relevant, I also note
where previous methodological accounts of spontaneity may have influenced successive texts.

Viola Spolin
In Improvisation for the Theatre, Viola Spolin addresses spontaneity as a foundational
principle extensively, explicitly defining the term in her glossary as “ a moment of explosion; a
free moment of self-expression; an off-balance moment; the gateway to your intuition; the
moment when, in full sensory attention, you don’t think, you act!” (370). She also explicitly
defines the term “spontaneous selection” as “selecting that which is appropriate to the problem
without calculation; a spontaneous choice of alternatives at a moment of crisis; since theater is a
series of crises, spontaneous selection should be working all the time; selecting out of the
‘explosion’ that which is immediately useful; insight” (370). She elsewhere analyzes the term’s
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relevance for her in detail, using it to collectively consider seven factors as “aspects of
spontaneity”: games, approval/disapproval, group expression, audience, theater techniques,
carrying the learning process into daily life, and physicalization (4-17).
Acceptance of the “rules” is central to her concept of the “game.” Games are essentially
characterized by successful “playing,” which she uses to link the core activities of traditional
games and dramatic acting, citing her teacher Neva Boyd’s work on play, where she writes that
both create “a condition in which strain and conflict are dissolved and potentialities are released
in the spontaneous effort to meet the demands of the situation” (qtd. in Spolin, 5). The “demands
of the situation” in a game are established by the rules, which in turn facilitate play activity:
“acceptance of all the imposed limitations creates the playing, out of which the game appears, or
as in theater, the scene” (6). Games focus action and attention among a group of players;
effective games are “highly social” and have “a problem that needs solving” within them. The
problem gives an “objective point” with which individuals become involved, but for the game to
be truly played, “there must be group agreement on the rules of the game and group interaction
moving toward the objective” (5). The focus and action directed toward the game’s objective
“provokes spontaneity. In this spontaneity, personal freedom is released, and the total person,
physically, intellectually, and intuitively, is awakened,” allowing “the student to transcend
himself or herself…explore, adventure, and face all dangers unafraid” (6). In turn, “the energy
released to solve the problem, being restricted by the rules and bound by group decision, creates
an explosion—or spontaneity” and “everything is torn apart, rearranged, unblocked” (6).
Spontaneity produces both special experiential conditions and special types of action.
Both approval and disapproval inhibit playing, for the “first step toward playing is feeling
personal freedom” (6). Freedom leads to both “experiencing” and “self-awareness (self-identity)
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and self-expression” (7). But freedom is limited by social practices of approval/disapproval,
through both fear of disapproval and submission to the approval of authority. Reacting to
approval/disapproval “results in a serious (almost total) loss of personal experiencing…in the
attempt to live through (or avoid living through) the eyes of others, self-identity is obscured, our
bodies become misshapen, natural grace is gone, and learning is affected” (7). She places heavy
emphasis on the teacher’s actions and attitudes to facilitate true playing and direct experience.
Teachers should engage in “constant self-surveillance” to avoid “words which shut doors, have
emotional content or implication, attack the student-actor’s personality, or keep a student
slavishly dependent on a teacher’s judgment.” They should also remember that they “cannot
truly judge good or bad for another, for there is no absolutely right or wrong way to solve a
problem” (8). Approval works as more insidiously authoritarian, and more difficult to recognize
as such, for students seek it to gain a better sense of themselves as progressing, but “it remains
progress on the teacher’s terms, not the student’s” (8); thus, the teacher takes on a burden of
“accepting simultaneously a student’s right to equality in approaching a problem and [her or his]
lack of experience” (9). By way of navigating this dilemma, Spolin reminds teachers that
judgment “limits our own experiencing as well as students’, for in judging, we keep ourselves
from a fresh moment of experience and rarely go beyond what we already know” (8). The best
policy for both teachers and students, then, is to do away with the “dependencies” of each for the
other, and instead focus on the rules of the games—“the problems within the subject matter will
teach both of them”—and teachers will be cued by attending to “the fact that the needs of the
theater are the real master…the teacher too must accept the rules of the game” (9).
The relationship between individual and group is essential to productive performance for
Spolin. She condemns a dominating attitude for any group member, and advocates for a group
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relationship of “individuals working interdependently to complete a given project with full
individual participation and personal contribution” (9). Each person should give their fullest to
the act of performance; differences in ability and experience are to be expected, but the teacher is
cued to “see that each student is participating freely at every moment,” considering not the
visibility of contributions but rather whether “a student is participating to the limit of his or her
powers and using abilities to the fullest extent” (10). Shared agreement and group involvement
in shared activity create the conditions for “harmony,” in contrast to competitiveness. Any sense
that a group member “has to be better than someone else” replaces participation and leads to
“compulsive action,” which Spolin associates with activities like fighting for status by criticizing
others, defensive attitudes, detailed explanation of choices, bragging, blaming others, apathy, and
boredom (11). “Contest and extension,” on the other hand—competitiveness of the group with
the shared activity, rather than among the group—“gives both release and tension in such a way
as to keep the player intact while playing” (11). Play is sustained and progresses as “each
individual strives to solve consecutively more complicated problems” and the group members
work “harmoniously together with others to enhance the group effort or project” (11-12). It is
important that the group’s goals evolve out of activity rather than be “superimposed” on it.
Desirable goals in this schema appear “easily and naturally,” coming from “growth rather than
forcing,” and in these cases success is not seen as an end-result but in the engagement with the
process itself. “Process comes before end-result” in Spolin’s ethic of group activity, but they
ultimately collapse in a group’s engagement with a shared, natural goal: “The end-result,
performance or whatever, will be no different from the process that achieved the result” (12).
The relationship of performers to audience is also key. Spolin criticizes attitudes toward
audiences regarding them as “either a cluster of Peeping Toms to be tolerated by actors and
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directors or as a many-headed monster sitting in judgment” (13). She implores companies to
remember that their every effort at creating theatre is for the audience, calling them “guests,
fellow players,” whose shared experiences “make the performance meaningful” (13). From this
perspective, performers experience “complete release and freedom,” understanding the audience
“not as judges or censors or even as delighted friends but as a group with whom an experience is
being shared…each one with a right to a thoughtful and meaningful experience” (13-14).
Theater techniques are the “methods” by which performance is done, but Spolin rejects a
splintered view of distinct skills in performers’ repertoires, emphasizing the central principle that
“the techniques of the theatre are the techniques of communicating. The actuality of the
communication is far more important than the method used” (14). Instead, techniques should
come “from the total self.” Theatre games provide a structure that can support a “direct,
dynamic awareness of an acting experience [such] that experiencing and techniques are
spontaneously wedded, freeing the student” (15).
She advocates “carrying the learning process into daily life;” instead of “homework” on
theatre training—even script memorization—workshop training should be done in such a way
that it is “absorbed, and carried out again (inside the self) to daily living.” Theatre practice
should lead to the ability to make “direct and fresh contact with the created environment,” which
in turn produces “recognition, direct and fresh contact with the outside world as well” (15).
Students should have a deepening “involvement” with their “phenomenal world” and experience
it “more personally” (15). She describes “experiencing” as “the only actual homework and, once
begun, like ripples on water is endless and penetrating in its variations…The world provides the
material for the theater” (15-16).
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Considering Spolin’s concept in terms of the dimensions of analysis I posit for spontaneity,
the answers to guiding questions is seldom tidy. For her, spontaneity appears to be a quality of
both behavior and experience. The experiential qualities are given primacy, for it is out of the
spontaneous experience of performers involved with the “game” guiding them that spontaneous
action appears. The “explosion” is experienced as engagement of individual intuition that,
hopefully, is also expressed in a way sharable by other participants, both performers and
audience. As she presents it, spontaneity seems to be binary—the moment of personal freedom
and choice, the connection with the intuitive, is either present, or something inhibits it, and it is
not. She does not appear to posit degrees of lesser or greater spontaneity; though the capacity for
it can be developed, at the moment of experience and action spontaneity is all or nothing.
Spontaneity certainly has normative value in her account; indeed, it is the central value by
which the success of the performers is evaluated. It is not a potentiality but rather a valued end
in itself—for Spolin, true spontaneity is by definition unqualifiedly good merely by virtue of
being experienced, though it also has the productive value of leading to the sorts of performance
action she seeks. Its normative qualities heavily emphasize Philip Ivanhoe’s unconstrained form
of value for spontaneity. The term “freedom” is strongly and repeatedly associated with it, as in
“free moment of self-awareness,” “personal freedom,” “participating freely” in shared gameplay, and experiencing “release and freedom” through relating to the audience as co-participants.
The “fundamental self” of untutored spontaneity seems important as well; she often invokes
individuals’ “intuition” and “personal experience.” But the self she advocates acting from is
ideally expansive, and independent of the influence of social gaze and the approval/disapproval
practices it wields, so even this fundamental self is idealized in terms of its unconstrained
freedom.
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Spontaneity goes beyond the individual, though, and can be experienced and enacted
collectively, through a group’s focus on the “game”: An understood agreement on context and
purpose for action, and on shared willingness of each to give their all to “solving the problem”
posed by the context and purpose. Her emphasis on “carrying the learning process into daily
life” suggests an expansive sense for the value of spontaneity; indeed, she gives no account of
caution or appropriate limitation on spontaneity. It is treated as a fundamental good, here
explored through performance.
Performance is Spolin’s vehicle through which individuals and groups can become aware of
and enhance their capacities for spontaneity. She does not seem to see spontaneity as limited by
inherent subject characteristics, opening her book: “Everyone can act. Everyone can
improvise.” Nor is spontaneity in improvisational performance limited by environment. Spolin
never seems to suggest that any particular physical location or setup enhances or inhibits
spontaneity, and the techniques of improv are by necessity largely minimalist. Instead,
spontaneity is limited by learned behavior patterns and relationship characteristics. In particular,
learned behaviors related to desire for approval, and to avoid disapproval, lead to self-inhibition
of spontaneity by performers, due to performers’ views of relationships between themselves and
teachers, audience, and each other. This self-inhibition can be released, and individual and
collective spontaneity enhanced, through the teacher’s attitudes and practices, and by the
attitudes performers take toward each other and the audience. In all cases, the emphasis is on the
game. The performers seek not to control or impress one another in advancing their own
contribution, but instead aim to collectively work together, each to their fullest ability, to
accomplish a shared objective. The audience is treated as neither judge nor privileged viewer,
but as co-participants in this process—indeed, vital ones, whose presence “make the performance
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meaningful.” Teachers are implored to eliminate habits of approval/disapproval, while balancing
this with the value of their authority in nudging performers toward more spontaneity-enhancing
avenues. They can do so best by also avoiding practices that control or impress, and giving their
focus to the collective agreement of the game. The use of authority should orient to whether
each player is working to their fullest, and whether the players are working together and
remaining focused on their purpose. Spolin’s work was the first systematic improv
methodology, written after long years spent primarily teaching her practices to children. A
second thread of methodology, also explicitly analyzing the term “spontaneity,” was not long
after initiated in the U. K. by Keith Johnstone, another writer who started as a children’s teacher,
but whose methodology is far more explicitly directed at adults.

Keith Johnstone
In his foundational improv text Impro: Improvisation and the Theatre, Keith Johnstone also
dedicates a full chapter with the title “Spontaneity.” His first associations for the term are with
“imagination” and “creativity,” citing examples of creativity tests, where subjects are evaluated
on tasks like finishing a picture from a squiggle, or coming up with a use for a common object.
Those who come up with a common use, or just add another squiggle, are classified as
“unimaginative” or “uncreative,” while those who make more complicated or bizarre choices are
seen as the opposite (75-76). However, he swiftly moves to trouble the approach to
categorization along these axes, arguing that instead of “showing people to be creative, or
uncreative…the tests are recording different activities. The person who adds a timid squiggle
may be trying to reveal as little as possible about himself” (76). The theme of imagination and
creativity being stifled and hidden as a result of social training, rather than lack of innate ability,
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is central throughout the chapter. He especially pins the basis of this phenomenon on
educational practices/attitudes, social attitudes about what art is, and beliefs about what are
“acceptable” ideas to express.
He decries attitudes in education that “encourage children to be unimaginative,” citing
examples of students shunned or insulted by their teachers for questioning textbook rules or
producing drawings that were not “correct” (76-77). He goes on to point out that “intelligence is
proportional to population, but talent appears not to be related” (76), going on to cite the ways in
which the European-descended inhabitants of his city “flounder” in their attempts to be original,
while the great art of the region was produced by natives. Native peoples are also described as
able to produce art on request, while “Nordic” art would require visiting a gallery to see. He
states that “most children can operate in a creative way until they’re eleven or twelve, when
suddenly they lose their spontaneity, and produce imitations of ‘adult art’,” and that a similar
phenomenon occurs when indigenous artists begin to produce work for whites, or when
“primitive painters” in Western culture seek formal education in their art (77). In Johnstone’s
view, to remain an artist means going against one’s education, and suggests that instead of the
artist as a “wild and aberrant figure,” we might view artists as those “constitutionally unable to
conform” to educational demands. He also suggests that, in terms of creativity, it might lead to
better teaching if, instead of thinking of children as “immature adults,” we think of adults as
“atrophied children.” He points out that many “well-adjusted” adults are “bitter, uncreative,
frightened, unimaginative, and rather hostile,” and that instead of assuming this is innate to their
characters, or that it is what being an adult means, “we might consider them as people damaged
by their education and upbringing” (78).
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Johnstone attributes the sudden “loss” of creativity at the onset of adolescence to changing
adult attitudes toward children wherein their creative works open then up for criticism, and
adolescents are compelled to create work that supports them appearing “sensitive” or “witty” or
“tough” or “intelligent,” or whatever image they seek to project. The notion of “creating” art is
important to this phenomenon, as Johnstone critiques the social attitude viewing the artist as
creator rather than “transmitter.” He writes that “we have an idea that art is self-expression—
which historically is weird. An artist used to be seen as a medium through which something else
operated” (78). Indigenous attitudes toward art see the resulting product as deriving from the
medium or the inspiration, not the character of the artist, but “once we believe that art is selfexpression, then the individual can be criticised not only for his skill or lack of skill, but simply
for being what he is” (79). He contrasts the “transmitter” belief with his own teachers’ efforts to
get him to ‘reject and discriminate” in his creative choices, in an effort to work out the “best”
choice, the one “anyone would have made who had thought long enough” (79). He argues that
instead, imagination should be as effortless as ordinary perception, where sensory stimulus is
dealt with automatically and unproblematically, only turning to “thinking” when it appears our
perception may be in error and we need to analyze its accuracy. He argues that imagination is
the same, effortless “unless we think it might be ‘wrong’, which is what our education
encourages us to believe. Then we experience ourselves as ‘imagining’, as ‘thinking up an idea’,
but what we’re really doing is faking up the sort of imagination we think we ought to have” (80).
He points out that people are routinely highly creative in such everyday activities as imagining
while reading, rationalizing and maintaining prejudices, and reacting in embarrassing situations;
while these reactions may often be unsatisfactory to others, they don’t have to be “thought up,”
and “spr[i]ng to mind quite automatically” (81).
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Johnstone states that “at school any spontaneous act was likely to get me into trouble” and
that “whatever came into my mind first should be rejected in favour of better ideas,” initial ideas
being unsatisfactory because they may be thought of as psychotic, obscene, or unoriginal (82).
He goes on to strongly criticize these categories as bases for treating ideas as unacceptable. He
views sanity not as an objective psychological state, but as a way people learn to behave out of
fear of rejection, for “being classified insane is to be shut out of the group in very complete way”
(83). He notes that people often think they’re a bit “crazier” than average, understanding their
own sanity as a “performance,” but not the energy expended by others to maintain their own
versions of this performance. Sanity, he argues, has nothing to do with how you think, but is
instead “a matter of presenting yourself as safe” (83). He gives examples of bizarre behavior
accepted because it was how the person “always” acted, citing a study concluding that it is
“when someone’s behaviour was perceived as ‘unpredictable’ that the community rejected them”
(83). He tells students that “sanity is a matter of interaction, rather than of one’s mental
processes” and recommends a “guru” who “reassure[s] by example” and “gives permission” to
students to “allow forbidden thoughts into their consciousness.” Without this example of “living
proof that…the imagination will not destroy you,” students will “go on pretending to be dull”
(84). He notes especially that laughter is a practice for controlling people: “You suppress
unwanted laughter or you start controlling it. We suppress our spontaneous impulses, we censor
our imaginations, we learn to present ourselves as ‘ordinary’, and we destroy our talent—then no
one laughs at us” (84). But what evokes laughter is often exactly what makes for good theatre,
and we turn to theatre to see “mad” thoughts expressed, while in everyday life we instinctively
understand that “mad thoughts are those which other people find unacceptable, and train us not
to talk about” (84-85).
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Obscenity, too, is a form of unacceptable expression we are trained not to talk about, and a
basis for self-censorship. In counter to general notions of obscenity that associate it with
sexuality or vulgar language, Johnstone emphasizes the relativity of obscenity, pointing out that
society provides many spaces for acceptable obscene expression—festivals, office parties, friend
or peer groups with a certain relationship, etc (85). The classroom is not one of these spaces;
yet, he highlights the hypocrisy of teachers’ obscene storytelling in the lounge followed by
punishing students for the same sort of expression. For teachers of performance, he advocates
for avoiding any notion of obscenity in criticizing student expression, instead allowing the
students “to behave as they want to behave.” The class is best “seen as a party, rather than a
formal teacher-pupil set up,” and students should “speak and act with the same freedom they
have outside of school.” Performances should not seek to be “obscene,” but performers should
“be aware of the ideas that are occurring to them,” and not self-censor over social notions of
acceptable expression for a space (87).
He cites the desire for “originality” as a third basis for self-censorship of expression.
Performers want to be “thought clever,” and “believe they know exactly what originality is, just
as critics are always sure they can recognize things that are avant-garde” (87). Johnstone asks
that a performer “realise that the more obvious he is, the more original…[and] the more himself
he appears” (87-88). When people are asked to give an original idea it throws them into chaos,
but if they just “said the first thing that came into their head, there’d be no problem” (88). “An
artist who is inspired is being obvious” instead of “weighing one idea against another.” What is
an “obvious” choice varies with persons and situations, but it is the direction toward which
spontaneity moves, while “striving after originality takes you far away from your true self, and
makes your work mediocre” (88).
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Johnstone offers examples of these principles in practice through on-the-spot word
generation, showing students rejecting their first ideas due to the reasons above, and noting that
“normally the mind doesn’t know that it’s rejecting the first answers” unless the process is
interrupted by pointing out the student’s hesitation (90). But students don’t need to hesitate, and
will seem more “inventive” by accepting the first idea: If asked to pick up an object without
thinking, “my hand is very likely to pick up something I don’t want…but the audience will be
delighted” (90-91). He especially advocates the general principle of saying “yes” to the
imaginative ideas of other performers, warning against saying “no” as way of controlling the
scene. Although “no” develops conflict, which is valuable to storytelling, “it’s important that we
don’t exploit the actors’ conflicts,” for even in an argument, “the actors should still be cooperating, and coolly developing the action…[the actor’s] first skill lies in releasing his partner’s
imagination.” Performers who practice saying “yes” to others “learn how their ‘normal’
procedures destroy other people’s talent” and gradually come to “understand that all the weapons
they were using against other people they also use inwardly, against themselves” (93).
He calls “anything an actor does” an offer, which can be accepted (“yes”) or blocked (“no”).
Blocking is “anything that prevents the action from developing, or that wipes out the partner’s
premise;” disagreeing or resisting is not blocking as long as it accepts the situation and moves
action along (97). He writes that “scenes spontaneously generate themselves if both actors offer
and accept alternately…something no ‘normal’ person would do,” and further, that instead of
“thinking up” an offer, actors should “assume that one has already been made” to get the action
rolling (99). He describes embrace of this practice as appearing “supernatural…you are
suddenly in contact with people who are unbounded, whose imagination seems to function
without limit” (100). In summation, Johnstone reinforces the link between spontaneity and
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imagination. Though “reading about spontaneity won’t make you more spontaneous,”
practicing his exercises about offers, accepting and blocking will help students understand his
central points: “(1) that we struggle against our imaginations, especially when we try to be
imaginative; (2) that we are not responsible for the content of our imaginations; and (3) that we
are not, as we are taught to think, our ‘personalities’, but that the imagination is our true self”
(105).
Johnstone expands on his concept with another chapter titled “Spontaneity” in his later Impro
for Storytellers. He repeats many of the same themes from Impro, especially giving examples of
the many ways that fear of revealing one’s “self” leads to suppression of the imagination,
through fear of psychotic thought or the desire to be “original.” He expands on the role and
practices of the improvisation teacher, starting by pointing out that “if you’re going to teach
spontaneity, you’ll have to become spontaneous yourself;” instead of placing the burden of
incentive on students, “the incentive has to be generated, or increased by the attitude of the
teacher” (55). This is done through “progressive desensitization” of students through exposure
to “dangerous ideas,” normalizing such ideas and thus making them safe for expression (56).
When introducing exercises, he advocates first encouraging students to “do it wrong,” so they
can recognize when they are self-censoring “accidentally” (56), as well as for the teacher to
“correct errors as they occur” rather than to “explain games exhausively—which implies that
errors should not be made” (60). Teachers should also pointedly “accept…responsibility for the
students’ failures,” which makes them appear more confident and reduces student fears of being
judged (60), and to posit some games as “advanced” (whether they are or not), where students
are predicted to fail but “it’ll be fun anyway,” as a way to encourage volunteerism in
participation (62).
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He emphasizes the relationship between scene partners, encouraging evaluation of scenes for
both parties in terms of whether their partner is enjoying working with them. Rather than trying
to “win” the scene by being in control, performers should be responsive to their partners, and
prepared to be changed through their interaction—“Instead of telling actors that they must be
good listeners (which is confusing), we should say, ‘Be altered by what’s said’”(59). For
individual performers, he pushes the attitude of “being average,” noting that “’trying harder’
can’t make you spontaneous.” In contrast, teaching approaches that encourage social displays of
“trying” do not aid learning and carry “the risk that that ‘thinking’ may become a ‘forced
activity’, never again to be experienced as effortless” (64). He argues that “we only try when we
don’t trust the forces within us,” whereas “being average” opens up potential because it “allows
automatic processes to take over” (65).
It is important to remember that “average” does not mean “dull.” As a method for generating
content, Johnstone strongly advocates taking risks, for excitement is maximized as the odds of
failure increase—though making it harder should never be used as a practice to justify failure for
those uncomfortable with it (67-68). To be “average” means to be “obvious,” which means
“being your own person, not somebody else’s, and it lets the spectators see you as courageous
and brilliant, because they would be terrified to function so effortlessly” (71). “Dullness” is
instead a technique, “a set of procedures for ensuring that nothing untoward happens” (68), and
can be reversed, but this needs to fall toward the obvious rather than the “original,” for “being
‘original’ and being ‘stupid’ are often identical” (69), both being techniques that constitute
“avoidance of the obvious” and stymies creativity (70). If performers are obvious (i.e., “your
own person”), then “things will happen. ‘Stupidity’ and ‘cleverness’ are devices that stop things
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from happening” (70). “Original” ideas are great, but should be generated through the obvious,
for “you mustn’t use ‘originality’ to deny the audience things that you have promised them” (72).
He closes with returned focus on imagination as central to spontaneity, and the importance of
allowing it to operate freely for a performer, lamenting the “narrow range of approved ideas” that
most perfectly sane people avoid out of fear of “crazy thinking,” a shame because “it’s their
behaviour that classifies people as insane, not their thinking” (72). Imagination runs up against
the created “social-self that would shield us against the onslaughts of other people…If we can
perfect this, we’ll hardly ever get laughed at against our will, but the imagination will be our
enemy—because it refuses to present us as…whatever else we’re pretending to be” (72). If
teachers reassure and protect students, coaxing them into “forbidden areas,” then “a seething
mass of lunatic thoughts will emerge that aren’t dull in the least. The teacher has to establish
such ‘craziness’ as a mark of sanity” (73), thereby reversing the association involved in
maintenance of the “social self.” Laughter is helpful in making “forbidden ideas” acceptable,
and Johnstone says “The best trick I know for releasing the imagination is to persuade the
students that their imaginations have nothing to do with them” (73). Instead, he encourages
students to think of imagination as having a will of its own, that they should accept no
responsibility for it, and to detach the self—the “I”—from it, for creativity is not self-expression,
but rather “the acceptance of gifts from an unknown source” (73). However, this view of the
imagination is meant as but a temporary safety net to encourage free expression of it, for
“ultimately students have to accept that the imagination is the true self” (73, emphasis added).
Johnstone’s account of spontaneity provides many illuminating parallels and contrasts with
Spolin’s account when considered in terms of our ideographic dimensions. Spontaneity, as in
Spolin’s account, is also a relationship between experience and behavior. But where Spolin
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gives primacy to the experiential side, Johnstone emphasizes behavior. He assesses successful
(and unsuccessful) occurrences of spontaneity by considering the products of action, especially
artistic or performance products, but also activities like conversation. The experiential side is
important—a “spontaneous” act is one that proceeds from the imagination, unfiltered through
desire for a certain social interpretation by others. But the student need not be aware of this
experiential state; action that proceeds from such a state is spontaneous in Johnstone’s account
regardless of what the student experiences about it, whereas in Spolin the experience of
“freedom” and “intuition” is central. Johnstone evaluates spontaneity in terms of acts and
responses that he deems untainted by fears of evaluations of psychosis and/or obscenity, or by
desire to be “original.”
This may in part be an artifact of a key difference in their writing styles. Spolin writes very
abstractly and pointedly eschews even simple examples, writing that while examples are
“sometimes helpful, the reverse is more often true, for the student is bound to give back what has
already been experienced” (39). In contrast, Johnstone relies heavily on examples and
descriptions of what he considers both spontaneous and non-spontaneous behavior. This major
stylistic difference reinforces their emphases in the behavior-experience relationship. Spolin
wishes to avoid evaluating particular “solutions” as better or worse ways of playing a game
(“there is no absolutely right or wrong solution to a problem”), leading her to shy from
describing and interpreting particular occasions of game-play as spontaneous or not. Avoiding
particular instances, she instead gives extensive account of the experiential and relational
characteristics that she sees as promoting spontaneity. Johnstone’s embrace of examples to
illustrate his account of spontaneity naturally leads him in the direction of giving primacy to
observable behavior. Though leaving much leeway for differences between individual social
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actors, Johnstone is far less reserved than Spolin about judging certain actions and responses as
genuinely spontaneous or not.
He uses several metrics in doing so. Most are expressed negatively, as the absence of
something spontaneity-inhibiting, rather than in positive accounts of overt behavior; in the
absence of inhibitions on spontaneity, whatever behavior emerges is essentially by definition
spontaneous. But in evaluating what is observable, he privileges especially behavior that is free
of hesitation, where people act on their first impulse. He also privileges behavior that expresses
(or at least seems comfortable with expressing) common social notions of psychosis or
obscenity. He is leery of any behavior that appears to affect “dullness” (a person’s conforming
to their perception of social notions of being “ordinary”). But he also condemns behavior that
exhibits “trying”, especially in the sense of striving for “originality” or “cleverness.” This is the
mirror image of the injunction against being purposefully dull: a person is still acting in reaction
to their perception of society’s notions of ordinariness, but then tries to violate them (which
Johnstone argues usually fails or produces an “inappropriate”, i.e., ineffective, response to the
situation). Instead of dullness or cleverness, Johnstone give primacy to “obviousness.” Whereas
being “ordinary” means conforming behavior to perceived social norms, being “obvious” means
acting as a transmitter of what appears when an individual’s imagination is operating without
inhibition.
An individual’s imagination is labeled “the true self.” Spontaneity is thus imbued as a
quality of individual’s actions, exhibited when those actions reflect an individual’s unfettered
imagination. Spontaneity in groups, for Johnstone, reflects less a collective experience of shared
focus and purpose, as in Spolin, and more of a shared commitment of group members to helping
each other access and express their individual imaginations. Whether by notions of obscenity,
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psychosis, ordinariness, originality, or our characterization of self as we want it interpreted, it is
other people that inhibit the imagination, through an individual’s fear of their judgment and/or
seeking of their approval. Self-censoring usually blocks the expression of imagination before it
is ever conveyed, but group behavior (especially in the performance activities on which
Johnstone focuses) can also stymie expression of imagination, through behaviors like the denial
of ideas expressed, or the blocking of action as a way of “being in control”—the overt, social
equivalents of individual self-censorship techniques. Groups can mutually assist the free
expression of imagination through behaviors that “accept” (say “yes” to) whatever is expressed
by others.
The markers that Johnstone lays down for evaluating spontaneity suggest a larger and more
involved role for an authority (“guru” in his terms) seeking to unlock this quality in students than
we find in Spolin. He advocates the guru as a model for the students, who “gives permission” to
access and express uninhibited imagination. The guru should also model spontaneity (“you’ll
have to become spontaneous yourself”). As such, the role of the guru’s interpretation and
evaluation of expression has a much larger scope than Spolin’s “authority.” The focus for Spolin
is on the “game”—are the students engaged fully with addressing the “problem that needs
solving?” A great deal of the authority’s input is determined by the shared activity itself.
Johnstone describes a number of activities used as instructional devices, but the focus for the
guru is on students’ expression of imagination in a very general way, given far more emphasis
than engagement in the activity. Because spontaneous behavior is defined mostly in negative
terms (lack of inhibition), the guru must quash inhibition as inhibition quashes spontaneity, as
well as modeling an example of such uninhibited expression. This means considering what will
be recognized as inhibiting notions of psychosis, obscenity, ordinariness, originality, etc., and
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rewarding behavior perceived to be uninfluenced by their inhibiting effects, while encouraging
changes to behavior that does exhibit these inhibiting affects. The guru must make judgment
calls about whether a student is being “obvious,” and respond accordingly. Thus, despite
Johnstone’s extensive concern about approval/disapproval in establishing inhibition in the first
place, his relational practices suggest a much more prominent role for it than in Spolin, where the
authority may choose the activities used to focus experience/behavior, but thereafter should
evaluate only in terms of responsiveness to the shared activity itself.
In a sense, Johnstone’s account of spontaneity shares Spolin’s binary concept—at the
moment of experience and action, either the imagination is being expressed uninhibited or it is
not. However, the array of different inhibiting factors he assesses suggests somewhat more of a
scale of greater/lesser spontaneity, as some factors may weigh more or less heavily than others.
No ready quantification on this scale is possible; only a general sense of degree to which the
imagination is operating without constraint. Greater/lesser degrees of spontaneity are more
applicable to individuals’ overall behavior over time than to any given moment. An individual’s
degree of capacity for expression of spontaneity is primarily affected by learned behavior
patterns. Inherent subject characteristics do not appear to be given credence as affecting
spontaneity, given Johnstone’s accounts of the natural expression of full spontaneity exhibited by
children until inhibited by social education. Learned behavior patterns of self-censorship
established through this education reduce capacity for spontaneous expression (though not
capacity for spontaneity itself, which is in principle unlimited for everyone). Presumably, new
behavior patterns which reduce self-censorship can also be learned. While environmental and
relational characteristics of a situation have significant power to reinforce or disrupt these
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learned behavior patterns, it is the influence of the learned patterns themselves that affects
capacity for spontaneous expression.
Spontaneity for Johnstone is a normatively positive quality—he refers to inhibited adults as
“atrophied children,” positively associates the term with creativity and cooperation, and he
negatively associates it against insecurity, control, and conflict. The positive value of
spontaneity in his account seems primarily a potentiality—the unlimited potential of the
imagination against the pressures oppressing it. When this potentiality is expressed, it becomes a
productive force that he claims supports healthier mental states, and more honest and amicable
social interaction. Spontaneity is not so much valued as an end in itself—there is, after all, an
inexhaustible latent wellspring of it in each individual—as it is valued for what it can do when
given unfettered expression. While considered inhibition has its uses—one should remember
whether one can swim before diving into a river to help somebody—the performance context
that is Johnstone’s particular focus has little use for it, outside of practical concerns for
performers’ shared safety.
The value of this potentiality aligns with Ivanhoe’s concepts of untutored and unconstrained
spontaneity. If the imagination is the “true self,” and spontaneity the expression of imagination,
than a person acting spontaneously is acting in accordance with some fundamental self, and thus
aligns with the values of Ivanhoe’s untutored variety. However, his heavy emphasis on the many
forms of limitation imposed on expression of imagination implies spontaneity’s value as
reflecting the lack of these constraints on expression, aligning with Ivanhoe’s unconstrained
form of spontaneity. There appears to be little role for cultivated spontaneity in his concept;
indeed, the cultivation of automatic social responses is seen as precisely the main culprit in
inhibiting spontaneity. While one can cultivate behavior patterns that tend toward greater
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degrees of spontaneity, this is seen as a shedding of acquired constraints rather than the direct
development of a spontaneous nature, which exists innately in everyone.
In sum, Spolin and Johnstone’s accounts of spontaneity diverge along several important axes
that set the terms for accounts of spontaneity by later improv methodology writers. Spontaneity
for Spolin is primarily instantiated in experience, while Johnstone emphasizes behavioral
expression. Both concepts can be seen as aligned with the values of untutored and unconstrained
spontaneity, but Spolin’s emphasis falls on the unconstrained side—to act “freely” is good in
itself—while removal of constraint in Johnstone is only important insofar as enabling access to
the untutored self of the imagination. For Spolin, spontaneity is a valued end in itself, while for
Johnstone it is a potentiality that can emerge as a productive force. Spontaneity can be directly
experienced on a group level for Spolin, while for Johnstone it is primarily an individual affair,
though a group’s practices can assist individuals’ openness to it. Finally, in terms of practices
oriented to enhancing spontaneity for improviers, Spolin emphasizes deep involvement with a
defined activity/problem (“game”), whereas Johnstone’s practicum activities are not ends in
themselves but means for recognizing self-inhibition and reducing it in expression. Despite these
many divergences, both writers share a sense of spontaneity that focuses on moment-to-moment
behavior and experience, a consideration that remains central throughout improv methodology.
However, the next major development in improv practices was toward “long-form” improv, a
practice for generating extended improvisational performances, with many instances of
“moment-to-moment” spontaneity connected through shared elements of theme, world, and
narrative.
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Halpern, Close, Johnson and Long-form Improvisation
Charna Halpern, Del Close and Kim Johnson offer the earliest methodology of long-form
improv in Truth in Comedy. Long-form can be understood as the extended
exploration/development of a theme, world, and/or narrative though improvisation, often through
multiple scenes and returning over time to the same characters, settings, and/or events to develop
and heighten them in relation to each other. Many forms are possible, but their end-goal in this
text is the production of “Harold,” a specific form developed at I.O. Improvisational Theatre,
based in Chicago. The Harold opens with an audience suggestion, which is used as the basis for
a “pattern game” to explore themes emergent from the suggestion. The cast then perform three
unrelated scenes (focused on a relationship between characters, a concrete environment/setting,
and an event of significance to the characters) inspired by the initial pattern game. The cast then
performs a “game” inspired by themes emerging from the first three scenes. The cast then
returns to the first three scenes, developing them further (often moving forward in time) and
perhaps establishing indirect connections between them and/or the first game. Another game is
then played, further developing themes from what has come before. Finally, a third set of scenes
attempts to connect the previous scenes, games, and themes as thoroughly as possible (133-42).
This goal for their method leads to a very different approach from Spolin and Johnstone. The
former two methodologists were concerned with more discrete moments of improvisation, and
with performers’ focus on their shared problem/activity or on responsiveness to their
imaginations, respectively. In contrast, Halpern et al. are concerned with the generation of
content at the level of a full-scale show for an audience. In Spolin and Johnstone, spontaneity is
a quality of experience and/or behavior for the performers involved; in Halpern et al.,
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spontaneity takes on much more the character of a method for performance, one for the effective
generation of successful content.
In navigating this shift, they move away from explicit deployment of the term “spontaneity.”
Whereas Spolin and Johnstone both devote whole sections titled by the term, and go to pains to
elucidate their visions of it, the concept is dealt with far more indirectly in Halpern et al. They
use the term “spontaneity” only twice, both times in a highly abstract way. Quoting Chris
Farley, they describe the Harold as “something that is created slowly, out of the moment. It’s
spontaneous and magic” (20). They also compare the techniques of chess and ping pong; in the
former, players must carefully anticipate and concentrate on moving their own plans forward,
while in the latter, players must be constantly prepared to act not with a planned agenda, but in
reaction to the needs of the moment, as the ball bounces. They conclude, “Improv is much closer
to ping pong than it is to chess. Actors create an improv scene in the same spontaneous way”
(71). Nonetheless, comparison with more explicit deployments of “spontaneity” reveals that it is
still a key principle in their methodology. But unlike Spolin and Johnstone, who ask us to
engage directly with the concept, spontaneity is approached indirectly, to be understood though a
cluster of related terms, through specific performance examples ascribed as displaying
spontaneity or its lack, and through the activities recommended to enhance it.
The use of a cluster of related terms is analogous to the approach used (especially by Kipper
and his various collaborators) in quantifying spontaneity as a dimension of personality. As
discussed in Chapter Two, their quantitative analysis correlates spontaneity with associated terms
such as playfulness, extroversion, creativity, well-being, present-time orientation, and ability to
respond effectively in novel or challenging situations. They also quantify spontaneity in contrast
to both healthy and pathological behaviors/experiences associated with routinized behavior, as
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well as in opposition to measures of depression, neuroticism, anxiety, obsessive-compulsive
behavior, past-time orientation, and stress. Spontaneity is to a certain degree evaluated
situationally; they judge spontaneity in part as an effective response in a context.
Halpern et al. also treat spontaneity as efficacious; its engagement by performers leads to a
better improv product. While making no effort to quantify it, they use a similar cluster of terms
to make its meaning clearer by association. As seen in the two examples where they use the term
itself, spontaneity is positively correlated with “magic” and negatively with planning and
anticipation. Other expressions associated with successful improv (which they would interpret
as spontaneous by definition) include “making it up as you go along” and “honest discovery,
observation, and reaction” (14). The notion of “honesty” is very important, thus the “Truth” of
the title and their central claim that “The truth is funny” (15). Placing “trust” in others is key to
shared spontaneity with a group, and to “let go” and trust others is “a wonderful, liberating
experience” (16). As in Johnstone, “trying” is seen as a recipe for failure, and a performer
should instead seek to be “sincere and honest…relaxed and natural” (23), for the best comedy is
based on “exposing our own personalities” (16).
Improviers should “listen” deeply to both the verbal language and expressive subtext of other
performers, and “avoid preconceived notions” of what is happening in a scene, instead adapting
their responses appropriately as the scene is built in conjunction with their stage partners (64).
Hesitation is not treated as prima facie suspect as in Johnstone, for taking time to offer a
“carefully considered response” is likely to lead to a “more intelligent” response than the “kneejerk” one that may emerge without consideration—taking the time to see how one’s coperformers are affected allows one to respond from a more “honest and emotional” state, which
is seen as more effective and thus more spontaneous (63). Instant response is not necessarily
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more spontaneous. Instead, it is critical to be “in the moment” and to act “moment to moment;”
performers should “follow the scene along, but they shouldn’t try to control it” (73). Ideally,
performers will cultivate a capacity for simultaneous action and reflection that aids their ability
to “keep an open mind” and drop their own ideas about the direction of a scene in favor of
agreement with what is communicated and established (82), and to make “active [as opposed to
passive] choices” that move action forward (84). This calls for attention and response to the
“now” of the scene, avoiding shifts of reference to memories of the past, possibilities of the
future, or to events offstage, except insofar as they have an immediate impact on the actual
action of the scenic moment (88).
Improviers are enjoined to be open to their “subconscious” or “unconscious” choices—to
“trust their inner voices” and allow “the unconscious mind” to lead them “down the right path”
(91). This is not to imply “correct” choices in performance which are best accessed by the
subconscious. Indeed, they repeatedly emphasize that “there are no mistakes” in improv (43),
for anything established can be “justified” (i.e., made sense of in terms of the reality created by
the performers), and this justification process is a major source of delight for the audience.
Rather than a way of accessing “correct” responses, the subconscious is best seen as overcoming
a performer’s “ego” that “hangs onto preconceived notions” in favor of openness to possibility
(91). In making choices, performers should seek to “discover, rather than invent” (104).
Readers are reminded that “it is impossible for the character an actor is playing to get stuck;” it
is the actor, not the character, that is stuck, and since the character shares the being of its
performer, “the player must reveal himself in this person…all they need to do is react honestly”
(113). Improviers should trust their “instinct” and “impulse” (121), which, cultivated against the
control-oriented ego, will tend to lead in more successful directions on stage.
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This cluster of associations gives a clearer sense of the meaning of spontaneity for Halpern et
al. We can understand the role of “spontaneity” in their text especially through positive
affiliation of terms and phrases such as “honesty,” “trust,” “letting go,” “exposing one’s self,”
“being in the moment,” having an “open mind,” the operation of the “subconscious” or
“unconscious” in the form of the “inner voice,” trusting one’s “instinct” or “impulse,” and
“discovery.” The meaning of spontaneity is also elucidated through its contrast against a
number of terms and phrases, especially “planning,” “trying” (particularly “trying” to be funny),
“preconceived notions,” “control,” “passivity,” “ego,” and “inventing.”
Several specific activities are also described as exercises for enhancing various aspects of
spontaneity. The “pattern game” is a simple group activity of fast word/phrase association by a
group from a suggestion offered as stimulus, used for “discovery and exploration” of the many
possibilities associable with an initial jumping-off point, and commonly used as the first step of a
Harold (29-34). In the “ad game,” a group must come up with all the elements of an advertising
campaign for an imaginary product or service; the focus is on enthusiastic agreement with every
idea that is expressed, followed by immediately moving on to the next element while building on
ideas already accepted (52-54). The principle of “agreement” is central to their account of both
effective spontaneity and improv technique in general; in discussing improv “rules” and when
“breaking” them is acceptable, they repeatedly state that “the only rule that can never be broken
is the rule of agreement” (35, 47). “One-word story” asks a group to tell a coherent story in
which each performer in turn may contribute only a single word at a time. The focus is on
careful listening, not planning contributions in advance, and immediate (“reflexive”) response.
Players should seek to meet the “in-the-moment” needs of the sentence and story rather than
trying to control of the story’s direction or making a “larger” contribution at the expense of
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coherence or forward progress—contributions of “the,” “to,” “of,” and other so-called “minor”
articles and prepositions are just as central to the success of the game as more prominent nouns
and verbs (75-76). Many other exercises are offered throughout the text, but these examples
seem most directly related to the principles the writers associate with spontaneity.
Applying our analytic/ideographic dimensions to the role of spontaneity in Halpern et al.’s
methodology suggests yet another account distinct from the work of Spolin and Johnstone
(neither of whom are cited as having direct influence on their concepts). As in Johnstone,
spontaneity seems to be a quality of both behavior and experience, but behavior is emphasized,
again in part due to the method of using many specific examples. The methodology is developed
with a much more specific goal—a multidimensional, comparatively long, spontaneous theatrical
performance—and their account of spontaneity is developed through behavioral patterns
intended to facilitate this goal. However, assessment of one’s own experience seems key to the
successful deployment and development of these practices. Many of the cluster of terms they
use around spontaneity invoke internal experience: “open mind,” “sub/unconscious,” “inner
voice,” “instinct/impulse,” as well as against “preconceived notions” and “ego.” But the goal is
to allow these principles to be expressed in behavior: being “in the moment” when making
choices, “exposing the self,” “honesty, “discovery,” and in opposition to “trying,” “control,” and
“inventing.”
Spontaneity does not appear to have a binary quality for them, as it is less assessed in terms
of individual moments than in terms of overall patterns of behavior and experience. As such, it
exists in degrees, though quantifying such degrees seems impossible except in very broad,
subjective terms of how successful an improvier is in performance. Spontaneity for them is a
normatively positive quality. However, it is primarily a productive force rather than an end in
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itself as in Spolin, or a potentiality as in Johnstone. In a sense, it is latent as a potential in one’s
“self” or “subconscious,” but is ultimately purposed as a productive force for successful improv
performance, not as its own raison d’etre. Its value is strongly connected with Ivanhoe’s
“cultivated” sense of spontaneity: Successful Harold skills are learned and developed, becoming
more “natural” with practice. The invocation of “self” and “subconscious” certainly suggests an
important role for untutored spontaneity, but the focus is more on using the resource of the self to
facilitate effective improv performance behaviors. The overcoming of constraints does not seem
to play an important role in the value they connect with spontaneity, except implicitly the
constraint of less-developed skill.
With their tight attention to improv performance practices, Halpern et al. do not explore the
desirability of spontaneity in contexts—in improv it seems unequivocally good, but other
contexts are simply not addressed (with the exception of their analogy of ping pong vs. chess,
where we can guess that spontaneity is thought unlikely to lead to success in the latter) . Greater
or lesser degrees of spontaneity do not appear to be related to inherent subject characteristics.
They never seem to posit that some people will be naturally better improviers than others.
Indeed, they repeatedly emphasize that improvisation is hardly something only “trained actors
and comics” can do. Instead, “we all do it every day” (9). If, “strictly speaking, improvisation is
making it up as you go along” then “this definition makes all of us expert improvisers. We all go
through life every day without a script, responding to our environment, making it up as we go
along” (14). Rather than invoke the inherent capacity for spontaneity in everybody, as do Spolin
and Johnstone, Halpern et al. go a step further and declare that we always already act from a
place of spontaneity in our everyday doings, with their account aimed at using it to accomplish
the specific purpose of improv for an audience. Greater degrees of spontaneity for this purpose
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are posited in connection with learned behaviors, i.e., learning the skills for improv that they
outline.
While environmental factors do not appear posited as affecting spontaneity, relational
characteristics are highly significant. While increasing individual capacity for spontaneity is
certainly important, the performance product that their system aims toward is a group
production—the Harold player is “part of a team” (117). As such, the practices they invoke to
increase spontaneity are directed toward social, rather than individual spontaneity. Though
spontaneity is indicated as an individual quality through some of the aspects of experience they
connect with it, actual recognition of it is done with respect to social interaction, the working
together with other improviers. Social spontaneity in such a pair or group is especially
recognized in practices of agreement. This central principle parallels Johnstone’s
“acceptance”—both explicitly connect it with “saying yes”—but at another level parallels
Spolin’s “focus” with respect to “games.”
Halpern et al. make use of the agreement principle on two levels: agreement with scene
partners and agreement with the scene itself. At the first level, players are enjoined to agree with
the reality established by all participants in the scene. Whatever one performer treats as “true” in
the world of the scene should be agreed to by all participants as a shared reality. In addition to
agreement on the reality of the scene, performers should also “agree to accept each other’s
initiations” (47), that is, to follow along with each other’s indications about the direction they
want to take the action of the scene. Denial of reality or initiation “ends the progression of the
scene” (48). Players are also strongly discouraged from asking questions, as this “places the
burden” of creation on others—instead, they should make and express assumptions that
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contribute to the reality/action (57-58). Conflict between characters is not problematic as long
as the performers agree to the reality and direction of the scene (49).
At the second level, Halpern et al., like Spolin, invoke the concept of “games,” but
operationalize the term quite differently. Spolin recognizes games as explicit frameworks for
focus in creating action, a “problem” to be “solved” in any number of creative ways, as long as
players adhere to the game’s “rules.” While Halpern et al. do offer exercises in this model that
could potentially be used in performance, they generally do not speak of “games” as preestablished, explicit rule structures. Instead, many are “invented on the spot” or found in
recognized tropes like “one-upsmanship” or unusual speech patterns. Players attend to the
information and action established to “discover” the scene’s game, or “structure of the scene”
(59). This game takes on the form of a “pattern” that players agree to as a basis for moving
action forward—“Find your game, and you’ve found your scene” (87). Players are enjoined to
“agree” to the discovered pattern that emerges, as well as to the reality established by each other.
The scene’s “game,” the recognized, shared pattern of action, encompasses agreement with each
other’s individual initiations, providing a clear direction for the entire group. In an idealized
situation, the performers achieve a “group mind” whose members, though not actually sharing
thoughts, “have a very strong sense of the group as an entity of its own, and connects with its
feelings and requirements. There is an empathy among the individuals involved, almost an
instinct. The members exist to serve the needs of the group” (92).
So agreement takes place between individuals who accept and make use of what is
established by each other, as in Johnstone’s practice of encouraging the full expression of
imagination in others. But this level of agreement is encompassed by shared agreement to a
“game,” not explicitly deployed as in Spolin, but “found” in the ongoing action of the scene, and
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potentially subject to refinement or reconfiguration as the action moves forward, driven by the
pattern discovered. This account of agreement constitutes the hallmark for recognition of social
spontaneity in Halpern et al.’s methodology. It also offers something of a synthesis of Spolin
and Johnstone’s divergent accounts of group spontaneity, with performers employing both
agreement with others and agreement on a focus for action, emphasizing either as they seek to
meet the needs of the performance. Nonetheless, the methodology of Truth in Comedy leans
much more toward the Spolin tradition, with its emphasis on spontaneity as generated through
overt practices, as opposed to Johnstone’s more interior emphasis on shedding inculturation as a
basis for supporting spontaneous behavior. In contrast, Carol Hazenfield takes Johnstone’s
emphasis a step further, offering a methodology centered on not only shedding inculturated
blocks to spontaneous behavior, but on direct engagement with interior experience as a central
practice for generating spontaneity.

Carol Hazenfield
In Acting on Impulse: The Art of Making Improv Theater, Carol Hazenfield critiques the
predominant strain in improv training of an “outside-in” model of cultivating attitudes and
practices, as espoused in the above systems. She describes such systems as built around the
premise of “follow these rules, behave in this way, and these results will occur” (11). In
contrast, she describes her methodology as “inside out,” an “experiential” method “based on
behaving truthfully in any given situation. You’ll learn to follow your impulses as they occur,
without filtering them through a set of improv rules or games. When you improvise
instinctually, from your own unique experience, you can be effective in every scene” (11-12).
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She thus gives great credence to making improv performance work from impulse rather than
principle. At the same time, the particular performance product she aims toward is relatively
highly structured. Though her practices work just as well for individual scenes, she is much
more focused on long-form improv. However, her idea of long-form is very different from the
Harold described above. The Harold is highly structured in terms of its arrangement of content,
but not in the content itself, which is meant to be as broad-ranging as possible. In contrast, the
arrangement of a show in Hazenfield is much less structured, but the content itself adheres to a
much more rigid pattern, described as “protagonist-centered storytelling.” In this narrative
structure, performers “1. Establish the protagonist, 2. Define the journey (which involves posing
a question to which we want to know the answer), 3. Raise the stakes and develop the scene, 4.
Answer the question definitively, and 5. Show how the protagonist has been changed” (92).
Hazenfield’s vision of long-form is far more narrative-centered than the Harold; in the latter,
narrative is present but ultimately subsumed to the exploration of themes and ideas. In
Hazenfield, the reverse is true: she explores the use of themes, especially in connection with
“genres” of theatre (171-78), but they are ultimately used as a means of supporting the prevailing
narrative of the protagonist’s journey.
Like Halpern et al., Hazenfield uses the specific term “spontaneity” only a handful of times,
but deploys it more purposefully. Interestingly, she appears to have a more ambivalent
relationship with the term than earlier methodologists, and it is not always couched in a positive
context. Early on, she decries the limitation that a “throwaway theatre” mentality brings to
improv, with low standards by the audience, who “expect to laugh, go home, and forget about it”
(9). She criticizes improv performers who respond “What’s wrong with improv the way is? We
make people laugh and we’re being spontaneous,” asking “But is that all there is?...It’s no
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wonder improv is the poor relation to theater. We’re not challenging each other or the audience”
(9-10). Shortly thereafter she equates spontaneity with illogical behavior, writing that many
people “find themselves frustrated when they improvise. Their partners in scenes often act
illogically (i.e., spontaneously) and these folks are at a loss to respond” (12).
On the other hand, she also writes that “No written play can match the edge and spontaneity
of an improv show” (9) and that students rely on improv teachers to “establish an atmosphere full
of trust, excellence and spontaneity” (209). Inveighing performers to be comfortable with not
knowing information in a scene, she writes “you may find that you look forward to those electric
moments of being off-balance, because they bring excitement and spontaneity to the stage” (80).
Most powerfully, immediately after laying out her vision of improv as a practice that can match
the emotional and narrative depth of scripted theatre, she writes “This journey requires attention
and practice; powerful spontaneous theater is created through commitment, experimentation, and
risk” (11). Clearly spontaneity also has significant positive value for her.
I believe a reasonable interpretation of this ambivalence with spontaneity may be that she
views the ideograph as being used to justify lower-quality improv work, where as long as
performers are being “spontaneous,” the needs of the art form are met. Her equation of
spontaneity with illogical behavior appears to parallel Johnstone’s injunctions against “being
original” or “cleverness,” or Halpern et al.’s warnings against “invention” as opposed to
“discovery.” Again, the notion of spontaneity is in these cases used to justify choices that
undermine the story or fellow players. But she also praises spontaneity highly, and we may view
her methodology as an attempt to reclaim the concept of spontaneity as a positive, productive
force in improv against interpretations which she sees as weakening or limiting the craft.
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In doing so, she employs a number of terms and concepts she connects with spontaneity,
much as the notion of spontaneity is elucidated in Halpern et al. She makes a definite body/mind
distinction, writing that “traditional improv classes focus on mental skills: how to empty your
mind and be flexible in your thinking.” In contrast, her methodology “emphasizes listening to
your inner life, following your body, and reacting emotionally…you learn to listen with your
whole self, respond from your gut instincts” (4-5). She later associates mind with “the brain”:
“Your brain is not as smart as you think it is…[it] will get in the way more than it will help,” at
least as far as improv goes (12). The “conscious mind” has uses—keeping safe, reading,
learning from others—but, “Other than that, SHUT IT DOWN…The experience you have during
an interaction is far more important, and more real, than your analysis of it. The first process is
the act of being, and it involves your whole self; the second is the act of thinking and involves
only your mind” (13).
Concepts of honesty, instinct, and selfness are all closely linked with spontaneity and with
each other. “To play truthfully on stage, you must follow your instincts as fully as possible.
And those instincts are inextricably intertwined with your self—your personality, your body,
your family, and little bits of every experience you ever had” (17). In the process of “learning to
speak a character’s truth, trust your instincts. Improviser’s instincts are usually correct.”
However, players must “distinguish between a genuine instinct and a protective mechanism.”
She explains this difference anecdotally, in a case where the “most truthful choice was for the
character to be vulnerable,” but the player does not want to do that and gets angry instead, then
claims that “that was where the character led them.” Encouraged to try again and express
vulnerability, “usually the improviser can see which was the truer impulse, and which was just a
fight-or-flight response” (25).
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“The body” is a crucial ideal linked with spontaneity. She idealizes spontaneous “body” in
the image of the wild, sexy, nasty, pleasure-craving centaur thundering through the woods.
Again critiquing rule-based “outside-in” methods, she writes, “Some people think we have to
trick ourselves into primitive behavior, because our social training is so strong it will always kick
in unless we do an end run around it. I don’t believe that. We don’t have to trick our minds; we
have to unleash our bodies” (28). To “improvise from your impulses, following your heart and
body,” will produce far more immediate and gripping narrative than the brain could create. The
audience too is brought into the analysis—“To incite the audience on a gut level, we’ve got to
improvise from our guts” (28). She enjoins performers to “let your body lead” and deeply attend
to its responses and gestures; “following these gut-level impulses kicks improv scenes into high
gear…Follow your body—it knows what it’s doing…It only occupies the here and now” and
thus “is likely the only part of you that is always connected to the moment at hand. Let it be
your guide” (29). The expansive expressiveness of the body is strongly related with “freedom”:
“Our bodies carry all the joy and heartache and humor and pathos we’ve ever experienced. The
body knows what it means to be human. If we free ourselves we can lead the audience on a
merry chase through the woods…When we improvise from our bodies, hearts, and minds, we
free the audience as well as ourselves” (36). Interestingly, in this last sentence, she appears to
bring “mind” back into the fold of productive categories for improv, but never really elucidates
her meaning.
Indeed, she immediately jumps to elaboration of “heart,” an aspect she places alongside
“body.” She equates heart with emotion, and emotion is held up as crucial for deep audience
investment: “We don’t go to the theater to see life as it is. We go to the theatre to see life as we
wish it could be.” She believes we wish “people would be more honest in real life…we could be

142

more open about our emotions…we long to see the effect we have on others, and to show their
effect on us” (38). To see these things expressed on stage is her idea of powerful improv. But
“what prevents us from doing this? Our brains.” Brains want “to choose a prudent, low-risk
course of action” which impedes “vigorous improvising.” When judging and choosing “an
emotion, you aren’t listening to or connecting with your fellow players,” and moreover, “it
interferes with the natural rhythms of stimulus/response,” which is “the reason life on stage so
rarely resembles life in life.” This is a consequence of social training: “As adults, we know the
potential consequences for of revealing our emotions. We know it’s a risk to love, to trust, to
fear or to betray…That’s why it’s doubly riveting” to see improviers following their
imaginations and hearts (38).
The importance of the “stimulus-response cycles” she mentions above is developed from the
claim that “Everything that happens on stage should happen for a reason.” The expression of
these cycles is “simply a matter of responding to stimuli truthfully.” “Truthful” response
involves acting “instinctually,” which will “bypass the conscious mind, and you’ll find that your
responses are truer to the character and to the moment” (67). While any choice of action can
work and be justified, the “best” choice—i.e., the “truthful,” “instinctive” one—is “whichever
one was predicated on the moment before” (68). This truthful response is set against
“performing”—“Once we stop performing we can start responding” (69). She elaborates by
contrasting “being truly affected by your partner, and adopting an affect,” where the former
involves feeling “off-guard” and “surprised,” while the latter means “staying safe and
comfortable and choosing a response” (70); the first is presumably “responding” and the second
“performing.”
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Accomplishing such truthful responses means improviers must “be willing to relinquish
control—to our partners, to the story and to our emotions.” When performers “give up
control…we understand that our only responsibility is to give and take truthfully, and let fate
decide the rest” (70). In a striking contrast with Halpern et al., who emphasize listening and
waiting for one’s partner to complete their action before responding, Hazenfield encourages
interrupting. For one thing, it a very ordinary and common part of real-life interaction, but more
importantly, “at the moment you feel the urge to interrupt, you are at the peak of the stimulusresponse cycle;” something “makes you want to respond right now” (72). Acting immediately
when “compelled to do so” will “catch our partners off guard” and “give our interactions the
quality of real, unpredictable interchanges.” This is not just a consideration that makes positive
use of interruption, but is “true for all your impulses” in improv—“Act on them the second they
hit you” (72). The “most interesting moments” on stage are those where “players let their guard
down and reveal something about themselves;” the revealing of self is often accompanied by
“relaxation” of the body, a “signal that the improviser has stopped feeling self-conscious” (73).
But truthful responsiveness is learned—“It’s a skill you build over time; courage is required,” as
is understanding that you may often look foolish. But “if you’re fixated on looking intelligent or
cool, you will never realize your true potential as an improviser.” To “respond truthfully” means
being “connected” to self as well as partner (81).
Working in this way is not simply a matter of shedding sources of inhibition, but is a skill
learned and developed through experience. Both “self-criticism” and “rampaging ego” are
“growth-blocking” behaviors that stymie the experiential learning process (197-200). Critique
has value; “It’s important to identify what needs to be changed, and to work to change it.” But
this practice should not be a form of self-punishment. Instead, performers should “mentally
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stand away” from their work and “look at it as an entity separate from you. In particular,
separate your personality or character from the work” (199). Artistic growth happens “almost
imperceptibly” and an improvier goes through levels of “unconscious incompetence,” “conscious
incompetence,” and “conscious competence,” with the ultimate goal of working toward
“unconscious competence.” In this idealized state, “you are no longer using your conscious
mind to make choices, but are making them instinctually…Unconscious competence arrives
unbidden. The more you think, or try, the less likely you will be to reach this stage. This is the
phase of letting go. It involves dropping all your conscious efforts, and trusting that what you
know will be expressed outwardly if you just stay out of the way” (202). She notes that growth
is generally uneven in different areas of skill, and also that all improv skills ultimately contribute
to each other, reminding her readers that “sometimes the next big leap that needs to be taken is
not the one we choose for ourselves” (203).
The terms and concepts that seem most aligned with spontaneity in Hazenfield include
“truthfulness,” acting from one’s “true” or “whole” “self,” acting from the “body” and/or
“heart,” reacting “emotionally” or at a “gut-level,” “honesty,” “instinct,” “impulse,” “freedom,”
“responding,” “being affected,” feeling “off-guard,” being “in the moment,” “giving up control,”
and “unconscious competence.” Spontaneity is also conceptually aligned against the “conscious
mind,” the “brain,” “trying,” “thinking,” “judging” and “choosing,” “performing,” and “selfconsciousness.”
Applying our conceptual dimensions to Hazenfield’s account, spontaneity appears to
instantiate in a relationship between experience and behavior, in this case with fairly equal
emphasis given to both sides. Spontaneity originates in the experience of “reacting truthfully”
from your “whole self,” and Hazenfield indicates that improviers have an intuitive ability, which
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can be sharpened, to know when they are having this experience. But the experience must also
be outwardly expressed, and not held back or self-censored; the expression of the experience of
instinctive impulse is just as important as the impulse itself. She does not give a clear indication
of whether spontaneity should be considered binary or divisible, but her account of the stages of
learning in particular suggests a non-binary spontaneity, linked more to experiential/behavioral
tendencies than specific moments, though this spontaneity is certainly not quantifiable.
Greater degrees of spontaneity are indicated by unhesitating action and immediate response.
Though she does highly advocate silence as a powerful improv technique (18-19), this silence is
not a moment for choosing a powerful response as in Halpern et al. Improviers should still react
immediately; silence should be meaningful, not a pause in the action but only of language.
“Honest” emotional expression is indicative of greater spontaneity. The most spontaneous
choice in a situation is based on “the moment before,” rather than trying to move the scene in a
certain direction, or even following emergent patterns as in Halpern et al. Committed emotional
reaction is seen as “risky,” and showing “courage” in expressing it is seen as more spontaneous.
As in Johnstone, it is often clearer when someone is not being spontaneous. This is often
assessed internally; the expression of spontaneous experience is characterized by a lack of
“judging” or “choosing” among responses, and by a lack of “self-consciousness” regarding how
people want to appear to others. This less-spontaneous experience is expressed in improv
through behaviors like overly-vague or overly-complicated offers; controlling the scene; forcing
the work of moving the scene forward onto others; hesitation; pretending (i.e., “performing)
rather than “being truly affected;” and the breaking of “natural stimulus-response cycles.”
Hazenfield’s sense of spontaneity seems that its presence is unequivocally good in improv,
despite her criticisms, which seem to be examples of “inappropriate” uses of the term which she
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sees as having crept into improv culture. While not appropriate in every context—Hazenfield
acknowledges the risk of full emotional expression in everyday life, and the importance of the
“conscious mind” in keeping us safe—in improv, full spontaneity in her sense is what players
should strive for. The value of spontaneity for her appears to be as an end in itself—it is
precisely being spontaneous that makes for good improv. Its value as a productive force in
creating a successful performance is secondary to its inherent value in that performance.
Hazenfield does not see spontaneity as some internal potential wellspring, as in Johnstone’s
“imagination;” instead, it is something that happens to performers, and which they must learn to
recognize and express.
The importance of learning spontaneity suggests an important role for Ivanhoe’s “cultivated”
form of spontaneity in her account. Immediate, honest emotional response is a learned skill.
The state of “unconscious competence” she idealizes is also a hallmark of cultivated spontaneity,
a “second nature” in Ivanhoe’s terms that is acquired through long experience and practice. She
reinforces this cultivated spontaneity by arguing that players should separate their “selves” from
their work in evaluating their abilities and progress. Of course, her heavy emphasis on “the
whole self” and “instinct” as the resource for accessing honest response suggests an important
role for untutored spontaneity—the basis for effective response in her ideal comes from
expressing from a “fundamental self” (though one that grows and changes with our experiences).
But this fundamental self is not seen as straining to burst forth, as in Johnstone, if only social
training and education were not holding it back. While Hazenfield certainly acknowledges the
power of social training in inhibiting responsiveness and expressiveness, spontaneity in her sense
will not just flow automatically if these barriers are removed—performers must learn and train to
be spontaneous. Her association of the “freedom” concept with spontaneity gives a nod toward
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unconstrained spontaneity as well; however, this appears as more of a valued quality emergent
from successful spontaneity than the focus of value for spontaneity itself. The value of
spontaneity for Hazenfield is in access to one’s “whole,” fundamental self, and the learned
ability to use this self as a source of responsiveness in improv; the experience of freedom is an
effect of, rather than inherent to, this value of spontaneity.
Hazenfield does not close the door on the possibility of greater/lesser degrees of spontaneity
being related to inherent subject characteristics; unlike the earlier writers above, she does not
make an explicit claim to the universal ability to improvise. On the other hand, she never
identifies any category of persons with greater or lesser improv capabilities, except perhaps in
tendencies toward “growth-blocking” behavior like “self-criticism” or “rampaging ego.” That
she offers strategies for overcoming these tendencies probably indicates that she does not view
them as inherent subject characteristics at all, but as learned behaviors. Learned behavior
patterns are the primary basis for greater/lesser degrees of spontaneity in her account. As
discussed above, greater spontaneity is achieved through exercises and practice that helps players
learn to recognize and express immediate honest, emotional reaction, while lesser spontaneity
results from learned behaviors of over-attentiveness to the “conscious mind” and concerns for
the social reception of one’s expressions.
Environmental characteristics do not appear to play a part in affecting players’ capacities for
spontaneity, but relational characteristics do. Players should be “polite” in the sense of treating
every offer as valuable and making use of it (47). But they should also be “generous,” in the
sense of making strong offers and expressing well-defined characters (52), and let this concern
for generosity override “the wrong kind of polite”: worrying about “hogging the stage,” being
nice all the time, saying yes when you want to say no, or “wussing”—keeping stakes of offers

148

low (48-50). They should all mutually support the story they are telling together, especially with
respect to her protagonist-centered model—players should identify a clear protagonist with
stakes in the outcome of a question, and all work together to help, hinder, or create higher stakes
for the protagonist, finally answering the key question and showing how the protagonist has
changed. Shared contribution toward the performed narrative should guide performers’ choices.
But her system is largely based on individual practices and attitudes, and greater spontaneity of a
group seems to be largely additive of the group’s individuals. She encourages interrupting and
acting “as soon as an impulse hits you,” and encourages players to catch each other off guard—
not by being “illogical,” in the sense she connects negatively with spontaneity, but by making
high-stakes offers that provoke a strong, unbidden response in your scene partner, which ideally
will be followed and expressed. Players are together guided by commitment to a narrative,
rather than a “game” as in Spolin or a “theme/pattern” as in Halpern et al. But players are
enjoined to focus on individual practices of spontaneity starting from the “inside-out”—being
open to one’s “full self,” making strong choices, and experiencing and expressing responses
fully. If all can engage individually, shared spontaneity will take care of itself. Mick Napier,
writing not long after Hazenfield, goes even further with this ethos of individually-produced
spontaneity, but with a methodology that returns to emphasis on methods of overt behavior, and
which also attempts to synthesize the wide variety of improv maxims advanced by earlier writers
into a single foundational value and principle of practice.

Mick Napier
Napier’s Improvise: Scene from the Inside Out addresses many of the same issues in earlier
writings, but highly criticizes their conceptual framing of effective improv techniques. In
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response to this critique, he offers a broad-based but single and fundamental practice that
attempts to synthesize disparate earlier improv practices, and elaborates from that point. His title
uses the same “inside-out” language of Hazenfield, but uses it for a dramatically different
purpose. Whereas Hazenfield was focused on the improvier’s inner life and giving it expression,
Napier’s “inside-out” refers to the scene itself, creating performance action from the scene’s own
inherent momentum, what we might call the scene’s “self.” This scene-selfness does not imply
that there are specific directions that specific scenes should go, but rather that the most effective
scenes are those that clearly follow the “dominant energy” they generate immediately as they are
initiated from the bottomless array of performance behavior possibilities.
Napier is heavily focused on improvisation as a practice, the generation of “a performance
product in and of itself,” which he broadly and succinctly defines as “getting on a stage and
making stuff up as you go along” (1). He uses the specific term “spontaneity” only once, in a
purely descriptive way: In his extended analogy of improv practice with the laws of
thermodynamics, he writes, “Broken glass on the floor does not spontaneously become a scotch
glass, but a scotch glass is just waiting for the release of energy necessary to become broken.
Everything…tends toward disorder” (107). This one mention, however, does imply an
opposition of spontaneity with disorder, since that “spontaneous” reforming is what the second
law of thermodynamics prevents. This is in keeping with his conclusions from the analogy,
where effective improv is the result of maximizing the “energy” brought to the “closed system”
of the scene and its experience by the audience. While the increase of entropy is inevitable, a
temporary order can be established in the closed system of the performance, and sustained by the
conversion of “potential energy” to “kinetic energy,” ideally efficiently, with as little loss to
entropy as possible.
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As he literally uses the term “spontaneity,” it refers to the creation of order out of nowhere,
for no reason, with no external energy input, and is thus impossible. So he shuns “spontaneity”
as such in his analysis in favor of “improvisation,” a particular performance practice involving
“making things up as you go along,” i.e., without prior preparation of content. If we treat
spontaneity as the quality that makes accomplishment of improvisational theatre possible as
such, then this lack of preparation is the distinctive “spontaneity” of Napier’s account. His
account then turns to what makes improv performance practice successful while maintaining this
distinctive quality—and indeed, the maintenance of this distinctive quality is often what makes
improv practices successful in his account.
He heavily aligns successful improv with “play” and against “fear” and “thinking,”
especially in his foundational tirade against “rule” principles in improv. Here he harshly
criticizes many of the tactics that are central to effective practice in earlier system, with examples
like “don’t deny,” “don’t ask questions,” “don’t dictate,” “show don’t tell,” “establish
who/what/where,” and “say yes, then say and” (3). He argues that this approach to improv is
highly problematic—following these rules does not lead to better improv, and the emphasis on
the rules themselves may weaken improviers. This is because attending to improv “rules” leads
to “thinking” about them as one performs, and “thinking” is precisely what Napier associates
with bad improv scenes. “Good” scenes tend to be experienced by performers and audience as
“magic,” “trance-like,” and defying analysis, especially at the time of creation—“Why bother
thinking about something amazing when you just want to sit back and enjoy it?” (6). “Bad”
scenes, on the other hand, are laden with “thinking”—by the performers, audience, tech crew,
everyone (4-5). Thinking is diametrically opposed against “playing,” which is the hallmark of
effective improv. Audiences don’t want “to see adult humans think and consider options around
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them…They want to see people play and play hard. Throw caution (thinking) to the wind (out).
Really play. If improvisers aren’t truly playing then they are ‘thinking about’” (11).
Thinking is associated directly with “fear,” which has great value—just not in improv. It has
been highly evolutionarily adaptive that “people fear things so they think of ways to prevent an
unwanted outcome” (10-11). But play, not the prevention of unwanted outcomes, is what makes
good improv, and focusing on prevention both stems from, and leads to more, “fear and
confusion” by the performers, who respond with behavior to “defend and protect” (11). The
behaviors addressed in improv “rules,” Napier argues, are effects of this thought-laden, fearful,
defensive position, rather than the cause of bad scenes. Defensive behavior in an improv context
often takes the form of denial, questions, vague offers, dictating action, and so on. In Napier’s
view, these do not cause bad scenes but are correlated with them, and this correlation has been
observed and codified precisely because these behaviors emerged in scenes where observers
were “thinking-about” the scene, whereas they weren’t thinking or critiquing during “good”
scenes—they were swept up in the “magic” (7-8). The “Rules” are problematic because
adherence to them does not “cause” a good scene, but the fact that performers are “thinking”
about them may cause a bad one. In sum: “Fear begets thinking. Thinking begets protective
behavior. Protective behavior is noticed as patterns in bad improvisation. Patterns of behavior
become rules” (12).
Play, presumably, is not merely an injunction that players “don’t think” (which would take its
own place as a “Rule” of the sort Napier critiques). He goes on to elaborate a positive account of
a fundamental pattern for approaching scenes that instantiates “playful” behavior. First: “Do
something. Anything…That you do something is far more important than what you do” (14-15)
because “it will snap you out of your head”—i.e., short-circuit “thinking” and “allow you to
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make a choice out of power as opposed to fear” (16). “Doing something” allows a performer to
“declare a position in the scene,” what he calls the performer’s “deal” and equates with concepts
like “what the scene is about” or “the game of the scene” (17). While boiling improv down to
“it’s all still just playing,” Napier says the performer’s “deal” addresses the question “what are
you going to play with when you play? You have to create it, but what it is doesn’t matter” (17).
He cautions against equating “power and bold and immediacy” with “frenetic and loud energy”
(18); the “snap” into behavior at the initiation can be anything, can be highly subtle, but any
strong declaration catches the audience “off guard” and tells them “there’s no time to think. No
time for them, and no time for you. That’s exciting. That’s vital. That’s strong. That’s playful”
(18). However, though doing anything is better than doing nothing, he does note that many
improviers use strategies to initiate that involve thinking, which is what they should be avoiding,
such a preconceiving beats, aiming for funny lines, recycling characters, or using silence as a
space to think rather than as a purposeful choice (18-22).
The next step is to observe what you did—“Immediately after you do something, assess what
you created” (24). He is careful to distinguish this from “thinking” about what you did: “Merely
check out what you did—in a real literal way…No speculation, no self-judgment, no seeking
answers to questions, no worrying about what ifs” (24)—not thinking but observing. This is
important so the performer will “know-what-they-are-do-ing,” which creates “your character’s
road map to the scene” (25). “Why” your character did what you did is irrelevant and a
distraction, but how is essential: “Words are of little impact when not filtered through the how.
The how comprises everything from emotion to state of being to character attribute to intonation
to physical score to point of view” (25). It is not that these aspects of “how” are all instantly
established by that first action, but rather that “how” is encompassing of all these aspects, and
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those you observe as emphasized in your first action are “your deal in the scene, the magical road
map for the character, created instantaneously, acknowledged thereafter, and played, I said
played, furiously” (25-26).
Finally, once you have done something and observed what was done, “hold on to what you
acknowledged yourself doing and how you did it, and do it more, in every way possible and at
every opportunity. Do not let go, and passionately make more of it. Be possessed with what you
created and how you are doing it” (26). Scenes suffer because players abandon their “deal,”
whether due to excess “niceness,” fear, thinking they’re run out of ideas, or thinking “that
different is funny” (26-27). This commitment to whatever was initiated and observed is what
constitutes Napier’s positive account of play as the essence of good improv: “That is the play in
improvisation. Creating a thing out of thin air, acknowledging what it is and how it does what it
does, making bold choices from within that thing, and filtering everything else that comes your
way through it, as well” (27).
The rest of Napier’s methodology is essentially just the detailing and elaboration of this
fundamental principle: good improv=play, bad improv=thinking, and “play” consists broadly of
the process above. With respect to performing with a partner, most important is that both players
individually make their strong initiation, observe it, and commit to doing more of it. Each
partner, as they do this, should “listen” to the other, and not merely to know what they are
saying. In Napier’s account, he writes that his concept of listening became, “I listened so that I
could respond to operative information my partners supplied for me and filter it through my own
character in the scene…I listen to gain valuable opportunities to say or do something relevant
through my character’s voice, when I respond” (32). Players do not respond “to” partners, but
“through” their own deals, acknowledging partners’ initiations while adhering to their own
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characters/points of view (33). In three-person scenes, Napier advocates all sharing a point of
view, so the scene will be about the characters, not the circumstances (61); when entering a
scene, the entering player should reinforce the existing points of view, or identify and reinforce
one if they diverge (62). In scenes with four or more people, performers should, as always, each
individually start with a strong action. They should all then identify the “dominant energy” of
the scene, and each “practice responding to and acknowledging that energy while staying true to
your own initiation at the beginning of the scene” (71). The key principle is strong individual
initiation and commitment; as individual players respond to ongoing action through their “deal,”
the scene will emerge of its own momentum. Effective shared stage work is not “altruistic”:
“Like it or not, improvisation is choices made by individuals, and individuals need to know what
to do” (32). Commitment to one’s initiation at the moment the scene begins is how individuals
know what to do.
As noted above, “spontaneity” in Napier’s account is descriptive. With respect to improv, it
identifies the quality—that the content of the performance is unplanned and unprepared—that is
distinctive of improv, and makes it “improv” as such, but does not attach a normative
implication. Normative value is instead bound up with “play,” the identifying characteristic of
successful improv in his view; we might view play as the accomplishment of navigating effective
performance action within the required bounds of remaining “spontaneous,” i.e., without
planning or preparing content. In a very broad sense, he suggests that this quality is quantifiable,
to the degree that we can directly equate effective improv with the minimal loss of energy from
the closed system of the performance, as in his analogy. Play is not a potentiality nor an end in
itself; it is a productive force, and its value has no meaning outside of the improv-generation
context he circumscribes. He does not extend his consideration of the value of play to “everyday
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life,” except implicitly in noting the adaptive value of fear and thinking for humans, suggesting
that play may often not be the best mode of behavior in many other contexts.
The value of play in improv invokes the value of Ivanhoe’s cultivated spontaneity—it is a
practice, a learned skill. It does not simply emerge “naturally” as a fundamental characteristric
of self once social training ceases to inhibit it, nor does he connect it with freedom from
constraint. His account of play is strongly behavioral—strong, observed initiation and
commitment to it. Experience of improviers and audience is important in assessing the success
of this behavior; experiences of “fear” or “thinking” are clear indicators that “playing” is not
being accomplished. But play instantiates in what is done in the performance, not the experience
of lack of fear/thinking that tends to accompany it. Play is recognized by its adherence to the
practice Napier outlines, and the product of this procedure, when successful, may be experienced
as having a sort of “magic” quality that defies analysis. Practice with this mode of improv
production will increase prevalence of playful behavior in individuals and groups—which is
valuable because it will, essentially by definition, create better improv in Napier’s terms.
Play is explicitly a product of individuals in Napier’s account; group play is additive of
individual’s play in the form of initiation, recognition, and commitment. It is identified and
recognized in groups the same way it is recognized for individuals, with the added layer that
each individual is playing, and that in groups of three or more, commitment is to a “dominant
energy” of the scene as well as to individual initiations. This sense of “play” is very different
from Spolin’s use of the same key term. For Spolin, playing emerges through shared agreement
between performers on a “game” or “problem that needs solving,” to which action is oriented. In
Napier, playing emerges through individual commitment to what is essentially arbitrary action
established as soon as a scene begins. In Spolin, players are guided by their shared objective,
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while in Napier the objective itself emerges from the playing, and need not be shared—the scene
accumulates through commitments to individual objectives, and these are commitments to a
“deal,” a “how” of individual behavior, rather than “what” the players aim to accomplish.
Interestingly, unlike other writers, Napier does seem to locate the basis for capacity for play
in inherent subject characteristics. He neither argues that “everyone can improvise” nor
identifies categories of people with greater or lesser capacities for play. However, he does
identify the fundamental constraint on play with “fear,” which he describes as not as an inherent
subject characteristic of particular persons, but of humans in general—fear and its resultant
thinking have had enormous adaptive survival value, and are “hard-wired” into the general
business of being human. So, people’s capacity for spontaneity is limited by characteristics that
Napier associates with being human at all. Of course, learned behaviors can exacerbate this
limitation, especially adherence to the “Rules” of improv he critiques, or problematic tactics like
repeating characters that “reliably get laughs.” But, as he argues, these behaviors do not cause
the limitation, but rather result from this inherent characteristic of fear. Environmental
characteristics can play a role—for example, the greater sense of stakes and thus inhibition that
comes with performing for a paying audience. But this too only gains relevance with respect to
evoking fear. Excepting his injunction to “find the dominant energy” in group scenes, relational
characteristics are not very responsible for greater and lesser degrees of play. Performers should
“take care of themselves first,” and play in a scene is simply additive from each doing so—
though performers should of course listen and pay attention to each other, in order to access
material through which to respond with commitment to their own initiations. A later pair of
writers, Mary Scruggs and Michael Gellman, continue along this direction of locating
spontaneity in individuals, extending the concept to a more holistic view of individual persons
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rather than particular instances of improv-creation, and applying their methodology toward a
more specific performance product: a long-term, real-time, single-setting scene.

Mary Scruggs and Michael J. Gellman
The sense of improv as fundamentally individual action, though done in collaboration, is
highlighted in Mary Scruggs and Michael Gellman through their choice to present their
methodology in a style deliberately reminiscent of Stanislavski’s An Actor Prepares. Process:
An Improviser’s Journey is presented as a fictional first-person narrative from the perspective of
an actor interested in improv who takes one of Gellman’s improv workshops. This device marks
two interesting shifts from earlier methodologies. First, it presents the methodology not as a
broad discussion of principles and tactics, but as a description of a specific course of training
(though discussion of the principles and tactics implicated in the course of training are woven
into the narrative). Second, the device makes for an explicitly psychological turn, as we see the
narrator’s imagined reactions, confusion, and discovery as the experience moves forward.
Scruggs and Gellman mark this course of training as advanced; the workshop advertisement
requires audition, and restricts audition to performers with a theatre degree or equivalent
experience (19). The end-product aimed for by the workshop is also distinct from previous
methodologies. Unlike the thematic long-form of the Harold, the multiscenic narrative longform of Hazenfield, or Napier’s exclusive focus on the “scene,” the workshop presented ends
with a long-form defined by “sustaining a character for an extended period of time…where the
lights were not taken down during the show—unlike the more traditional revue styles, which
were comprised of short scenes and blackouts” (xviii). Specifically, the show performed at the
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workshop’s conclusion consists of groups of four improvisers who sustain a 20- to 30-minute
scene in a single physical setting, in real time, each as the same character throughout.
The entire account is filtered through the narrator. A number of other characters, including
other workshop participants and the character of Gellman himself, contribute views and
reactions, but these too are filtered through the narrator’s experience of them. As a result,
outside of the author’s introductions, it is hard to mark concepts as definitive for Scruggs and
Gellman; the “journey” is one particular character’s reaction and experience of learning improv.
At times, the narrator is confused by elements of the workshop, or finds them unhelpful, and
different characters offer diverging views and reactions, inviting the reader to question the
program of training as dogmatic. The narrative ends immediately before the narrator is about to
perform his first public show, leaving it unknown whether he “succeeds”—we do not know if the
training “worked.” This is in keeping with Anne Libera’s framing assertion in her foreword that
it “doesn’t matter how, or even if, this work creates plays of literary quality. It is the process in
and of itself that is worth studying and communicating to a larger audience” (ix).
The narrator’s use of “spontaneity” marks it as somewhat of a magical, unanalyzed term, yet
strongly associated with improv; interestingly, its use disappears as soon as the main workshop
narrative starts. Describing a partner’s cold reading at an audition for a scripted show, he
narrates “she was good. I thought she was going off script, because her reading sounded so
spontaneous” (5). Later, describing a play he watched, developed for Second City’s Donny’s
Skybox theater, he narrates “In some ways it had the best of both worlds—a lot of the
spontaneous, natural feel of improv, and a little more complexity in terms of emotion, character,
and story, like you’d see in a play” (18). Finally, describing an earlier workshop in
Improvisation for Actors he took, the narrator says that “the games I learned laid a foundation of
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playfulness, creativity, spontaneity, and connection to others” (8). The narrator broadly
associates spontaneity with these above concepts: “naturalness,” “play,” “creativity,” and
“connection,” along with a sense that the impression of spontaneity is associated with goodquality scripted acting.
Explicitly discussing improvisation principles in his preface, Gellman writes, “The most
important idea is simply focusing out and avoiding conscious choices…Improvisation is too
often evaluated in terms of good choices or bad choices” (xviii). “Good” choices are those that
are associated with a strong audience reaction. Against this view, he argues instead that “when
we are working at our peak, we should not be in control or even aware of our choices” (xix).
The foundational technique involved in his improv method involves “exploring and heightening”
three foci. First, focus on a “point of concentration” (POC), which “gives us action instead of
just activities. We learn to focus out, make discoveries, and react to those discoveries.” Second,
a “point of view” (POV) “gives us a method of creating dialogue, which moves the play forward,
avoids dialogue traps, and heightens our knowledge of character.” The third focus is “scenic,”
which “helps us to focus the play one action at a time and allows the actor to live in the
moment.” Overall, “the techniques boil down to focusing out, making discoveries, and having
an emotional and physical reaction to those discoveries” (xix). Scruggs’s “Note on the Text”
lists the “principles of basic training” as “Follow the follower. Stay in the moment. Focus on
your partner and react. Make discoveries” (xxiv).
“Reaction” is especially important. Discussing an audition scene with a partner who showed
offensive and thoughtless improv behavior, a former improv teacher of the narrator chides him
for arguing that the partner “wasn’t playing a character,” replying, “according to you…because
you chose to judge his performance instead of responding to what he was creating” (17). The
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teacher agrees that the partner’s work was “bad” improv, but highlights the importance of
responding to what is happening, what is being expressed, rather than imposing analysis on
action. Later, another character in the workshop is handling a mimed object and begins to
recount her history with it by way of explanation for her emotion. Gellman stops her and asks
her to just have a reaction. She feels sad, which Gellman calls “great,” until she again explains
her sadness through an imagined history. Gellman emphasizes that “reaction” does not include
reasons for/analysis of that reaction—reacting is important, not justification for that reaction.
Performers are enjoined to “react to what you see, taste, hear, touch, and smell—not to the story
in your head” (71-72). Reactions need not be “big,” but should be “strong,” i.e., “important to
your character” (73). It is also important that they be “physicalized” and made apparent, for “if
there is no physical manifestation of your reaction to your discovery, does it exist for your
audience?” (69-70). The physicalization of reaction takes primacy over dialogue, which
Gellman describes as “only the by-product of reaction—the ashes of what just took place” (57).
Scruggs and Gellman offer an interesting overlay of principles from both Hazenfield and Napier.
The focus on strong reactions and being affected is very much aligned with Hazenfield’s
emphasis on emotional response. However, where she advocates focus inward, toward one’s
“self,” Scruggs and Gellman specifically advocate “focusing out” toward the scene itself in a
way much more aligned with Napier’s practices. Napier strongly emphasizes “holding on” to
one’s point of view or behavior patterns; in contrast, Scruggs and Gellman align with “change”
derived from “discoveries” drawn from the environment or other characters, rather than
discovery drawn from attending to internal responses.
If we take spontaneity as the defining feature of improv performance, then in addition to the
broad senses expressed by the narrator, we see spontaneity in Scruggs and Gellman as associated
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with “reaction,” “discovery,” being “in the moment,” commitment to ongoing “process,” and
being “not in control or even aware” of choices. Spontaneity is also contrasted against
“conscious choices,” evaluation and/or analysis, and “being in your head.”
With respect to our dimensions of analysis, spontaneity for Scruggs and Gellman appears to
be a quality of both experience and behavior; performers are enjoined to have both an emotional
(internal experience) and physical (observable behavior) reaction to the discoveries they make.
There is no clear indication whether spontaneity is binary or divisible. The narrative presents
moments of “successful” improv, as well as “unsuccessful” (which interestingly, from the
narrator’s perspective, includes technically effective performances where he or others
nonetheless did not seem “in the moment”—i.e., the presented behavior was an engaging
performance, but failed at being improvisation). But nothing suggests that the authors view
spontaneity as clearly present in the successful work and absent elsewhere. On the other hand,
nothing suggests greater or lesser degrees of spontaneity, at least not in any quantifiable (or even
account-able) form. Instead, we have only the narrator’s account; sometimes he interprets his
own actions, or that of others, as more spontaneous or less, or as spontaneous or not. But for his
own self-evaluation, we have only his fictional subjective feelings, while for others we have only
his evaluation of behavior. Other characters sometimes disagree with his evaluations. It might
be argued, considering Scruggs and Gellman’s warnings against evaluation, that the very act of
evaluating the spontaneity of self and others is indicative of lesser spontaneity. But on the
whole, the choice to present a first-person narrative indicates at least a somewhat subjective
character for spontaneity. The narrative perspective suggests recognition and characterization of
spontaneity is itself part of the “process” of development, and indexed to at least some degree to
individual experience and interpretation.
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Spontaneity for Scruggs and Gellman is clearly a normatively positive quality, at least as far
as improv goes—it is not addressed with respect to other contexts. They appear to view it as a
valuable end in itself. While of course it is also valued as a productive force in generating
effective improv, the praising of the “process” as valuable in itself, regardless of its ability to
produce “literary-quality” performances, suggests an intrinsic value to engagement with
spontaneous performance in their mold. They do not appear to treat spontaneity as a potentiality,
except perhaps insofar as the unlimited potential for “discoveries” embedded in the scene or
exercise. Instead, what is offered is “principles of basic training” (xxiv). The Gellman character
emphasizes the importance of practice in getting past the “noise in our heads” that “keeps us
from this work” (48-49), and later, when doing an exercise on “dialogue rules,” he even
encourages students to think of them as like “multiplication tables,” where “you have to drill
them so they become rote [i.e., automatic]” (58). Spontaneity is viewed as a learned skill, not a
potentiality unleashed, and thus aligns primarily with Ivanhoe’s cultivated sense of spontaneity.
While the narrator’s association of spontaneity with “naturalness” hints at a role for untutored
spontaneity, the methodology’s emphasis asks performers to focus outward and make discoveries
in the scene, rather than inwards toward the responses of one’s “self,” as in Hazenfield. The
“unconstrained” sense of spontaneity seems almost directly opposed to Scruggs and Gellman’s
account. Freedom to choose and act in accordance with “what one wants to do” runs counter to
Gellman’s assertion that in “peak” improv work “we should not be in control or even aware of
our choices” (xix). Idealized spontaneity is characterized by a loss of control and sense of self,
replaced by immersion in the learned skill of shared creation.
If “practicing” in a broad sense, simply getting more time doing exercises and performing, is
the basis for greater degrees of spontaneity, lesser degrees are related to both inherent subject
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characteristics and learned behaviors in the form of “personality.” Decreased capacity for “being
in the moment,” “making discoveries,” “reacting” to other characters and a shared environment,
etc. is not reduced to general causes, but instead, in keeping with the narrative model, is
subjective to particular characters. Of the main characters, Geoff (the narrator) is eager to
impress, Marty is a consistent performer but insecure, and Kristin tends to plan and think outside
the moment (Gellman’s character is never presented as actually performing improv, and we do
not get as well-developed insight into many minor characters). These personality characteristics
are often shown as detrimental for the characters’ efforts at improvisation. Geoff’s anxiety about
the opinions of others, Marty’s fear and insecurity, and Kristen’s “being in the head” all
correspond to more generalized problems identified by earlier writers, but are presented as
individualized issues, with different people facing different challenges.
Equally important, these same tendencies that hold back spontaneity for them are also
strengths. Geoff’s eagerness to impress, a liability when it takes him out of “the moment,” can
also translate as strong, bold choices and as concern for the interests of the audience. Marty’s
insecurity and tendency to hold back can also take the form of attentive, supportive behavior
with scene and exercise partners. Kristen’s overthinking contributes to greater narrative depth
and comfort with structured exercises. By using the narrative device of dealing with
improvisation as experienced by particular individuals, Scruggs and Gellman resist the
reductionism risked by earlier writers in trying to generalize about what attitudes and behavioral
tendencies are conducive or detrimental to effective improv. Strengths and weaknesses are
presented as sides of the same coin, and cannot make sense without reference to the particular
personalities that instantiate them. Environmental characteristics are not addressed as having an
effect on spontaneity, and relational characteristics are not discussed beyond the general practical
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concerns addressed in all texts, of listening, attentiveness, and support for partners. Instead, the
individual is paramount. Whether we view “personality” as inherent subject characteristics,
learned behaviors, or both, it provides the core material that both enhances and inhibits
spontaneity. Increasing capacity for spontaneity in improv cannot be simply a generalized matter
of shedding problematic attitudes/behavior patterns, or of practicing and developing “effective”
ones. Instead, personality provides the baseline for the ongoing “process” of engagement with
improvisational theatre. Performers will “succeed” and “fail;” their personalities will provide
both resources and resistance, and this will happen in individual ways. But the long arc of
continued practice, involvement, and challenging of self in improv presumably bends toward
greater spontaneity, though what exactly this means depends on who is making the journey.
Such an account offers an opening to a diversity of spontaneities as broad as the array of improv
performers. While such an account may be appealing as a means for untangling the broadly
divergent accounts of spontaneity given by various methodologists, it also risks diffusing the
spontaneity ideograph too greatly, undermining its character as a principle of cohesion among
the many practical views of improv. The final writers discussed in this section, Tom Salinsky
and Deborah Frances-White, swing back in the other direction, offering a much more explicit
account of spontaneity—but one which also decentralizes the term and subsumes it as one of a
broad array of values and principles underlying successful improv.

Tom Salinsky and Deborah Frances-White
Tom Salinsky and Deborah Frances-White’s The Improv Handbook is also formatted around
a “workshop” model, though they write with a far more traditional description-and-discussion
approach, rather than the narrative framing of Scruggs and Gellman. At 400 pages, their text is
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far longer than any of the other improv texts considered in this section, and sweeping in its
scope, covering not only improv theory and exercises, but also an overview of improv history,
detailed insight on forming and running an improv ensemble, strategies and considerations for
professional improv enterprises, and interviews with a wide assortment of figures in the improv
world. The text’s core is a 250 page account of exercises and discussion points derived from
their fundamentals workshops. Though they identify heavily with the Johnstonian rather than
“Chicago” tradition, the book is significant for its explicit efforts to identify and synthesize a
variety of issues and approaches within a general account of practice. They introduce a variety
of important methodological considerations and theoretical innovations, almost all of which can
be seen as tying in with issues of spontaneity. However, due to the vastness of the text, I shall
here focus on their more explicit use of spontaneity, but draw on their other theoretical insights
where it may help illuminate this account.
Many of their explicit uses of the term “spontaneity” come with little explication. They
discuss Lance Percival’s improvised, topical calypso numbers, noting that he stressed being
“well-prepared” for them, but also that his audience suggestions were “genuinely spontaneous
and unplanned” (12). Groucho Marx is held up as having a “gift for spontaneous verbal
comedy” as well as for “making dialogue sound spontaneous” (13). They note that the semiimprovised filmmaking method of Christopher Guest, while including a significant editing
process, allows for a script that “makes terrific use of the spontaneous wit and insight of the
actors involved” (13), and that in scripted work actors work hard to “contribute to the illusion
enjoyed by the audience that they are voyeurs observing spontaneous behavior” (284).
These uses give us little insight into their meaning for “spontaneity,” other than pointing to
its “unplanned” character and invoking it as a quality expressed in effective acting. However, it
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is worth noting that they do not disassociate being “well-prepared” with being “spontaneous,” as
in their Percival example. Elsewhere, they discuss “hoop games,” making the point that the
games’ behavioral or dialogue constraints, which require thinking and choosing by the
improviers, “doesn’t necessarily fly in the face of imperatives to ‘be obvious’ and to ‘be
spontaneous’.” After all, there is no “best” or “most” obvious offer, “nor is it the case that their
second or third choice will be less spontaneous” (219). Limitation, thinking, and choosing are
not seen as necessarily opposed to spontaneity, though they elsewhere warn that one of the
greatest challenges of improv as a “storytelling medium” is developing the skill of “learning to
tell spontaneous stories, since many of the sub-skills go thoroughly against the grain” (270).
This last point suggests that effective improvisation in their view is not simply coextensive
with spontaneity, but that spontaneity is instead one aspect of effective improvisation, which also
involves other skills that may run counter to spontaneity. Nonetheless, spontaneity seems like a
clear term of defining value for improvisation in their account. Indeed, their home-base studio is
called “The Spontaneity Shop” (27). Writing of their personal histories with the studio, Salinsky
states that “the challenge of artful spontaneous creation still excites and challenges me” (24), and
Frances-White later laments that many improv groups function “more like a social club than a
place for great creative expression or a home to develop great spontaneous comedy” (32). As a
general approach to training improviers who are reluctant to participate or make strong offers,
they advocate a “safe, supportive atmosphere” where these performers are then “pushed to do
exercises which demand that they act quickly and spontaneously” (273).
Beyond these scattered references, they also use the device, eschewed by writers since Spolin
and Johnstone, of devoting a section explicitly titled “Spontaneity” as a chapter and as day one
of their outline for a typical eight-class Level One improv course (403). This is the first section
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of the workshop description itself, and begins with “Pointing at Things,” a three-step exercise.
First, students point at things in the room and say what they are; then, they point at something,
then a second thing, saying the name of the last thing they pointed at, and so on; finally, students
point at things, calling them anything but what they actually are (46-47). They note that the third
round is almost invariably the hardest for students, with moments of silence even with a full
class, generally quieter volume, and a sense in the participants that the game gets harder as it
goes, as if they have “temporarily run out of words” (47). This is despite the fact that in the
second round, unlike the third, it is possible to be wrong, and that the second round is really the
same as the third, but more restricted (47-48). Students often attribute the problem to “too many
choices,” but the authors argue it is not the volume of options but rather “option paralysis”—
“lots of options and no criteria.” They attribute the problem to social education that encourages
people think in terms of “Right Answers and Wrong Answers.” Even though being wrong is
possible in the second round, it feels more familiar, for “we take comfort…from being able to
accurately judge our own performance.” In the absence of criteria, students often “invent their
own rules”—refusing to repeat a word is common—or try to “show off how clever and
imaginative they are,” or conversely, how dull, making sure “each word seems nice and safe and
mundane…so as never to say anything remotely sexual, scatological or in any other way
interesting” (48). They follow Johnstone in viewing these responses as running counter to
spontaneity, and describe the goal as playing the third round with the same “pace and fluency” as
the first round. “Trying” to come up with “good” words makes the game harder, but “trying
harder” leads to less effective gameplay. Instead, they advocate to just name something,
anything, show mild curiosity at what one says, then “immediately move on to the next object,”

168

without evaluating the choice. For some it takes time, but even a small amount of practice
usually shows improvement quickly (49-50).
However, this approach usually increases fluency but decreases volume and energy. Far
better is to pronounce each object “with great joy and energy and delight…loudly, brightly and
boldly!” This approach is almost never taken by students without prompting, though it generally
makes the game far easier, and moreover, “attempting any kind of performance with energy and
focus and enthusiasm dramatically increases your chances of success” (50). They attribute the
“feeble” gameplay that is most students’ default mode to the fact that enthusiastic selfpresentation means to “abandon control over the size of the gap between what they advertise and
what they deliver.” By presenting themselves as “not up to the task,” they excuse their own
failure, and though they are nearly guaranteeing their own failure with this attitude, they take
comfort in having control over that failure. Though “advertising success” increases the chances
of success greatly, students find it “horrifying” to not “be able to control the size of the
advertising/delivery gap” (51).
This is related to adults’ “basic feeling that talent is innate, that learning has come to an end,
and that they now know what they are good at and what they are bad at” (51). The value of
“Pointing at Things” is “how readily it demonstrates that your ability (talent) is related to your
attitude”—playing it with “joy” actually directly improves performance. The other benefit to
playing this way is that “it turns off your internal censor…the little mechanism inside your head
that likes to check what you say before you say it.” Though useful in everyday life, it is “a
nuisance” in improv, but “if your attitude is one of cheerfulness and delight, you will fool your
censor into thinking that there’s nothing here that needs checking” (51). The game triggers the
“learning-anxiety response” though it cannot have any bearing on our abilities in other areas of
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life. A single negative remark can shut down the imagination, while a single positive one can
help open up the “torrent of ideas,” and the game demonstrates that we can have these same
effects on ourselves (52).
The chapter drives this point home by following up with the “What Are You Doing?”
exercise, wherein two performers are watched by a group. One performer announces an activity,
which the second performer then acts out while naming a different activity, which the first
performer does while naming a third activity, and so on; anyone who makes a mistake should be
“tapped out” by a spectator, who then takes their place in the game (52-53). Typically, some
groups will play enthusiastically, with lots of mistakes, and others will play very seriously, trying
hard to avoid being tapped out. They describe the point of the game as to see how much “fun”
the students will have. The procedure is difficult and “screws up your ability to plan,” but is “a
rather tedious spectator sport, so the game only has any interest while it’s impossible to sustain.
This is quite a profound demonstration of the importance of failure. Here’s a game which has no
function when people stop failing at it” (53).
They describe the core skills rooted in these “spontaneity” exercises as “step one” in training
improvisers: “Can we, on demand, generate any number of arbitrary ideas without stress?”
They contrast this skill against the structural skills of storytelling that make up so much of their
methodology, writing that “the ability to control when your mind generates arbitrary ideas and
when it generates connected ideas (as well as deciding which mode is appropriate) is crucial for
your success” (52). The other exercises listed for the first day on “Spontaneity” in a standard
workshop (401) are discussed in other sections, and are much more engaged with “connected
ideas” than the two described above. Their distinction of these modes is significant for my
understanding of their view of the relationship between spontaneity and improvisation in general.
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Improvisation is a “storytelling” practice for them, as for Hazenfield, but they have a much
looser structure than hers, and one much more conducive to shorter scenework. First, a
“platform” is established that shows the world of the story and what is normal in that world, and
often establishes a “hero” (a central figure that is not necessarily a “protagonist” in Hazenfield’s
sense). The platform becomes a “story” when “routines are broken and when A affects B,” but
“surprise” is rare and powerful in effective stories, and players should learn to build from the
“obvious” of the platform (271).
The skills of storytelling are largely the generation of “connected ideas,” but spontaneity, the
ability to generate “arbitrary ideas,” is the essential baseline that enables the practice of improv
as such. Unlike most other writers, they do not fully dissociate “control” from spontaneity,
despite identifying the fear of loss of control over the advertising/delivery gap as a major
stymying force on spontaneity. Instead, having control over when you generate “arbitrary,” (i.e.,
spontaneous) ideas is a learned skill that is a subset of general improv skills. These general skills
include many which involve “connected ideas,” distinguished from the “arbitrary ideas” of
spontaneity. In practice, both modes are generally operating in greater or lesser degrees, but they
are distinct in their contributions to the ongoing production of improv. In their view,
spontaneity is not equivalent to “good” improv. “More” spontaneity does not equal better
improv, and less does not equal worse, though spontaneity is an essential baseline for improv to
exist as a practice at all.
In sum, spontaneity is more explicitly addressed in Salinsky and Frances-White than in any
other writer since Spolin and Johnstone, and is identified with the generation of “arbitrary ideas,”
as distinct from “connected ideas.” Spontaneity is strongly affiliated with terms and concepts
such as being “unplanned,” “lack of criteria,” “joy” or “enthusiasm,” “abandoning control” over
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self-presentation, “fun,” and embracing of failure. Spontaneity is contrasted against terms and
concepts like “thinking in terms of right and wrong answers (i.e., “evaluation”),” “trying,”
“stress,” and the “internal censor.”
Application of our analytical dimensions to Salinsky and Frances-White’s account does not
strongly align spontaneity with either behavior or experience. The generation of arbitrary
“ideas” implies an internal, experiential origin for spontaneity, and the concepts aligned against
spontaneity are mostly experiential factors. But the way in which ideas are expressed— ideally
with a fun, joyous attitude—is held to have a direct impact on player’s capacities for this
generation. Spontaneity presumably exists in the feedback between the two. It does not seem
binary, but is always present to some greater or lesser degree (even in the first round of Pointing
at Things, players still must arbitrarily choose what they will point at next). It is not generally
quantifiable, though they associate greater spontaneity with the greater “volume” and “energy”
expressed when students are prompted to play with deliberate enthusiasm.
Strictly speaking, we may see spontaneity as simply descriptive, simply “generation of
arbitrary ideas,” but the attitudes and modes of behavior that Salinsky and Frances-White
associate with effectively evoking spontaneous expression—curiousity, joy, enthusiasm, fun—
are certainly normatively positive. And of course, the practice of improv as such depends on
spontaneity. The value of spontaneity appears to be primarily as a productive force. It is not an
end in itself, but rather a baseline for enabling improvisation. Nor do they directly implicate an
unlimited potential as in Johnstone’s “imagination,” but simply note that “any number” of ideas
can be arbitrarily generated. The focus of their “spontaneity” is on that generative process,
which can be learned and developed, and is thus best seen as an expression of cultivated
spontaneity. However, their emphasis on the negative impact of education and social training,
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like Johnstone, also suggests aspects of a “natural self” more accessible by children, that
“naturally” expresses itself when learned barriers are removed. Greater and lesser degrees of
spontaneity are primarily related to these learned behavior patterns (both productive and
opposing) rather than inherent subject qualities or environmental/relational characteristics.
Being “free” does not appear to play an important role in their valuation of spontaneity. In fact,
“being in control” of one’s self-presentation is presented as a significant stymying factor on
spontaneity.
However, “being in control” of the generation of both “arbitrary” and “connected” ideas is
essential for effective improvisation. As noted above, spontaneity skills are a subset of improv
skills for Salinsky and Frances-White. In this context, spontaneity appears to be a quality of
individuals. In a conceptual move echoing the spontaneity debate in psychoanalysis (Chapter
Two), once spontaneity is brought into the social realm, it becomes “improvisation,” involving
the generation of connected ideas as performers develop a scene together. The use of the
“obvious” is held to generally be most useful here, but generation of arbitrary ideas remains
important—ideas of some sort must be continually generated for improvisation to succeed. No
idea is “more obvious” or better than another, and the judicious use of surprise is key in turning
platform into story.

Synthesis: Development, Unity, and Contestation for “Spontaneity” in Improv Methodologies
Many details in our list of analytic dimensions have already been discussed above, but some
broad themes are worth summarizing regarding the historical development of the spontaneity
ideograph in improv methodology, points of unity cohering this ideograph across textual
accounts, and points of contestation among these accounts. It should be noted that these authors
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rarely explicitly cite each other and almost never directly discuss the influence of previous
writers on their own work. It is also reasonable to assume that the writers are to a certain extent
unaware of influences on their accounts of spontaneity, and also that these influences are diffuse,
with earlier texts only one small element of a vast network of influences. I do believe that in
many cases consideration of a writer’s particular use of terms or expressions indicates a response
to other texts, but no author ever explicitly states this. The following general claims are
necessarily speculative, and in any case should not be read as necessarily implicating specific
intention toward affecting the spontaneity ideograph by the writers considered.
One significant direction in the diachronic development of spontaneity in these writings is a
trend toward greater backgrounding of the term. Both Spolin and Johnstone devote extensive
sections to explicit analysis of “spontaneity” as such. Later writers continue to use the term, but
explicit analysis largely fades away, and the term is used in a much more taken-for-granted way
revealed through its association with other terms and with more specific practices of improv.
The concern becomes more with the activity of “improv” in a more general sense, with the
background importance of spontaneity assumed, and the question of successful improv is
diffused beyond the key ideograph of spontaneity to constellations of associated ideographs
connected with successful improv. Practices are generally oriented to this constellation rather
than to spontaneity directly. While leaving spontaneity criterial to the identity of improv
practices, writers following Spolin and Johnstone begin to focus on a wider range of practices
implicated in “successful” improv, beyond the generation of spontaneity itself. This trend peaks
in Napier, where “spontaneity” is used explicitly only as an impossibility, and the focus is
entirely on effective improv practices. In the most recent text considered, Salinsky and FrancesWhite reinforce this trend by their return to an explicit address of the term “spontaneity;” their
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treatment of it as “generation of arbitrary ideas” decentralizes it as only one aspect of improv
practice, though a foundational one, still definitional to the practice.
Though this trend may seem to indicate a reduced significance of the spontaneity ideograph
for improv methodologists over time, I believe that another reasonable interpretation of this trend
is actually the progressive reinforcement of the spontaneity ideograph as its explicit deployment
is subsumed to methods of blind obedience. Spolin and Johnstone, as the earliest methodology
writers, were highly concerned with establishing the “identity of practices” to which their
methods were applicable. Explicating “spontaneity,” which they recognize as criterial to improv,
is thus an important project for their accounts, as they are still establishing the identity of the
ideographic community in which their methods and evaluations of practices are account-able and
able-to-be-made-sense-of.
Methods of blind obedience with respect to an ideograph only become possible when an
ideographic community has been to a certain extent established and endogenously recognized by
its members as such. Only then can the conditions for both blind obedience to an ideograph and
for breaches through explicit engagement with that ideograph become recognizable methods
within that community. This process is ongoing; ideographic communities are not formed by
reaching some critical mass of recognizable relation to an ideograph. But in the nascent stages
of the formation of an ideographic community, that community’s relationships with its criterial
ideographs and their synchronic associations are still under negotiation (though by no means
necessarily explicit or deliberate negotiation). Spolin and Johnstone’s writings may be seen as
an important step in this process of ideographic community formation, through their
appropriation of the ideograph “spontaneity” from the broader culture and their application of it
to the activities of those whose practices and values are influenced by improv methodology.
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In turn, later writers tend to take spontaneity for granted. After all, improv is much more
than “just” being spontaneous, though this characteristic is criterial. Though this chapter focuses
on the spontaneity ideograph and its synchronic associations in improv, the methodologists
above also use a number of other ideographs related not directly to improv as spontaneous, but
instead to other aspects of successful improv performances such as narrative development, strong
characters, technical skills like space-object work, etc. Again, this trend is made clearest in
Salinsky and Frances-White, where the skill of “generation of arbitrary ideas” identified with
spontaneity is explicitly distinguished from other relevant improv skills. Post-Spolin/Johnstone
writers may be seen not as reducing the relevance of spontaneity, but instead taking its character
for granted as criterial for the identity of improv practices, and focusing on practices which,
though still rooted in the essentiality of spontaneity, do not necessitate explicit analysis of this
foundational characteristic. In the “early days” of the establishment of improviers as an
ideographic community, the character of identity of practices was still under negotiation and
calling for explication. Later writers, much more secure in the criterial identity of their practices,
are free to treat the character of spontaneity as “what everyone already knows” by virtue of
membership in the established ideographic community to which they and their readers are
presumed to belong. The improv practices they advocate can be explicated in “blind obedience”
to the ideographic community’s use of the spontaneity ideograph; they do not require
justification of their relationship to spontaneity, as community members “always already” take
the criterial significance of spontaneity for granted.
If we accept this account, it implies an emergent consensus on certain features and points of
contestation associated with the spontaneity ideograph, such that improviers are progressively
able to use the term more unproblematically and “automatically.” Many details of these
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practices as spontaneity is progressively backgrounded are already discussed in the individual
analyses above, but again, some broad trends are worth noting. That spontaneity is criterial to
improv is a universal theme. Methods of generating recognized spontaneity in performance are
not merely additive to improv, an additional trick applied to “traditional,” “non-spontaneous”
theatre techniques. Nor are they merely the thing that makes improv stand out as distinctive
from other performance genres. While writers often disagree about the methods, with
implications for their accounting of spontaneity, all agree that appeal to such methods is what
makes improv qua improv.
The “learnability” of spontaneity is also a universal claim, embedded in the very assumption
that one can accomplish elucidating methodology at all; it makes no sense to describe methods
for successfully accomplishing something if we do not assume those methods are at least
earnestly believed to increase the skills underlying such projected accomplishment. Some
writers make explicit claims that everyone can improvise. Others do not make this claim, or, like
Scruggs and Gellman, assume a higher established baseline of related performance skills rather
than “starting from scratch,” but all must assume that improviers practicing (diligently and
critically) the skills they describe will learn to be more spontaneous, at least insofar as
spontaneity underlines successful improv. Accounts of the particular spontaneity-enhancing
skills involved vary greatly: shared recognition of and commitment to patterns in Spolin,
Halpern et al., and Napier; the shedding of enculturated inhibitions in Johnstone; access and
expression of emotion and the “self” in Hazenfield; generation of arbitrary ideas in Salinsky and
Frances-White. These different accounts of the concrete skills implicated in enhancing
improvisational spontaneity draw writers in different directions regarding both congruence and
difference in the synchronic associations they make with the spontaneity ideograph.
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A number of ideographs are synchronically associated with spontaneity or in opposition to it,
and some occur across most writers. With the exception of Napier, all writers explicitly oppose
“control” in various forms against spontaneity, with some also aligning spontaneity explicitly
with “freedom” or “loss of control.” All identify some form of “thinking” in opposition to
spontaneity; this term is used specifically in Hazenfield, Napier, and Salinsky and FrancesWhite. They and the other writers also oppose spontaneity to a cluster of terms associated with
especially antithetical “types” of thinking, e.g., “evaluation/judging/choosing,”
“approval/disapproval,” “trying,” “planning,” “inventing,” “self-censorship,” or “being in your
head.”
Though accounts of the “self” are divergent as discussed above, most writers (Napier, and
Salinsky and Frances-White, are exceptions) connect spontaneity with access or expression to
some “true” or “whole” self. This terminology is explicit in Spolin, Johnstone, and Hazenfield,
while they and other writers also associate closely related expressions like “intuition,”
“obviousness,” “exposing one’s self,” “instinct/impulse,” and “naturalness.” The idea of access
to and exposure of the self would also be related to such associated ideographs as “honesty” and
“truthfulness.”
The idea of spontaneity as instantiated in “play” is an important theme. Napier especially
makes this term central; Spolin, and Salinsky and Frances-White, also use it explicitly, while
other writers deploy terms closely associated with the experience of play: “creativity,” “being in
the moment,” “making discoveries,” “joy/enthusiasm/fun.” The experience of play is also
contrasted against attitudinal states like “insecurity,” “passivity,” “fear,” and “stress.” A number
of ideographs related to “play” are also expressed as characteristic of relationships between
participants or of their group behaviors, such as “cooperation,” “accepting,” “trust,” and
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“connection.” Similarly, other relational characteristics are also associated in opposition to
spontaneity as being antithetical to play: “competition,” “blocking” or “conflict,” for example.
These categories emerge as the primary clusters of ideographs synchronically associated with
spontaneity across most or all writers, and providing a certain ideological unity to spontaneity for
improviers: that spontaneity is criterial to improv; that it is a developable skill; that it is
associated with freedom or loss of control; that it is opposed to “thinking” in various forms; that
its enactment and/or experience involves access to some fundamental and/or complete self; and
that its enactment involves some form of “play,” a behavior indicated through certain
experiential states on the part of participants, and/or certain relational attitudes or behaviors
among participants.
Within this ideological unity, certain dimensions of dissensus also emerge. Many details of
dissensus are already discussed above, but it is worth noting several analytic dimensions along
which our methodological writers diverge significantly. The basis for spontaneity’s value
divides. Spolin and Johnstone both give strong emphasis to spontaneity as “freedom,” the
unconstrained form of Ivanhoe’s spontaneity values. Both also ascribe an important role to
untutored spontaneity, as access/expression of a “natural,” fundamental “self,” whether in the
form of “intuiton” or “imagination.” Later writers deemphasize unconstrained spontaneity,
viewing it more as an experiential byproduct of spontaneity. But many continue to emphasize
untutored spontaneity, especially Hazenfield, and Salinsky and Frances-White. Both, however,
view this access to “self” at least in part as a learned, developed skill and so ascribe value to the
cultivated aspects of spontaneity as well. Halpern et al., Napier, and Scruggs and Gellman view
spontaneity’s value almost entirely as a cultivated, learned skill instantiating play, product, or
method.
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The ontological status of spontaneity’s value is also at issue. Spolin, Hazenfield, and
Scruggs and Gellman seem to view spontaneity as an end in itself, valuable simply for what it is.
Halpern et al., Napier, and Salinsky and Frances-White all view it primarily as a productive
force, valuable for its capacity to contribute to effective improv. Johnstone also shares the view
of spontaneity as a productive force for performance, but gives this aspect secondary importance
to his account of spontaneity as fundamentally a potentiality, a wellspring of infinite possibility.
There is also some divergence with respect to the basis for greater or lesser degrees
of/capacities for spontaneity. Many writers, like Spolin, Johnstone, Halpern et al., and
Hazenfield, locate this basis in learned behaviors and characteristics of the relationship among
participants (which may also include teachers, audience, etc.). These learned behaviors and
relational characteristics can affect prevalence/performance of spontaneity by either promoting
or inhibiting spontaneity; all writers give examples of both. Salinsky and Frances-White, and
Scruggs and Gellman, do not emphasize relational characteristics, instead subsuming these
concerns to their account of spontaneity’s basis in learned skills, with spontaneity-promoting
relationships emerging from certain learned methods of behaving towards performance partners.
Scruggs and Gellman also imply a role for spontaneity as enhanced or stymied by inherent
subject characteristics in the form of “personality;” Napier takes this ascription to inherent
subject characteristics a step further by positing the adaptive value of “fear” for humans in
general as a foundational stymying force on the capacity for “play.”
Finally, different writers emphasize spontaneity as emergent primarily from individuals or
from social interaction. Johnstone, Hazenfield, Napier, Scruggs and Gellman, and Salinsky and
Frances-White, all view spontaneity as fundamentally emergent though individuals, with group
spontaneity more or less additive of individual production of spontaneity. Spolin and Halpern et
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al. give the opposite emphasis, with spontaneity seen as emergent from the interactions of
individuals together.

Conclusion
My purpose here is not to evaluate the accuracy/efficacy of consensus perspectives of
spontaneity among these writers, nor to attempt to resolve areas of dissensus, but rather to make
these areas clear as significant features of the use of the term “spontaneity” among the
ideographic community of improv methodology writers. I have extensively analyzed the
ideographic dimensions derived from Chapter Two with respect to improv methodologists’ use;
however, this analysis has thus far addressed only the descriptive features of these deployments
of the “spontaneity” ideograph. But ideographs are by definition not merely descriptive, and
have real implications for the social positioning and opportunities of concrete persons acting
within the ideographic communities where an ideograph is used and of which these persons are
members. In the following chapter, I address issues of the way in which the spontaneity
ideograph is deployed in concrete improv practices, and the oppressive/enabling features of these
deployments upon individuals—a critical assessment of methodological spontaneity.

181

CHAPTER 4
IMPROV’S RHETORIC OF SPONTANEITY: A CRITICAL PERSPECTIVE

A Critical View of the Relation between Ideographic Accounts and Material Practices
An important question emergent from analysis of spontaneity in improv methodology is,
what is the actual impact of ideographic accounts of spontaneity on concrete improv practices?
In other words, how does the ideograph, whether employed explicitly or via methods of blind
obedience, actually operate to constrain and channel commitments among members of this
ideographic community? How does it affect concrete, observable behavior of community
members, and what are the implications of these impacts on relations of power, privilege, and
oppression within the community and with respect to the larger culture in which the community
is embedded?
The particular impact of methodological writings is difficult to tease out with respect to the
broad questions above. First, methodology is a production after-the-fact of concrete personal
interactions, which make up the vast bulk of actual improv practice and learning; written
methodology may be best viewed as artifacts of particular methodologists’ concrete experiences
with improv. Second, the influence of method writings is unpredictable, as actual improviers
encountering these writings may interpret them and/or use them in very different ways, which
may be very influential on concrete interactions but leave no readily-accessible artifacts. Still, I
would argue that the effect of methodology writings, while small in the “big picture” of improv
culture, is outsized in its impact, due to its wide dissemination over long periods of time, stable
artifactual character, and recognized status among improviers as descriptive of paradigmatic
improv practices.
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Interestingly, the explication of methodology also has to some degree the inherent character
of a “breach” in the improv community, even when its influence goes on to reinforce and
increase unity in that community. As noted above, the practical use of “spontaneity” involves a
special relationship with methods of blind obedience, as successful enactors of spontaneity are at
least to some extent unaware of their successful enactment (at least until after the fact). This is
reflected in the vague but significant language of writers invoking the “magic,” “unanalyzable,”
“in the moment” character of spontaneity. Paradoxically, successful enactments of spontaneity
require that performers be to some extent unaware of their success. Success requires that
performers are not “trying” to be spontaneous, they are “just doing it,” and awareness of this
unawareness is how you “know” you are successful, reflected in writers’ language of “intuition,”
“truthfulness,” “impulse,” or “discovery,” for example. As such, “blind obedience” to principles
of spontaneity is in part criterial for successful enactments of spontaneity at all.
Thus, any explication of the ideograph “spontaneity,” in calling attention to it and making an
effort to circumscribe or alter its applicability as an ideograph, constitutes a breach of the
methods of blind obedience that make successful enactments of the values underlined by the
ideograph possible. Improv methodology, in its analysis of spontaneity, is an application of
power—social action that projects to alter the “meaning” of spontaneity as an ideograph, i.e., its
“formal power” to “contain the commitments” of improv community members (c.f. Coogan
671). Again, it is not relevant that writers often do not consciously and deliberately aim to have
concrete impact on the operation of the spontaneity ideograph; the fact that such action involves
the application of power is enough to make the impact of that action on power relationships
relevant. The inherent relevance of power in the activity of producing methodology thus makes
such production amenable to critical analysis.
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The application of critical theory is itself inherently a form of breach, an application of power
against methods of blind obedience to tacit ideology. I here understand critical theory in a broad
sense, inclusive of a variety of philosophical and sociological approaches that employ the
“critical” label but may have significant foundational differences in worldviews, assumptions
and/or goals. For example, Rune Premfors identifies significant divergences in “postmodern”
and Habermasian “critical theory.” In this account, the postmodern position holds that all
knowledge (“science” included) is local and provisional and that “rationality…may only be
achieved in specific language games” which “are always in conflict with others,” while
Habermasian critique rejects that “truth” is merely arguments and aims to reform communicative
practice in ways that make a “rationality” possible (83). Habermas also views power as
eliminable or reducible by practices of consensus-formation, while postmodernism views
power/knowledge as a fundamental, unified concept that cannot be eliminated but only change
forms. Habermas also embraces the possibility of genuine “democratic” social reform wherein
the influence of power is reduced, while postmodernists view democracy not as a goal but as
“active resistance to any form of metanarrative claiming to reduce the autonomy of local groups
and individuals in the name of some ‘totalizing’ idea” (83-84). However, I here emphasize the
unifying aspects of such divergent approaches, especially their positions that “an alternative to
the philosophy of consciousness should be sought in a philosophy of language” and their
critiques of “the current ‘system’” as problematic and implicated in oppressive organizations of
power (Premfors 83). These points of unity are especially amenable to my emphasis on the
language-activity of ideographic practices and their role in reinforcement and resistance of larger
social structures, i.e., the “current system.”
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G. D. Allen defines a society’s structures as “its control holding, power wielding categories,
which possess relative independence of the others” and whose “substructures exercise power
through organizations.” In modern societies, “there are numerous principle structures that
exercise power to control the others, though often in different ways,” including as examples
“People, Government, Church-Religion, Industry, Economy, Education, Courts, Labor, and
Police” (2). For my purposes, “critical theory” makes use of this broad view of social structures.
Many of Allen’s examples of structures can be viewed as analogous to less formallyinstitutionalized but relevant structures within the ideographic community of improviers:
“People” as the influence of the “general population” of improviers and audiences;
“Government” as improv organization management practices and structures; “Religion” as
practices of value and ideology in improv; “Industry/Economy/Labor” as practices of
maintaining viability of improv organizations; “Education” as improv training practices;
“Courts/Police” as practices of enforcement for improv organizational structures and the
“dominant” improv ideologies they advance. These various structures in improv have power and
influence in respect to each other in different ways, with improv methodology writings most
aligned with aspects of “Religion,” “Education,” and “Courts/Police” (this last to the extent that
such texts are used to establish/justify normative orders of spontaneity for practitioners). The
broader character of these structures in the larger culture within which improv communities are
embedded is also relevant insofar as they impact improv-community structures and practices
(and to a lesser extent, how improv practices influence such structures in this larger culture).
In keeping with my ethnomethodological perspective, I view such structures as emergent
from and constituted by ongoing practices of practical accomplishment, rather than as
prefiguring such interactions. Jack Katz, writing of class privilege in particular, notes that, for
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example, “apartment owners” do not possess a “thing;” rather, they are “benefitting from being
in a mesh of relationships that include the income earning behavior of tenants, the ongoing
processes that sustain the courts…the daily dressing into uniforms of the officials who will chase
out squatters, etc. What the owner has is no thing but a beneficial relationship to others’ doings,
doings which in their evolving, interactive interrelatings throw off material rewards to the
owner” (130). A similar account is applicable for other particular instances of the many forms of
privilege and oppression—that they are not rooted in structures themselves, but emergent from a
mesh of relationships and interactions, with material consequences.
Ethnomethodology’s focus on description and suspension of prefiguring structures of
analysis may at first glance appear poorly suited for critical analysis, but Freund and Abrams
have argued for ethnomethodology’s critical potential. As I do, they view “critical theorizing” in
its “most general sense: to step back and see the everyday world as strange; to understand and
question the material-social-psychological-political-historical-“scientific”-etc. status quo; to
theorize in order to change the world” (377). They draw connections with ethnomethodology as
a corrective for “dogmatic” approaches to Marxism; by starting with core questions of practices,
ethnomethodology asks such questions as “How is speech possible? How is science possible?
How is sociology possible?,” grounding analysis not in “the topics of science and sociology, but
the achievement of dealing with a topic” (381). As such, ethnomethodologists “see social
knowledge as inextricably linked to the contexts in which they are produced as well as their
methods of production” (387). In doing so, “ethnomethodology provides a critique of ideology
by showing that social perception and information produced by existing…institutions are
questionable or false. This is done by treating such information and perception as subjective,
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situated, and linked to the practical interests of those producing such perceptions and social
information” (386).
The practical accomplishment of influencing ideographic practices through the production of
theory as an application of power may be best viewed in terms of what David Coogan calls
“materialist rhetoric,” a rhetorical analysis that does not just “identify ideographs, narratives, and
characterizations,” but seeks to “link these and other techniques of rhetoric to techniques of
power…The emphasis in our analysis, in other words, must remain on outcomes” (690). Miller
argues that “social change occurs when the way people understand reality changes…when
language changes, when categories change…People come to understand their world differently,
[and] the sense of what is appropriate behavior (and what is not) changes; which is to say that
social change occurs when the ideographs change” (477). Peter Freund and Mona Abrams write
that ethnomethodology emphasizes “the materialistic in everyday settings in which ‘real’ people
act…[and] treats the production of information as subject to such clearly materialistic
contingencies as keeping one’s job” (392). A focus on the material consequences of embodied
practices of rhetoric offers an amenable ethnomethodological approach to critical analysis of
ideographic practices. But how do we assess outcomes of rhetorical practices regarding
“spontaneity” in the ideographic community of improviers?

Critical Assessment of Spontaneity Rhetoric in Improv Praxis: Seham and Spontaneity
We may view methodological rhetoric implicating concepts of spontaneity as an application
of power addressing the issue of “transposibility” for the ideograph “spontaneity” in improv, i.e.,
how a “form of discourse can have a meaning that is independent of any particular context in
which it occurs” (Myles 880). Following Bourdieu, John Myles rejects “realist” solutions that
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answer this question through accounts of linguistic “code” as determinative; this is appropriate
for “spontaneity” as considered here in keeping with my ethnomethodological approach.
Granted, “spontaneity” is determinative in the realm of improv practice insofar as it is a central
term marking those practices as recognizably what-they-are; however, particular accounts of
spontaneity do not overdetermine improv practices, as attested by the contestation among the
significant accounts discussed above. However, rather than reverting to a nominalist position,
Bourdieu shifts the ground of analysis from the determinative qualities of language on expressed
content as such to the view that “discourse is the product of social differences in the ability, or,
better, propensity to speak rather than any paradigmatic relations belonging or internal to the
language itself” (882). Such “habitus” in a social field orients members’ use of “discursive
positions arising from differentially experienced language worlds feeding into a commonly
shared ‘field’ or discursive situation” (883-84).
Transposibility is accomplished through the intersection of individuals’ and groups’
“expressive interest” in concrete social contexts with structural forces orienting the habitus of
“social capacity” to speak, with both “linked together by the particular nature of a field where the
expressive interest finds its opportunities or limits” (884). The “market value” of language
practices is contested and variable with time and context (885), but reinforced through practices
of social censorship and self-censorship that structure the social capacity to speak in particular
ways in particular situations (888-89). But Myles argues that such an account fails to “account
properly for the role of reflexive agency…in discursive situations” (895), to which
ethnomethodology can provide a corrective in its account of the intuitive, effective practices used
by social actors to create and recognize such discursive situations. Breaches of methods of blind
obedience, such as explicit methodology and/or critique, reveal those “reflexive moments when
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the social facticity of…language arises, becomes obvious to participants and creates conditions
of contestation, deference, euphemization, or self-censorship” (893).
As I argue above, methodological analysis of spontaneity in improv is such a breach, a
“reflexive moment” that operates (purposefully or not) as an application of power on the
structural “market value” of the criterial term “spontaneity” among the field of improv
practitioners. What, then, are the materialist consequences of such operationalizations of
spontaneity? How do they enable, inhibit, and/or enforce particular expressions and practices of
“contestation, deference, euphemization, or self-censorship” with respect to concrete persons
implicated in the improv community? What impacts do they have on access, representation, and
accepted expression (which together may collectively be understood as “social capacity to
speak”) by participants in improv practice?
Amy Seham provides some key initial insights to these questions in her treatment of issues of
gender, class and sexual orientation in improv. Seham’s approach is sprawling, and addresses
issues of general social discrimination practices, personal politics in improv history, and the
impact of organizational and economic considerations on improviers. As much as possible, I
will confine my remarks to her treatment of the rhetoric of spontaneity in improv culture, how it
has been envisioned and put into practice by the organizations she studies, and the impact of
these practices on women, people of color, and LGBT individuals in improv. Seham uses the
term “spontaneity” commonly, broadly and often unproblematically, reflecting its use in general
improv culture. Consequently, I will not analyze her use of the term as with the methodologists
above, but instead seek to draw connections between the spontaneity-practices she identifies and
the rhetoric of these methodologists.

189

She begins by noting that demographically, improv is dominated by “young, white,
heterosexual men.” On one level, this is unsurprising, given the power dynamics of U.S. society
at large; but it is surprising given that “women and people of color have historically found a
voice through improvisational modes of cultural expression—including feminist theatre and
jazz—but to the notable exclusion of improv.” She views this ongoing marginalization, so at
odds with improv’s claims to freedom, openness, playfulness and opportunity, as emergent from
practices that reinforce hegemony through “the mode of play on stage, through the manipulation
of rules and structures, and by the rigid control of what improvisers acknowledge as funny”
(xviii). She shows that the rhetoric of spontaneity, and how it is put into practice by various
organizations, is directly implicated in the forms of such oppressive practices.
Regarding “the mode of play on stage,” she particularly raises concerns about scene-building
practices of “agreement” and “groupmind,” the foundational improv principles that “no offer is
to be rejected—all offers must be accepted and supported,” in the goal of achieving
“groupmind,” “the entire troupe working intuitively toward the same goals” (xxiv-xxv). Such
groupmind is often associated with “collective unconsciousness” and the ability to “tap into
something universal, genuine, and true” (xxv).
First, Seham notes that while some may find such a vision utopian, “for those who feel
marginalized by the group, it can seem like a frightening loss of identity” wherein “groupthink
forces conformity and narrows the range of options that groups are able to consider” (xxv). She
argues that in actual improv practice, “any form of difference—whether it is based on gender,
race, or sexuality—is subsumed into the larger groupmind. Anyone whose views diverge too far
may be accused of trying to impose an inappropriate personal or political agenda…the universal
groupmind for which classic improv strives is too often simply the heterosexual white male
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mind” (xxvi). Even as improv grew and expanded and later organizations “found playful ways
to challenge the status quo,” nonetheless “traditional hierarchies of race and gender remain
intact,” and new organizational practices “often acted to reinforce mainstream ideology” (38). In
part, this ongoing hegemonic dominance emerges as a result of factors not directly related to the
rhetoric of spontaneity. Seham offers extensive analysis of how women, people of color, and
LGBT persons are stymied in improv through their “social training” in the larger culture, and
through organizational and economic practices such as casting, the “ghettoization” of such
performers into “chick scenes” or “black scenes,” the class-privileging “pay-to-play” access
policies of many major organizations, and direct censorship practices for stage content (e.g., xxvxxvi, 19, 26-27, 60, 104-05). However, she also locates the basis for such marginalization in
accounts of what counts as spontaneous in practice, and what is recognized as spontaneous,
especially with respect to the associated practical principles of agreement and groupmind.
Most obviously, agreement is framed in opposition to “denial,” and in practice, any form of
“resistance” (e.g., to a stereotyped character endowment) is often treated as “denial” and
antithetical to accepted improv practice (21); the “right to say no” is contested in the context of
improv’s ethos of agreement (154). Far more insidious, though, is the way in which practices of
groupmind can limit access to critical social reflection through its emphasis on immediacy:
“Any real challenge to society’s status quo requires conscious thought and the deconstruction of
normative values—a task quite difficult in the context of groupmind” (68). In opposition to the
utopian perspective of groupmind, Seham calls for recognition that “simple spontaneity does not
access cosmic truth, but something else—it accesses the sediments of experience and memory
that form the sense of self…nothing can emerge from improvisation that has not been learned,
synthesized, and remembered by its players” (226-27).
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In particular, she is concerned about how the emphasis on groupmind privileges “those
fragments of the performers’ personal memories, beliefs, and individual libraries of cultural
reference that are most easily and immediately accessed under the pressure of the moment and
simultaneously most likely to be accepted by fellow players and approved of by audiences”
(xxvii). For example, she identifies the phenomenon that White performers could easily be
“recognized” as playing Black characters through the establishment of readily-recognizable
stereotyped behavior—something not possible in reverse. Moreover, such stereotypical
deployment is almost necessary in the context of improv; if players need to establish themselves
as another race for the purpose of a scene, about the only way to do so in a context-free improv
scene is to make use of the most broadly-shared stereotypes (13); this is also true for performers
playing the opposite sex (72). More subtly, an improv ethos of agreement that emphasizes
“exploring and supporting relationships, giving up control of unfolding events, or subjugating
self-interest for the benefit of the group” can have the effect of reinforcing “gender training” for
women (14), naturalizing the playing of passive, supportive, or objectified roles in improv.
This naturalization effect is among Seham’s greatest concerns with the ethos of groupmind.
She especially challenges the view of groupmind as generative of “higher states of
consciousness” or “universal truths” (55), asking, “when the group works as one mind, whose
mind is it? How does the seeming rightness, inevitability, and spontaneity of improv mask the
unmarked power of hegemony” (65)? The naturalization of hegemonic depiction in improv is
reinforced through such claims as the insistence that “connections” in a Harold “are simply
waiting to be found…good players never make connections. Rather, they ‘recognize and pay
attention to’ patterns that already exist.” Such tacit belief in an “originary, natural order” from
which inspiration is drawn implies that an improvier is “not responsible for the connections he or
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she makes…While this notion helps to unleash spontaneous creativity, it also serves to reinforce
and even justify conventional roles and relationships and absolves individuals of any obligation
to look beyond stereotypes” (54).
The belief that relevant patterns are “already there” operates to assume the
legitimacy/essentiality of convention, which is reinforced further by the emphasis on “shared
recognizability” of emergent patterns as the center of what is “funny” for the audience (43).
“Speed and spontaneity are often used as a rationale for the performance of stereotypes,” and
many “players and audiences are convinced there is an implicit truth to these representations
because they seem to be intuitive references to popularly held and recognizable beliefs” (102).
Often, the audience will applaud scenes where “their suggestions produce the expected jokes and
relationships rather than original or innovative ones…these stereotypes are repeated and
revalidated by audience laughter and recognition” (102-03). Even as the steady reoccurrence of
patterns and stereotypes offers more opportunities for critique or change, “players tend not to
question the representations that emerge through spontaneous improvisation because, in that
moment, they seem like commonsense truths” (103). While “theories of spontaneity and
groupmind often protect players, giving them permission to explore and express socially
unacceptable behavior” (xxvii), such theory also “often works to absolve performers of full
responsibility for what emerges in a joke or scene” (105). Though not explicitly addressed by
Seham, another level of concern is that such theories of spontaneity not only absolve
responsibility, but can also be used as a cover for deliberately hurtful or offensive depiction and
expression. There is no rhetorical response from within the ethos of spontaneous immediacy to a
performer’s claim that their expressions of stereotypes, misogyny, homophobia, etc. were
derived from sincere “in the moment” impulses.
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In all these ways, “unexamined spontaneity, for all its pleasurable sensation of flow and
connection, can serve to feed sexism and racism at the deepest levels of myth and archetype”
(224). The general methodological injunction against self-censorship, whether framed as
“intuition,” “play,” “freedom,” etc., is a double-edged sword: It encourages self-expression, but
also naturalizes and reinforces the most readily-accessible (and thus, almost by definition the
most stereotypical) hegemonic expressions. The agreement principle expressed as “acceptance”
or “trust” works the same, encouraging self-expression through the shared understanding that
one’s expressions will be accepted, but also calling for acceptance of the expressions and
depictions of other players, however problematic. The methodologists discussed above never
appear to acknowledge this dark side of spontaneity, usually treating it as an unqualified good in
improv; even Carol Hazenfield’s more critical take is directed toward inappropriate applications
of the concept, not problematic consequences inherent to it.
Indeed, improv methodology as surveyed above is almost uniformly “neutral” in its treatment
of the character of the actual bodies of improv performers. Improviers are treated as generic
performing bodies. The existence of race, sexual orientation, and even differential physical
characteristics like size, is generally never acknowledged by the above methodologists. Even the
more subjective approach of Mary Scruggs and Michael Gellman falls short; while their three
principle characters are gendered, none raise issues about how their gender impacts their improv
experience/expression. None of the major characters is associated with a race; indeed, if any
characters are, they are minor ones and any relevance is never acknowledged.
This high level of the invisibilizing of difference in improv methodology strongly supports
Seham’s concerns about the valorization of agreement and groupmind in improv practices of
spontaneity. After all, the simple fact is that the concrete bodies on stage are not neutral. They
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are particular bodies, gendered, racialized, and so on, with particular histories and with
differential presentations to the gaze of the audience. The accumulated, sedimented histories of
individuals that Seham locates as the basis for spontaneous expression are particular and
individual, and shaped by the social positioning of the bodies involved. The treatment of
agreement and groupmind as accessing shared, even “universal” truths ignores the relevance of
concrete bodies and their histories and serves to reinforce hegemonic expression when the field
of actual improv practitioners and audiences (with many notable exceptions, of course) is itself
dominated by hegemonic bodies: i.e, white, heterosexual males.
The thin treatment of gender in particular is all the more striking in that 5 of the 11 authors of
my set of methodologies are women. Only three texts in this set acknowledge gender as an
improv issue at all: Mick Napier, Tom Salinsky and Deborah Frances-White, and Keith
Johnstone’s Impro for Storytellers, and all have a take that is problematic in light of Seham’s
critiques. Napier cavalierly naturalizes male intransigence, writing, “if women are on a
campaign to change male improviser behavior, they have about as great a chance as changing the
behavior of the guy they are in a relationship with,” and “men joke about women not being as
funny and will continue to do so. Fair or not, they do and will” (90). He also argues that beliefs
about differential treatment of women in improv are merely a “power drain for women,” that
dwelling on such beliefs are simply indicative of insecurity and weakness, and that “no strong,
funny woman improviser I’ve ever worked with gives any thought to any of those beliefs and
hates when other women do” (90).
Johnstone explicitly recognizes the situation as problematic, arguing that women are often
“driven out” of male-dominated improv, and that “male-dominated Theatresports typically has
no pathos, no compassion and no tenderness. Women can provide these qualities, given the
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chance,” but “those who survive the put-downs and the aggression are likely to end up just as
tough as the men—in which case we might as well be using men in skirts” (“Storytellers” 33839). He vaguely recommends that teachers urge men to treat women respectfully, and to
“consciously to include ‘feminine’ scenes, just as action movies do, and to let women control
scenes and be the heroines of stories.” Women, meanwhile, “should sometimes train together,
away from the men, and…have a social life together, and should teach each other not to be so
ingratiating” (339). While Johnstone’s approach does ask men to change their behaviors, it still
places responsibility on women to adapt their own behavior in response to naturalized
“aggressive” male behavior. Women are lauded for a capacity to bring emotional qualities to
improv, but it is not suggested that men should themselves develop capacities for “pathos,
compassion, tenderness.” Presumably, men’s development of these qualities would not only
improve their improv, but also their relationships with fellow women improviers and each
other—yet an essentialized gender duality is reinforced, in which pathos, compassion and
tenderness are outsourced to women and tokenized in the overall improv process (“consciously
to include ‘feminine’ scenes, just as action movies do”, 339).
Frances-White (writing without her otherwise co-author Tom Salinsky for the section
“Women in Improv,” Salinsky and Frances-White 337-40) takes a gentler tone and
acknowledges the real impact of social training, but still places the responsibility for changing
the situation on women’s choices. Women should be more forceful in making and establishing
high-status choices (339), and if they notice that men in a group “don’t like their values or
opinions, then don’t work with them…leave and start your own group with people you like”
(340). Her primary argument for diversity and inclusiveness in improv is not framed in the
values of access to expression, broadening of recognized social depictions, or opening the field
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of “propensity to speak;” rather, the argument boils down to “it will likely make the work better”
(338). From this view, hegemonic depictions are problematic more because they are indicative
that “a group has fallen into lazy trends” (339) than because of direct concerns about these
depictions. Meanwhile, addressing the problem of comfortable access for women improviers
takes an unproblematized capitalist turn: if you don’t like your opportunities, make your own—
as if it were as simple as that.
Where the rhetoric of spontaneity in methodological writings treats spontaneity as produced
through social interaction, as for Spolin’s “shared focus” or Halpern et al.’s “group mind,” it runs
into the critical risks associated with groupmind for Seham. However, as illustrated in the above
examples, there are different critical risks implicated by the opposite direction, taken by other
methodologists, of treating spontaneity as additive of the spontaneity-production of individuals.
While Seham associates the groupmind problematic most strongly with practices in
ImprovOlympic (now IO), she associates the problems individualist ethics of spontaneity most
with the organizations ComedySportz and Annoyance Theatre.
She describes the rhetoric of the first (as expressed in official organization handbooks) as
“full of ruthless positivism” insisting that success “is a simple matter of mental attitude” and “a
matter of individual commitment and determination” (102-03). From this perspective, “social
conditions are merely obstacles that can be overcome with hard work and fearlessness” (103).
But serious critical concerns are raised by such an ethic of individual responsibility. As Andrew
Ross writes: “When personal consciousness is the single determining factor in social change,
then all social problems, including the specters raised by racism, imperialism, sexism, and
homophobia, are seen as the result of personal failures and shortcomings. Individual
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consciousness becomes the source, rather than a major site, of socially oppressive structures”
(qtd. in Seham 103).
The notion of inclusiveness in this setting translates into the acceptance of anyone who can
“keep up” in an aggressive, competitive format that consciously appropriates the social ethos of
an “All-American” sporting event, complete with the national anthem and snack vending, where
“obscenity” (including expression of homosexual desire) is censored as inappropriate, but
stereotyped depictions of gender or race are not (85, 99, 105). Even as teamwork is valorized,
the emphasis is on aspects of “productive conflict” resulting in improvement through
competition, not on the cooperative aspects of teamwork (37). Anyone who can rise to the
challenge is accepted, but challenges to the challenge itself are not. And again capitalistically,
the ultimate answer to disputes over expressive practices is, if you don’t like it, you can go
somewhere else for your improv.
In contrast to ComedySportz, the Annoyance Theatre pointedly eschews programmatic show
structures and even official titles and roles (though no formal positions are acknowledged, it is
noteworthy that Mick Napier, author of Improvise, is generally recognized as the organization’s
“leader”). However, Annoyance’s practices still rely on the same underlying ethic of individual
responsibility, with a similar problematic. The central principles of “play” and “process over
product” are framed by the belief (expressed in detail by Napier in Improvise) that improv
“rules” and the problems individuals have in their improv experiences are rooted “not in the
genre’s anarchy but in the individual’s own fears and ‘baggage’” (Seham 126). But this
principle, and the anarchic organizational policy following from it, creates an ethos of improv
entirely “based on individual relationships, willfully ignoring the broader social or political
context” that shapes individuals’ behavior (127). Regarding women specifically, the view is that
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if they feel marginalized on stage, they need to exhibit more power by committing “all the more
thoroughly to the improv process, although not necessarily to such rules of improv as perpetual
agreement” (154). Such commitment, though, calls for the denial of political or identity
principles in improviers’ practices: “Conscious resistance to society’s status quo comprises a
political agenda, and…any agenda (particularly a feminist one) interferes with committed
improv” (157). Such a claim, of course, willfully ignores “the underlying ideology of the status
quo and the so-called neutral spaces” whose very unmarkedness is political in nature,
naturalizing them as “the way things are” (158).
At the same time, Annoyance also has a reputation as unusually supportive for women
improviers, and taught Chicago’s first class “designed expressly to help [women] overcome
feelings of powerlessness on the improv-comedy stage” (127). The workshops teach that “most
women’s trouble centers on their belief that they must obey the rules of agreement while they
watch men break those rules” (157); but this should not be an excuse for weak play. Rather, the
problem is located in the very upholding of rules over relationships. “Genuine free play” is held
to “always challenge oppressive limitations.” While recognizing that “those personal
interactions are political,” women should pursue a “feminist agenda moment by moment,
tactically and opportunistically, as a good improviser knows how” (158). The workshop’s
central focus for its women participants is the traditionally-masculinized virtues of “get tough
and stop complaining” (155), with tactics of “assertiveness and self-permission;” when endowed
with a stereotyped or low-status character, “it becomes her job to turn it into a powerful one”
(156). Women in the workshop are “given permission to break the rules themselves,” or better,
to “maintain agreement but practice defenses and escapes:”
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Instead of resenting being defined as a whore…embrace the opportunity to make that whore
a unique character with a key role in the scene…If a scene partner ignores you, make the
scene about a relationship in which the man ignores the woman. If he denies your reality,
become a character who is confused about the facts of the situation, and make it work for you
(156-57).
While such techniques are empowering, they are empowering with reference to an already
skewed cultural backdrop wherein spontaneity and free play is intertwined with masculinized
qualities of aggressiveness, assertiveness, control, and individualism; women’s success is
encouraged, but in terms that frame success as acting “like men.” Meanwhile, men “naturally”
have no such need for techniques of “defense and escape” (with respect to gender issues in
particular; other marginalized intersectional dimensions of men’s identities may of course call
for such techniques). To draw a provocative analogy, such an approach is structurally similar to
teaching women “not to get raped” instead of teaching men “not to rape.”

The “Neutral” Body and Ableism in the Rhetoric of Spontaneity
Most of my improv methodologists take the view of spontaneity as additive of individual
productions, and the character of their writings reflects this. With the notable exception of Viola
Spolin, who pointedly eschews even the simplest examples, all methodology writings rely
heavily on specific examples of improv. Halpern et al. tend to focus more on shared group
accomplishment, but their pages are also filled with the name-dropping of celebrity comedy
performers. While other writers highlight celebrity accomplishment much more sparingly, they
make extensive use of examples (both from direct experience, and hypothetical though probably
distilled from experience) of extraordinary improv, and to a lesser extent, “epic fail” improv.
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The “quality” of the improv in these examples is assessed in terms of adherence to the practical
principles the examples illustrate, never in terms of identity and power relationships—i.e.,
improv is never assessed as better or worse because of how it positions and impacts particular
performers with particular bodies and histories, but rather always in relation to abstract
principles. This practice of methodology writing works to reinforce a “neutral” view of a
“generic” body in much the same way as writings that emphasize groupmind , though subsuming
this body to principles rather than “shared experience.” Moreover, the valorization or
villainization of individualized examples of improv reinforces a masculinized view of
spontaneity-production as “heroic” personal accomplishment without reference to the privileging
or oppressive social structures that make such spontaneity-production accessible and
recognizable to/for particular bodies-in-society with particular histories.
For all its impact on issues of race, class, gender, sexual orientation, etc., nowhere is the reallife impact of methodological neutralizing of bodies more glaring than in the utterly complete
absence of any reference to an issue so sensitive or invisibilized in improv culture that not even
Seham’s extensive critical study touches it: the bias of ableism. Fiona Campbell defines ableism
as “a network of beliefs, processes and practices that produce a particular kind of self and body
(the corporeal standard) that is projected as the perfect, species-typical and therefore essential
and fully human. Disability, then, is cast as a diminished state of being human” (44). Laura
Smith, Pamela Foley and Michael Chaney note that this diminution is “characterized by the
belief that [disabled] individuals need to be fixed or cannot function as full members of society.”
Ableism views disabled persons as “abnormal, rather than as members of a distinct minority
community” and disability is viewed “as a defect rather than a dimension of difference” (304).
Margaret McLean argues that:
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Central to ableism is the concept of norm or average because it simultaneously creates the
idea of difference as abnormal deviance…Normalcy is embedded in the beliefs, actions and
discourses that make up the fabric of everyday life. For the nondisabled person imbued with
the tenets of normalcy, disability is a relative state characterized by a hierarchy of degrees of
corporeal misfortune. The effect of these notions is to privilege persons regarded as “able”
while silencing and dominating those regarded as disabled (16-18).
Jessica Cadwallader describes such tenets of normalcy as operating through the “politics of
perception” wherein perceptual practices are marked as “common-sensical” practices enacting
“sedimented knowledges” that “enable the recognition of particular kinds of difference as visible
and…meaningful.” Through the invisibilization of the politics of such perceptual practices,
“dominant perceptions of disability as lack, as broken, as tragedy, as incapacity, as failure, as
pitiful, as not entirely human, as proximate to death” are enacted as “dominant, common-sensical
perceptual practices” (518).
Laura Rauscher and Mary McClintock describe these oppressive perceptual practices as
“deeply rooted beliefs about health, productivity, beauty, and the value of human life…[that]
combine to create an environment that is often hostile to those whose physical, mental, cognitive,
and sensory abilities…fall out of the scope of what is currently defined as socially acceptable”
(qtd. Hehir 3). Such hostility is emergent even through “well-meaning” social practices toward
the disabled. For example, Thomas Hehir problematizes dominant concepts of “inclusive
education” that are modeled on the assumption that “it is preferable for disabled students to do
things in the same manner as nondisabled kids” (3) as reinforcing the dominant narrative that
disability is “negative and tragic and that ‘overcoming’ disability [is] the only valued result” (4).
Such focus on helping the disabled to “overcome” disabilities can serve in insidious ways to
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reinforce disability, by deflecting opportunities to develop other skills taken for granted by
nondisabled persons. It also reinforces problematic ableist constructions of disabled persons,
which Hehir identifies as, at one extreme, paternalistic views of disabled persons as in need of
charity, and on the other in the mythos of the inspirational “supercrip” who heroically
accomplishes challenging tasks in spite of their disability. This second extreme acknowledges
the capability of disabled persons, but frames it in terms of accomplishment as a nondisabled
person, implying that “a disabled person is presumed deserving of pity—instead of respect—
until the person proves capable of overcoming disability through extraordinary feats.” Both
extremes “have at their core ableist perspectives, the failure to accept and value disabled people
as they are” (4).
Rooting ableism in the politics of perception reframes disability as “not an individual
limitation…but rather an oppressive relationship” (Nabbali 6) in which the marginalization of
rights and access for disabled persons is legitimized “as a necessity for public safety, rather than
for the best interests and wellbeing of those under control” (8). Like Hehir, Katherine
Runswick-Cole decries the “preoccupation with the production of ableness” in “inclusive
education” models while, simultaneously, disabled students “must fit in and not disrupt the
education of the majority” (115). She further argues that ableism operates as “a determinedly
nebulous concept…The intrinsic ambiguity of ableism means that disability becomes the focus
of attention. A fuzzy category, ableism is sustained not by declarations of what it is but by
assertions of what it is not, and thus it is necessary to hunt down and name disability in order to
maintain ‘ablism’” (115).
Though Runswick-Cole views disability as needing “naming” to enforce ableism, the
maintenance of the nebulousness of the idealized “able body” is equally important to these
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practices. The rhetoric of spontaneity in improv methodology that operates from the perspective
of a “neutral” body vigorously enforces this nebulousness, the naturalizing of the “ordinary
body.” Granted, in one sense we may see the genericization of bodies in improv methodology in
a positive light, as reflective of inclusiveness and the central claim that “anyone can improvise,”
or reflective of emphasis on shared experience, without the “singling out” of bodily difference.
However, we have seen above how such treatment of bodies in spontaneity theory has
problematic material impact on the access and expression of women, people of color and LGBT
persons in improv practice. The problem is all the deeper with respect to ableism, for the issue is
not even considered—not merely dismissed, but apparently not even identified as an issue at all.
Yet surrounding the treatment of ableism as a non-issue is a discourse of bodily spontaneity
that, in its accounts and examples, is clearly not inclusive of disability, at least in many of its
most “visible” forms. While the generic bodies of improv methodology inevitably reinforce
dominant hegemonic concepts of the “neutral” (white, male, heterosexual) body, there are very
few examples or accounts that cannot in principle be equally read as involving women, people of
color, and LGBT persons, as characters or performers. This is not the case for disability.
Instead, it is nearly impossible not to read methodological accounts of spontaneity as
unproblematically valorizing the idealized “able” body.
The core of Spolin’s game system focuses on movement in space, often vigorous and/or
precise, as do all the methodological accounts of skills such as environment establishment and
space objects. The photos of improv scattered through Halpern et al. usually show performers in
complex physical positions, carrying each other, etc. Hazenfield glamorizes the character of “the
spontaneous body” through images of teenage sexuality and the “thundering centaur.” Salinsky
and Frances-White’s core “spontaneity” exercises describe ranging around a room and rapid
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switches between different physicalized activities. Johnstone’s censoring of hesitation,
principles like Napier’s “do something now,” and general improv injunctions against thinking
and choosing privilege the quick-acting body at the necessary expense of others for whom
reaction and expression literally takes more time and effort. All writers emphasize deep
listening, visual attentiveness, and the ability to react immediately, committedly, and with fullyembodied involvement.
In all these ways, methodological accounts of spontaneity unproblematically assume the
“neutral” improvier body as an able body, implicitly sidelining at the least persons with sensoryor mobility-limiting disabilities. Granted that these are only the most “visible” and stereotyped
forms of disability, but the assumption of their non-presence in general accounts of the
spontaneously-acting body for improv methodologists is a strong indication that other less visible
forms of disability may also influence access and representation in improv. Even the
problematic “defenses and escapes” approaches to improv critique advocated above, are less
available to such disabled persons. Women have the option to “get tough” and advance a
feminist agenda “tactically” through their own “strong,” “immediate” choices; it is much more
difficult to tactically negotiate such work when a person’s capacity to actually express such
choices is recognized and treated as limited by other improviers.
What’s more, as seen above, the deliberate deployment of a feminist (anti-racist, etc.)
“agenda” is commonly seen as fundamentally antithetical to improv’s ethos of spontaneity. It is
difficult to believe that such backlash would not be all the more pronounced against “agendas”
that called for changes in an ensemble’s actual physical practices of producing spontaneity in
such a way as to be inclusive of access and contribution from disabled persons. This ethos of
spontaneity presents a major challenge to using institutional improv as a medium for “disability

205

artists,” who use art to engage the audience “in a critical process of questioning the sociopolitical
construction of disability and related ableist ideologies.” Even if welcomed in an ensemble,
disabled persons performing improv would almost inevitably be instead framed as “disabled
people doing art,” with the emphasis on “admiration and appreciation in which individual
[disabled] artists are admired for their ability to create work similar to other able-bodied artists”
(Eisenhauer 9). Disabled persons performing improv risk the cultural reinscriptions of Hehir’s
“persons in need of charity” (in the form of ensemble “accommodation”) or “supercrips”
(disabled persons labeled “heroic” for “overcoming” their disability by performing improv).
Even with the most critically-minded ensemble, this ableist framing still risks being inscribed,
through the experience of performances by audience that read the disabled performing body
according to such hegemonic narratives. The dominance of these narratives in ableist culture
places disabled improv performers “within a cultural discourse of enfreakment” wherein the
audience’s gaze is treated as “neutral and normative” while relying on “unquestioned
maintenance of normal/abnormal boundaries…and the cultural construction of disability as
property…something to be attended to…as both an object of curiosity and as a specimen”
(Eisenhauer 11).

Spontaneity and the Comedy Bias in Improvisational Theatre
This last point connects with Seham’s third mechanism of hegemony in improv practice, “the
rigid control of what improvisers acknowledge as funny (xviii).” Johnstone explicitly invokes
disability in his discussion of comedy and tragedy as they relate to status: “the man who falls on
the banana skin is funny only if he loses status, and if we don’t have sympathy with him. If my
poor old blind grandfather falls over I’ll rush and help him to his feet” (“Theatre” 40). This
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example illustrates how the valuation of “funny” in improv can also serve to systematically limit
access and accomplishment. Harm, humiliation, and their accompanying loss of status are
hallmarks of what is culturally recognized as “funny.” But due to the hegemonic framing of
disabled persons as “pitiable” or “admirable for overcoming,” the harm or humiliation of
characters they present is likely to be experienced by the audience as “appalling” rather than
funny. Of course, harm/humiliation as “funny” is a highly problematic social construct in itself;
but meanwhile, in an improv milieu that so overwhelmingly values “funniness,” the incapacity to
be found funny through these means operates to limit disabled person’s capacity to contribute to
that so-valued “funny.” The same structure operates, for example, with women; Del Close’s
much-discussed misogyny takes a subtler turn in an extract from his notes where he writes
“Women are not funny. Audiences laugh when men are made out to be fools in a scene” (Libera
116)—implying both that making-foolish-of is funny, and that audiences do not laugh when
women are made out to be fools.
But why the question of “funny” in the first place? Why is it relevant to the practice of
improv that the humiliation of certain bodies won’t be experienced as funny? One point relates
to issues of the larger social positioning of persons, reflecting the observation that humor is
experienced with the loss in status of a high-status, unsympathetic character. The aversion to
laughter at the humiliation of women, disabled persons, etc.—if we take this phenomenon at face
value—thus reinforces the lower-status, “sympathetic” social positioning of the bodies that
portray them. The converse positioning of a “dominant” body as one that can be “safely”—i.e.,
humorously—humiliated in turn reinforces the social recognition of such bodies as higher-status.
But this point masks a deeper issue for improv: why is “what is funny” such a relevant
question in the first place? Nothing in the functional dynamics of improv, or the structure of the
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medium, would seem to tilt it toward producing what is experienced as “funny.” But the actual
historical path of improv has so overwhelmingly emphasized such production that the terms
“improv” and “improv comedy” are often used interchangeably, including in Seham. Writers do
often ask, “what other emotional or experiential dimensions can we bring to improv?” But such
forays are always juxtaposed to “funny” improv, as if the categories of improv evocation are
recognized as “funny” and “everything else.” While writers discuss what is funny (and not)
extensively, no such focused treatment is given to the expression of tenderness, fear, desire,
despair, awe or any of the other myriad dimensions of human experience.
The comedy bias runs deep in improv methodology, shaping the methodological discourse
even as it is challenged within it. As with the use of specific examples, Spolin is an outlier
regarding the comedy bias; she never connects improvisation with comedy, or any other
particular mode of performative evocation, embracing the whole range of physical expression
through focus on performer’s “direct experience.” However, she does occasionally seem to
acknowledge a bias toward comedic production as a significant risk to access of direct
experience, writing that “Improvisation in itself is not a system of training. It is one of the
results of the training…When ‘improvising’ becomes an end in itself, it can kill spontaneity
while fostering cleverness. Growth ceases as the performers take over. The more gifted and
clever the players, the more difficult it is to discover this” (44). It is difficult not to see
“cleverness” here as representative of “joke-making” and other techniques criticized by
methodologists. She also goes on to single out laughter as a cause of “breaks,” “momentarily
pulling away from the stage environment and relationships,” and suggests that teachers sidecoach “use your laughter” to reintegrate it into the performing experience (46).
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Whether the comedy bias was in fact less of a factor in Spolin’s experience, or whether she
downplayed it to avoid legitimizing it through recognition, is an open question, but later writers
clearly recognize and in some cases embrace it. Halpern et al. unapologetically “tip [their] hats
in acknowledgement of the more serious uses of improvisation, and saunter off in the direction of
chuckles, chortles, and guffaws” (15). Salinsky and Frances-White have no problem assuming
that, “If you are looking to begin improvising or are already an experienced improviser, you are
probably chiefly interested in improvisation as a tool for comedy” (30). The device of examples
in post-Spolin writers is illustrative: though Hazenfield, and Scruggs and Gellman, draw from a
somewhat wider range of experience, other writers’ examples are almost exclusively
recognizable as “comedic”—silly, fast-paced, often outrageous. To some extent, this may be a
product of aiming for conciseness and clarity in examples rather than comedy as such. However,
there is no reason to think that the improv principles illustrated could not be just as clearly shown
through examples of non-comedic expression. Instead, writers illustrate key principles
extensively and almost exclusively through comic examples: Johnstone’s silly and rapid-fire
status games (often with “psychotic” or “obscene” content), Halpern et al.’s connections and
group mind, Napier’s commitment and play, etc. Another point to consider is the extensive use
of examples of performance by a “famous” or “accomplished” improvier, utilized by all postSpolin writers but Hazenfield and Napier; the figures in these examples are invariably famous
beyond the “improv world” for their accomplishments in comedy, especially film and scripted
work.
Significantly, most writers do expressly speak against the limits and pitfalls of the comedy
bias. Halpern et al. warn improviers against “trying to be funny” (23) and against making jokes,
which indicate “that you are not really involved in the scene” (27). Scruggs and Gellman
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identify laughter as the expression of “tension” that undermines our direct experience with
anything “outside of the boundaries of what we’re used to” (56). Salinsky and Frances-White
write that the downside of teaching performers to be “bold and fearless” is that many improviers
are trained never to play vulnerable characters (155), and become trapped in patterns of
“outfunny”-ing each other (147) or joking (157) as means of “being in control” and “not being
affected.” Writing of approaches to using audience suggestions, Johnstone warns that “laughter
misleads,” and that suggestions take control from the performers and place it with “a few
malcontents” in the audience “who want to be funnier than you” (“Storytellers” 26). He argues
that “self-revelation should be at the heart of improvising, but suggestions offer a way to hide the
performers’ true identities…A suggestion may get a laugh, but don’t assume that anyone wants
to see a scene based on it. In general, the funnier the suggestion, the less use it’s likely to be”
(30). Hazenfield decries the “‘real world’ mentality about improv,” the “conventional wisdom
that improv audiences are looking for a quick comic payoff, that there isn’t time to do more
meaningful work” (4), and calls for a more “dramatic” approach to improv so “we can take the
audience on a ride through all aspects of the human experience—not just the comic parts” (5).
Napier identifies the limiting effect of “having laughs in mind when you go on stage” as
producing a “product-oriented” mindset where “the product is the laugh, or the need to create
that laugh.” In contrast, “alleviating the burden of getting a laugh opens up a whole new
universe. Suddenly, a moment that would have been joked out is played through. All moments
in the scene appear more honest, and points of view and character are upheld effortlessly” (86).
Yet the very fact that methodologists so forcefully speak out against the comedy bias, even if
usually only as small asides, serves to reinforce and naturalize this bias. That this bias is so
widely identified as limiting is indicative that it is also being treated as the “natural state” of
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improv, an assumption almost all methodologists explicitly or tacitly endorse. Even as writers
argue for more expansive approaches to improv, most simultaneously feel the need to make the
rhetorical point that this will make the work funnier. Halpern et al. emphasize “honest
discovery, observation, and reaction” because “The truth is funny” (15). The audience will
“laugh at things they can relate to” (23); this laughter is “a side-effect of attempting to achieve
something more beautiful, honest, and truthful” (24-25), and the connections achieved through
groupmind “are a more sophisticated way to get laughs” (28). Salinsky and Frances-White speak
against comedy as an overt goal, summarizing their emphasis as “positivity, risk-taking,
storytelling,” but are quick to note that “out of these elements…great comedy can come” (270).
Hazenfield argues that improv emerging from “the heart” and drawing on the full richness of
performers’ inner lives “can be just as surprising, delightful, and funny as gameprov…wonderfully comic scenes can be created in this way,” while the fact that this approach
supports dramatic improv is described as merely a “bonus of bonuses” (4-5). Despite all the
potential Johnstone’s central principle of “status” has for critique and exploration of deeper
relationships, his examples emphasize silly, fast-paced status transactions, and he notes that
playing status transactions as “games” will release laughter (“Theatre” 35). Napier notes that
improv can “be funny on purpose or not funny on purpose” but quickly identifies that its usual
problem is that too often, “it is not funny on not purpose” (2); the approaches to scene initiation
he identifies as poor technique (19-24) are generally failed efforts to be funny. For all his praise
of the depth and range that working without the goal of laughter can bring to improv, Napier
immediately qualifies this point with the “punchline” that “these scenes are some of the funniest
I’ve ever experienced.” The laughs may not come as often, “but the laughs produced are of
greater quality…not cheap laughs, but more intelligent, richer laughs: better laughs.” And he
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recognizes the powerful inclination toward “cheap laughs” when he accepts that such richer
improvisation “can’t be achieved without agreement among the players,” for just one performer
in “need-to-get-a-laugh mode” will “pull the rug out from under the scene every time” (87).
In all these examples, writers challenge the comedy bias with an appeal to broader-based
principles of improv—honesty, groupmind, storytelling, emotional access and expression, status,
commitment, etc.—but then immediately reinscribe the same bias by selling these principles in
no small part because they are held to make the work more effective as comedy. Even Seham,
for all her critique of the oppressive role that valuation of comedy has played in improv,
reinscribes the comedy bias in the same way. She notes the two-sided character of comedy: that
“like improvisation, comedy is often seen as an instrument of the disempowered…using tactics
of irony and observations of incongruity to challenge the status quo, if only temporarily” (xxixxii). But comedy also often operates as:
...a conservative force—disparaging the lowly, ridiculing the outsider, and enforcing societal
norms, hierarchies, and conventions. Women and other oppressed people are often
effectively barred from wielding the weapon of humor by two obstacles: mainstream
society’s refusal to acknowledge their ability to create comedy, and its punishment of those
who try (xxi).
Seham’s book is rife with examples of such oppressive comedy practices in improv and their
impacts on oppressed persons, yet she does not question comedy as a bias itself. Instead, she
focuses on the incongruity that many sincere improviers claim that “improv-comedy must be
based on the humor of emerging truths—incongruities, character, and situation—rather than
jokes…theoretically a feminine mode of comedy,” while in practice, “Chicago improv tends to
privilege a heterosexual white male joking subject” (xxii). Her concerns are with the hegemony
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of the “heterosexual white male” dimensions of this subject, rather than the “joking” one, for she
immediately goes on to valorize improv as a “valuable means” of expressive access for women
and others “underrepresented in mainstream performance,” and as a vital medium for “artists
seeking to express and share the unique humor of their backgrounds and experience—to show
that they, too, can be funny” (xxii-xxiii).
In other words, Seham’s focus is on wider representation of access to “funny” expression,
and a broadening of social constructs of “funny” to be more inclusive of varying approaches to
humor, while accepting the hegemony of the focus on humor itself. Yet many of her examples
can be read as oppressive in the service of comedy rather than of sexism, etc., per se. Not that
the two can be so readily untangled; dominant notions of what “counts” as funny are part of the
web of general social structures supporting oppressive relationships. One valid approach to
challenging such structures is the expansion or modification of practices for recognizing or
experiencing expression as “funny,” to be more inclusive of differential experiences of comedy.
But such an approach cedes improv’s ethos to the overwhelming comedy bias, and puts the field
of contestation on these grounds: How can more people be more funny, or how can they still
effectively do improv that is purposefully not funny? An alternative approach, though, would be
to challenge the comedy bias directly, in the process pulling the rug out from under the practices
by which the limiting recognition, and the enforcement, of comedy ideals supports oppressive
structures and relationships in improv.
It is not only methodologists’ excess attention to comedy practices that upholds this bias; the
valuation of comedy is itself informed by and informs writers’ accounts of spontaneity in
improv. For example, the focus on “immediacy of response” as a key factor in making
spontaneity recognizable stymies the expression of emotions that literally take time to experience
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and express, like sadness, relief, or determination. Such emotions, pushed into use in the fastpaced way associated with improv spontaneity, often fall back into the comic through the
incongruity that expressing them with such immediacy evokes—i.e., however sincerely
expressed, the forced immediacy of response tends such emotions toward being experienced as
melodrama. Viewing spontaneity as so dependent on immediacy thus reinforces a comedy bias,
by forcing non-comedic expressions into a chronemic mold associated with humor.
Frances-White nods toward this consideration when she argues that improv’s inclination
toward comedy is “probably a product of the fact that improvisation tends to be performed as a
series of scenes or sketches which stand alone, despite sometimes being connected or revisited
later” (29). In longer work of “forty minutes to an hour, the audience will accept genuine
emotion…because they have invested in the characters and care enough to allow themselves to
feel for them” (30). She argues that audiences cannot accept a series of tragic or emotionally
intense scenes that stand alone. However, this argument reinforces the rhetorical dichotomy by
which improv is assessed as “comedy” and “everything else”—both by the contrast of comedy to
“genuine emotion” and the assumption that the alternative to a series of comic scenes is nonstop
emotional intensity. But certainly, there is some insight into how the comedy bias works through
repetition once introduced—once a show marks itself as comedic, the introduction of “genuine
emotion” will seem incongruous to the audience, both disrupting their ability to invest in that
emotion and their ability to comfortably return to a comic mode of experience if the performance
moves back in that direction. As a result, even longer work has still “chiefly been comedic”
(30), with more “genuine emotions” pushed toward the end, where they will be least disruptive
of the comedic elements of the performance.
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Another example is the overwhelming rhetorical association of spontaneity with experiential
states and modes of behavior that are recognized as emotionally positive, evocative of laughter,
and tending toward a certain frenetic energy. Much of the language most closely tied to
spontaneity in methodological accounts generally reflects these features. Spolin characterizes
spontaneity by its “freedom” and “play.” Johnstone extensively associates spontaneity with
unfettered expression of the “psychotic” or “obscene.” Halpern et al. mark spontaneity as the
expression of recognized connections, which reflect “truth”—and “the truth is funny.”
Hazenfield also invokes “freedom” and the immediate expression of “impulse” as core
components of spontaneity. Napier makes “play” his primary improvisational principle.
Salinsky and Frances-White’s key spontaneity exercises are specifically built around performers
doing as much as possible as quickly as possible, and evaluated in terms of how much “fun” they
are having. Only Scruggs and Gellman is an outlier, with central associated ideographic terms
like “process” and “discovery” that do not so directly share the same joyful and frenetic
character as other writers’ central terms—perhaps not coincidentally in an account whose
practical focus is on skills for longform, real-time, character-intensive improv.
A third example is the methodological alignment of “thinking” in opposition to spontaneity.
This issue is connected with the first example, aligning spontaneity with immediacy of action
and response, but goes beyond it to exclude thinking from the field of meaningful action and
even experiential product of improv. Though Andrei Buckareff’s response to Galen Strawson
supports a model of spontaneity inclusive of cognition (Chapter Two above), improv
methodologists tend to specifically exclude cognition, using the terms “thinking” and other
associated terms like “evaluating,” “planning,” “choosing,” “self-censorship,” or “the mind.”
Such an account of spontaneity, in excluding so much cognitive action from the field of
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recognized spontaneous behavior, helps contribute to the comedy bias by literally encouraging a
“mindlessness”—both in the positive sense of flow experience that improv methodology
emphasizes, and in the negative sense of stymying improv’s potential for critique and
consideration. Napier takes this position to its extreme in marking “thinking” as the principle
symptom of bad improv, and extending this claim to the audience—if the audience is “thinking”
about the improv, rather than caught up in the “magic,” then something is wrong with the
improv.
But the exclusion of thought from the recognized field of spontaneity limits improv’s
expressive potential and reinforces the comedy bias by stymying thoughtfulness. Exclusion of a
space for analysis, reflection, etc. in improv’s actual performing practices pushes performers’
generation of spontaneity toward always aiming at the “next big thing.” This limits improv’s
ability to portray realism; for people do think, after all, often, and often significantly, and if we
accept Buckareff’s response to Strawson, such thinking is as spontaneous as any other sort of
action. The lack of space for thought and reflection also pushes honest emotion and serious
exploration of issues toward melodrama (and thus humor) in the same way as the emphasis on
immediacy of response in practices of spontaneity-recognition.
The potential of improv for social critique is also greatly limited by a lack of space for
reflection and thoughtfulness. As Seham points out, “Any real challenge to society’s status quo
requires conscious thought and the deconstruction of normative values” (68), and the exclusion
of “thought” in improv thus helps reinforce that status quo. While Seham focuses on the
production of critique in performance, the same is true for the audience—the meaningful
receiving of critique also takes conscious thought and reflection. Moreover, the meaningful
expression and experiencing of critique requires space not only for thought but also for pain, on
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the part of both performers and audience. An honest unpacking of structures of privilege and
oppression is painful both to express and to digest, both for those victimized by such structures
who must come to terms with their own experiences of oppression, and for those who, if
sincerely engaging the critique, must come to terms with the destructive social forces of their
own privilege and their own roles in the victimization of others. But pain—genuine, empathetic
pain—is of course antithetical to humor, and thoughtfulness is marked as antithetical to
spontaneity; and together these reinforce the comedy bias with respect to improv’s critical
potential. Comedy can of course be a powerful vehicle for critique, but the comedy bias
enforced by this rhetorical framing of spontaneity limits critical approaches in improv to satire,
which tends to be a “shallower” form of critique, drawing both its critical potential and humor
from the most broadly recognizable hegemonic stereotypes in a way that mirrors Seham’s
concerns with groupmind. To go beyond satire to deeper, more engaged critique in improv
means allowing space for thought—including reflection, evaluation, and for that matter,
approval/disapproval—by performers and audiences. It also requires space for pain and the
spectrum of other emotions related to sincere engagement with critique (regret, pride, fear, hope,
etc.)—a difficult proposal under improv’s comedy regime as supported by its methodological
accounts of spontaneity.

Toward a Critical Improv
Granted, these same problematic features of spontaneity also have a profound liberatory
potential, for all the reasons that the above methodologists justly valorize them; the problem
comes with treating spontaneity, as accounted, as a neutral, unqualified good. The clear value of
spontaneity in these accounts, when treated as so unqualifiedly good, masks the material
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consequences of methodologists’ rhetorical use of the “spontaneity” ideograph. Among these
material consequences are problematic issues of access, representation, and expression for
women, people of color, and LGBT persons. While the marginalization of these groups in
improv mirrors society at large, the particular tensions and historical trajectory of improv have
led to intracultural practices that reinforce this marginalization, as expertly analyzed in Seham’s
case studies.
Above, I have extended her analysis by connecting some of her critiques with particular
features of the rhetoric of spontaneity in the popular improv methodology texts that help support
and justify such improv organizations’ practices. I have also called to extend these critical
considerations to the issue of ableism, and the particular challenges it poses for improv practices
and operationalizations of spontaneity. Finally, I have shown that these problematic constructs
of identity, representation, and expression are also more broadly supported by improv’s bias
toward comedy, which is in turn supported by methodologists’ ideographic rhetoric of
spontaneity. All are significant concerns for a critical perspective on improv through the lens of
how spontaneity is accomplished in rhetoric and practice. I believe that all are issues which
improv practitioners and scholars should explore and challenge in more detail; however, I here
confine myself to a few introductory thoughts on addressing these issues with regard to practices
of spontaneity.
Regarding issues of demographic access, representation, and expression, my own
positionality makes comments on suggested approaches difficult. As a heterosexual white male
largely conforming to tacit ableist ideals, any effort on my part to speak for groups marginalized
in improv practices would be suspect at best. However, as a starting place I would first broadly
advocate that fellow improviers who share my positionality (one disproportionally represented in
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improv) to listen and take seriously critiques and experiences from marginalized voices in
improv. Furthermore, improviers—especially those whose identities intersectionally include
dominant positionalities—should reconsider unreflexive principles of spontaneity that call for
refusal to analyze or question impulses and the expressions driven by them, and should assess
their own expressions and impulses from a critical perspective that considers how their actions
are reflective or reinforcing of hegemonic privilege. Finally, I call on improv practitioners and
scholars to return to an explicit address of the key ideograph “spontaneity,” and to consider
critically how naturalized/neutralized operationalizations of this guiding term have real,
differential material conequences for improv participants at the levels of access, representation,
and accepted/accessible expression. On the theory/methodological level, one productive area to
assess is the double-bind between the hegemony-reinforcing problematics that dog both
groupmind (socially-generated) and individualized operationalizations of spontaneity—as
discussed and critiqued above, the problematic created at either end of this spectrum is not
neutralized by a simple shift toward the other end.
As discussed above, many of improv’s hegemonic practices are also supported by its bias to
comedic production, and addressing this issue also helps to address critical demographic issues,
for the alignment of spontaneity with comedy is one general practice by which hegemony is
upheld and critique is limited in improv. In keeping with my call for a direct challenge to the
comedy bias (as opposed to creating space for a broader field of comedic voices), I recommend
two shifts in the practice and rhetoric of spontaneity in improvisational theatre: 1) from
“unmindfulness” to “thoughtfulness” and 2) from “joy” to “jouissance.”
The first shift challenges the rhetoric of “emptying the mind,” “let go of control” and “just
take action, be-in-the-moment” that characterizes improv operationalizations of spontaneity.
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Such accounts of spontaneity emphasize what I collectively call an “unmindfulness” that, ideally,
transcends both internal and external sources of restraint and is expressed through unconsidered,
unhesitating action that is considered “free” and “natural” and is opposed to “thinking,”
“planning” or “considered action.” While the liberatory potential of such an account is clear in a
world filled with both socially-enforced and internalized censorship, such an approach also
short-circuits critique, self-analysis, and consideration of the larger social implications of improv
expression, for these are also sources of restraint. It also privileges persons whose positionality
offers the most access to such unhesitating action.
In contrast, I would like to propose an account of “thoughtfulness” that looks to integrate
action generally pejoratively marked in current improv methodology as “thinking” into improv’s
accounts of spontaneity. Hazenfield takes steps in this direction with her account that challenges
practices focused on emptying the mind, but instead of allowing for thought and consideration,
she refocuses on the impulse of emotional experience as inspiration for action, locating “mind”
as a fundamental censoring force with a role analogous to “fear” for Napier. While their
critiques of “mind” and “thinking” are apt and meaningful in their accounts, I would like to
suggest that the diametrical opposition of thought to spontaneity goes too far, both raising the
above critical concerns with access to expression, and also limiting improv more generally, by
foreclosing the “thoughtful” dimensions of expression and experience.
My notion of “thoughtfulness” in spontaneity is not meant to replace action- or emotionfocused accounts with weighed and considered action, but to instead expand them to recognize
equally the potential—indeed, the necessity—of spontaneity in the many “cognitive” activities
shunned by improv methodologists as “thinking.” Such an integrative approach would make a
distinction between “thinking-about” the performance and “thinking-in” the performance.
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“Thinking-about” represents the myriad of cognitive behaviors identified as problematic for
generating spontaneity, including approval/disapproval, fear, calculation of self-presentation, etc.
And it would also include the conscious “agendas” stigmatized by most improv practitioners, as
discussed in Seham and above. I agree that such “agendas” are destructive of spontaneity when
they take such forms as “how can I make this scene feminist?” for the same reasons they are
destructive when performers are “thinking-about” how to make the scene funny, how to be in
control of the scene, how to express the self-presentation they desire, etc. Such an account does
not deny spontaneity to thinking, but rather identifies certain practices of cognitive action as
destructive of spontaneity just as certain practices of behavior in improv are also identified as
spontaneity-inhibiting. In other words, my account does not identify a mind-body division, and
seek to bring “mind” into the fold of spontaneity. Rather, actions distinguished by improv
methodologists into categories such as “thinking,” “emotion,” and “overt action” are unified
within the ethnomethodological field of social behavior.
I argue that the “thinking” practices identified as destructive by improv methodologists
stymie spontaneity not because they involve thinking as such, but because they involve
“thinking-about” the performance and how to accomplish expressive aims beyond being-in-themoment. But the genuine problematic with such forms of thinking-about should not radically
banish all forms of “thinking” in improv. Instead, I seek to bring thinking back into the fold of
spontaneity through the notion of “thinking-in” the performance. Such an account recognizes
thinking as itself a form of action, as subject to spontaneity as more “overt” actions, and views
thinking as integrated with, not opposed to, emotion. It allows for performers to take time to
react, but in a way that keeps them in-the-moment with the scene. This approach to thinking in
improv creates space for performers to think, not as performers but within the context of the

221

spontaneously-created scene. As stated above, people do think—evaluate, plan,
approve/disapprove, etc.—all the time, and much thinking is spontaneous reaction. In “real life,”
we do stop to think when confronted with choices and with forms of expression we find
problematic. We do consider our actions and responses. And emotions, though valorized for
their immediacy in much methodology, are often not so immediate in “real life”—they are often
arrived at and discovered through thought and reflection.
Instead of opposing thought to spontaneity, I advocate for allowing thoughtfulness into the
range of recognized “spontaneous” responses in improv, in the form of “thinking-in” rather than
“thinking-about”—that is, thinking as a form of deep involvement with the moment, “incharacter” as it were, as opposed to the “thinking-about” cognitive behaviors that alienate
performers from the moment. Such thinking does not involve “choosing” a response in the way
methodologists critique, but instead involves allowing oneself to be affected by thought, in the
same way that Hazenfield advocates for emotion, but without the breakneck pace of response her
account of impulsiveness calls for. Thus “thoughtfulness,” which allows for deep involvement
with ongoing action through thought as shaped by and shaping emotion, as opposed to
“mindlessness” that banishes thought as antithetical to immediate experience.
Such an approach to spontaneity in improvisational theatre would call for a de-emphasis on
“unhesitancy” of action, and an embrace of the power of silence, to which many methodologists
nod positively but give short shrift. It also creates space in improv for reflection and critique,
neither as deployment of “agenda” nor as a matter of resistant “tactics,” but as its own rich
dimension of experience through which reactions can be discovered and expressed. Such
“thoughtfulness” does not force critique and reflection, but allows for them as forms of genuine
spontaneous action and response, from which performers can express their discoveries and
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impulses. In doing so, it moves away from the problematics associated with the “immediacy”
and “unhesitancy” of accounts of spontaneity that constrict it to “mindlessness,” and opens paths
for a richer, deeper improv that embraces those dimensions of experience that take time to
discover and express. And like many of the challenges to the comedy bias discussed above, the
argument can be made that in addition to helping address issues of access, representation, and
expression in improv, such expansion of what is accepted and recognized as spontaneous in
improv has the potential to generally make the work better—and hell, perhaps even funnier.
The second shift I advocate, from “joy” to “jouissance,” challenges the comedy bias more
directly by expanding the scope of improv’s rhetoric in associating spontaneity with terms like
“play,” “fun” and “pleasure.” While much improv rhetoric of play leaves room for serious
engagement with issues or emotion as a form of “play,” the strong tendency is toward a
gleefulness, a “randomness” of behavior, quick action, bizarreness, and exaggeration. As shown
above, this bias badly limits both improv practice in general and the voice of individual
improviers, especially those with nondominant positionalities. In place of this rhetoric of “joy,”
I would propose a rhetoric of “jouissance,” in the broad sense employed by Elizabeth Bell that
goes beyond its associations with sexual pleasure to “encompass potentiality as well as
immediacy, excess as well as completion, desire as well as satisfaction in sexual, literary,
political and economic realms…a powerful and empowering trope: at once physical and
discursive, biological and political, material and social” (108).
While Bell’s use of the term focuses on feminist ethics and aesthetics of performance, and
the connections of performance with sexual pleasure, I believe the broad sense of the term has
valuable applications for improv. In Bell’s “pleasure-centered” economy/aesthetics of
performance, jouissance plays the role of transcending the sexual pleasure she places at the
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center of this dynamic, moving toward a pleasure of complication, reflection, and deep
experience. We may see improv’s rhetoric of “joy” as analogous to the simplified and visceral
center of sexual pleasure in Bell’s account: something to be cherished and sustained, but, as the
center, also operating as a homogenizing and controlling force—and so also something to
question and go beyond, to create a richer and more vital pleasure economy, if you will, by
creating space for a multitude of “pleasures.”
In improv, a shift to jouissance helps to decentralize “joy” and invites a more diverse
“economy of experience/expression.” This expansive economy recognizes deep, rich
experience—including of sadness, fear, anger, injustice, oppression, and so on—as nonetheless
in the realm of joy, as pleasurable by virtue of having meaningful experiences, having
meaningful opportunities to express onself. In short, to approach improv as a true “flow”
activity in Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi’s sense, an effort to go beyond mere “pleasure” to the rich,
meaningful—and not at all necessarily pleasurable—experience of enjoyment. Such an aesthetic
shift in the rhetoric of spontaneity would call for a methodological approach that asks improviers
and audiences to go beyond the easy pleasures that uphold the comedy bias, and to actively
engage with their hurt, their tenderness, their desire, their cultural positionality, etc—as well as
their joy—as groundings for pleasure in performance. Not merely as add-ons, experiments to
showcase range beyond comedy, but as the essence of improv: A space for the unlimited
wellspring of the imagination, for shared experience, for the range of human emotions, for
commitment to engaging honestly and powerfully with whatever happens.
The purpose of this critique is not to silence by layering in new rules, new “don’t’s.” Instead
of seeing improv made safer, I want it to be scarier. The purpose of encouraging “thinking” in
improv is not to give performers a chance to “think twice” about the implications of their choices
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or the course of action they are spontaneously playing out. It is because thinking is powerful and
dangerous. In “everyday life,” we make purposeful, tactical choices to be silent all the time, for
good reasons as we navigate power structures emerging as forms of control that create
consequences for expressing “what one thinks”—depending on what that is. For all its risks,
improv is about as safe a public social space as we can make for expressing all those thoughts we
silence in the everyday. Dangerous thoughts. Frightening thoughts. Irrational thoughts.
Approval and Disapproval. Acceptance and Rejection. They are all so powerful to express, both
from the perspectives of resistance to and reinforcement of hegemony. Why should improv
sever such a source of rich and powerful expression by shunning it as outside the realm of
spontaneity, when there is no good reason to frame it this way?
Awful things will get expressed and done sometimes. Good. Instead of silencing them, let
us take them seriously. Again, improv is about as safe a public social space as we can make for
experiences and enactments of both hurting and being hurt. So let us take risks with our feelings
and our choices, and not be afraid to hurt each other, or to suffer ourselves. For that matter, let
us not be afraid to be truly happy—not just gleeful—to love things, to find things beautiful and
valuable and worthwhile. And then let us be affected by all this, and learn from it, and not only
to be better at improv. In Spolin’s terms, let us not leave improv on the stage, but “carry the
learning process into daily life” as we take to the everyday world the discoveries that things
we’ve never even thought about can come out of our bodies and mouths, and that things we’ve
thought about an awful lot can too.
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Conclusion
An understanding of the spontaneity ideograph in improv is essential not only to making
sense of its criterial accounts for accomplishment of the activities implicated in communities of
improviers, but also of the power relationships and aesthetic character implicated in particular
productions of those (ideally) spontaneity-generative activities. As discussed above, the
ideographic rhetoric of spontaneity, while valorizing the concept as enabling, facilitative and/or
liberatory, also has oppressive qualities through its marginalization of non-hegemonic identities
and issues, through its naturalization of the neutrality of bodies, and through its reinforcement of
a comedy bias. I have offered several points of entrance toward a more critical practice of
improv, and a rethinking of its rhetoric of spontaneity, that would begin to address these
concerns, at least at the level of marking them as relevant to improv’s relationship with the larger
culture wherein its practices are embedded. This critical analysis, however, is still grounded in
the artifacts of formalized written methodology, itself analytical of improv attitudes and
practices. In the following chapter, I shift to a different set of artifacts—narratives prompted
about improviers’ experiences of spontaneity in improv practice, offering a set of individualized,
concrete examples of spontaneous experience not subsumed to a broader analytic schema. This
approach provides an opportunity to apply questions of ideographic structure and critical
implications to personal, rather than synthesizing, accounts of spontaneity.
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CHAPTER 5
CULT OF THE STAGE MONKEY’S’S NARRATIVES OF SPONTANEITY

The relevance of concrete examples as a form of account to illustrate and clarify
operationalizations of spontaneity was addressed in the previous chapter as an important tactic
for negotiating the meaning of such accounts. Indeed, although analysis of more broadly-based
conceptual accounts of “generic” models of spontaneity has thus far been the focus of my
attention, in keeping with my emphasis on the ideographic character of the “spontaneity” term, a
strong argument can be made that example-based accounts are far more foundational to an
assessment of the practical use of concepts of spontaneity in improvisational theatre from an
ethnomethodological perspective. After all, as discussed above, methodological accounts of
spontaneity are derived from, not prior to, actual experiences of spontaneity by methodology
writers. Methodology accounts (again, excepting Spolin) are riddled with examples of
spontaneity (or its breach/failure) experienced or observed by methodologists; even with writers
like Napier, who rely heavily on hypothetical examples, it is strongly implied that these
hypotheticals are distilled from and analogous to actual experiences. Given that methodology
writers are engaged in the activity of establishing accounts of the meaning of spontaneity for
improviers, it seems reasonable to presume that their accounts are attempts to “make sense of”
these experiences of spontaneity and non-spontaneity, rather than an elucidation and application
of prior accounts of spontaneity to the particular activity of improv.
Given this consideration, the present chapter will offer a final perspective on the rhetoric of
spontaneity, this one “from the ground up.” Rather than examining the assumptions and
implications of derived accounts of spontaneity, as in the previous chapters, this section will

227

consider spontaneity as expressed in the direct narrative accounts of improviers prompted to give
examples of their experiences of spontaneity and non-spontaneity in the process of engaging in
improvisational theatre. These narratives provide concrete examples of how improviers generate
their own accounts of “spontaneity” when asked to provide illustration of the term’s meaning for
themselves. Although the improviers providing these narratives have undoubtedly been
influenced in their interpretations of spontaneity by existing methodological operationalizations,
either directly by reading such literature or indirectly through the literature’s influence on the
overall social milieu of improv, such narratives still provide examples of more “self-constructed”
concepts of spontaneity, of the type from which more formal operationalizations are derived.

Ethnomethodology and Narrative
Regarding any concerns over the use of reported narratives rather than direct observation as
an object of ethnomethodological investigation, many of the same comments apply that were
discussed at the beginning of Chapter Two regarding conceptual analyses. As with that set of
artifacts, narratives cannot offer “direct” access to practices of spontaneity. However, as
“interpretive behaviors”—behaviors requiring a certain form of self-understanding on the part of
actors about “what-they-are-do-ing”—phenomena of spontaneity are fundamentally resistant to
literal descriptions anyway. Instead, as with conceptual analyses, the following should be
viewed as descriptive of overt behavior that involves interpretation on the part of social actors.
The behavior described via analysis of the narratives does not imply that these accounts are
“accurate” or “definitive” of practices of spontaneity. Rather, the behavior assessed is that of
“practices of reporting one’s experience of spontaneity in the absence of a prior imposed account
intended to influence responses.” As the reports are drawn specifically from the participants’
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experience in a social activity, improvisational theatre, which marks spontaneity as criterial and
with which all narrators strongly identify with their own social identities, the narrations in
question can be reasonably considered as offering insight into the interpretive behaviors of
participants regarding their practices for recognizing, assessing, and making-visible that which
they treat as “spontaneous,” at least within the social realm of improv.
A number of scholars offer insights that support these above perspectives. John Shotter
distinguishes “theories” and “accounts” in a manner parallel to the way I treat improv
“methodology” and “narratives.” He argues that theory/methodology is grounded on
accounts/narratives; that theories are explicit, abstract, discrete, systematic, complete, and
predictive, while accounts “have no such pretensions.” Regarding accounts, “what sense there is
to be found is not decided beforehand, but is discovered or disclosed in the course of the
exchange in which the account is offered” (114). A narrative is like theory “only in the
requirement that it be coherent and be understood as a whole…it cannot itself be grounded in
evidence, for it works to shape what we will interpret as evidence” in formulating theory (113).
From an ethnomethodological perspective, narratives cannot be seen as definitive beyond the
situatedness of their practical use, but can still serve as examples of “knowledge” within that
situated perspective. Ethnomethodological assessment of narrative related to membership in an
ideographic community “prioritizes members’ experience” through primary focus on what
members relating narratives “are doing, what knowledge they are demonstrating” through
language and paralanguage “to organize, define and make sense of their social experiences”
(Manzo 142). Barbara Smith argues that all value claims are based on local and contingent
conditions, and that aesthetic/value judgments “are not essentially different from ‘descriptive’ or
‘factual’ statements” in that they are neither more nor less compromised by social positioning
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and idiosyncrasy; the difference is the relative uniformity across a larger culture of those
judgments treated as descriptive/factual, “although the value of all objects is to some extent
subject-variable” (29). Linda Alcoff argues that the experiences reported in narratives are
necessarily situated in individual identity and social positioning, but it is exactly these features
that make local, contingent practices of knowledge possible: “Cognition is incapable of total
closure or complete comprehensiveness precisely because of our concrete, situated, and dynamic
embodiment. It is only because being is always being in the world, and not apart or over the
world, that we can know the world” (70). Though “identity” (as a woman, African-American,
improvier, etc.) is often treated as directly associable with certain histories of experience,
“identity” as a concept of practical use is better treated as a sort of shorthand for “the cognitive
significance of experience” (73), i.e., not “shared experience” but a shared orientation toward
experience as one would find among an ideographic community.
The knowledge expressed in narratives is necessarily local and contingent, but
ethnomethodologically, this is the only form of knowledge possible, for what is treated as
“knowledge” is itself dependent on contextual social practices for evaluating the knowledgestatus of claims. With respect to particular situated contexts, these practices tend to be mostly
successful. Thus, certain biases and limits in perspective allow knowledge as a practice to
operate; as Susan Babbitt notes, “When we try to be objective, we try not to be unbiased, but
rather to be biased in an appropriate way (298).” David Carr describes this facilitating role of
bias and limited perspective in narrative practice: “All the extraneous noise or static is cut
out…A selection is made of all the events and actions the characters may engage in, and only a
small minority finds its way in the story. In life, by contrast, everything is left in; all the static is
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there” (13). The function of narrative as authoritative often takes a form where the “big-picture”
truth is irrelevant; “knowledge” consists of recognition that something matters to someone.
In the case of our improv narrations, in a sense even the honesty of storytellers is an
irrelevant consideration, if we consider the activity under observation to be not “narrating
examples of spontanteity,” but instead what the activity “really” is, i.e., “narrating examples of
what storytellers present to be interpreted as experiences of spontaneity.” Dennis Day and
Susanne Kjaerbeck describe this practice as “positioning,” where, in interaction, “one inevitably
positions oneself through the actions one performs (verbally and non-verbally) and, at the same
time, is positioned by other participants” (17). Positioning is especially useful as an analytic
concept in contrast to the more static “role,” allowing for analytic inclusion of a greater
“diversity of selves” and an increased sense of relationality in shaping the “self” of the
positioning/being-positioned subject (18). They describe storytelling as object of
ethnomethodolgical analysis as “characterized by a focus on the interactive accomplishment of a
story’s telling…the teller of the story demonstrates a stance with regard to what is being reported
which, in turn, makes relevant the taking of a stance by the story’s recipients (30).” We may
view the narratives considered below as artifacts of interview respondents’ practices of
positioning themselves in concrete ways to the criterial ideograph “spontaneity” with respect to
their shared participation in improv. Any “regularity” of phenomena identified in these
narratives is not an explanation of participants’ experience of spontaneity, but rather itself a topic
of investigation (34). Conversely, “anomalies” in patterns of reporting on spontaneity are not
puzzles to be solved, but opportunities to examine one’s own positional/positioned limits as a
story’s recipient, and invitations to consider the relevant perspectives of others as they present
their contextualized contributions to a milieu of endogenous knowledge (Hoagland 137).
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Participants and Method
As described in detail in Chapter One, participants volunteered their responses to seven
guiding questions presented without additional prompting, either in writing or verbally in an
audiorecorded interview. All respondents are affiliated with the improv organization Cult of the
Stage Monkey (COSM), originally organized at University of Louisiana—Lafayette in 1998,
where many generations of performers later it still performs throughout the Fall and Spring
semesters, now organized as a registered student organization. An early member of this
ensemble later established Stage Monkeys, affiliated with the University of Southern Mississippi
(Hattiesburg) and is still performing throughout the year. Members of these two ensembles later
founded other non-university organized ensembles across the United States: COSM Chicago
(2007-2011); MicroCOSM of Washington D.C. (2008-2010); COSM of Carbondale, IL (20082011); and Stage Monkeys of San Diego (2009-present). A professional group, Silverbacks,
initially consisting entirely of earlier members of various branches, has performed bimonthly in
Lafayette, LA since 2012.
While these various groups use variations of the original name, all recognize themselves as
sharing membership in the larger organization confederated of these ensembles and their former
members; “Cult of the Stage Monkey” is also generally recognized as the name of the
organization at large. The organization at large has no formal influence over the affairs of
individual branches beyond permission for use of the name, and the various branches developed
largely with little direct influence from the others. However, shared affiliation with the
organization at large is an important part of each ensemble’s “identity.” A number of personal
relationships are maintained across ensemble lines, and present or former membership in any
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branch confers a sort of standing credibility and connection with other members of the various
branches, in a somewhat fraternity/sorority-like manner. Connections across ensembles are
formally maintained through national events that bring together members and alumni of all
branches for workshops, performances, and socializing. These have included seven semiannual
conference-like “Barrels” held at locations of the various branches, and more socially-oriented
“Bananaversaries” held in Lafayette, LA to celebrate the 10th and 15th anniversaries of COSM’s
founding.
Twelve respondents participated in the interview, most answering all or a majority of the
seven questions, with two respondents answering only one question each. Most respondents
have been primarily affiliated with COSM-Lafayette and/or Silverbacks, two worked with
COSM-Chicago, one with Stage Monkeys-Hattiesburg, and one with COSM-Carbondale, with
some overlap among these groups. All have been primarily onstage performers, with one
exception of a lighting operator; six have also worked extensively in a director role, usually
while also performing.
I will assess these narratives by addressing responses to the guiding questions in the order
they were presented to respondents, identifying emergent themes and points of contestation or
divergence. While the questions only ask for specific examples, most responses also include
additional “explanation” or “justification” by respondents wherein they elaborate on their reason
for choosing the example they give, or offer a more broad-based account of their examples’
connections to the broad concept of spontaneity. I draw extensively from these explanatory
comments in identifying themes across the narratives. Though not prompted, they are an
important part of the narrative process in this context, as the positioning of the narrator with
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respect to spontaneity is not usually clear from the example alone; instead, narrators feel the need
to establish the “moral” of the story.
Indeed, these “morals,” the “point-of-the-story,” often takes center stage in the narratives,
most of which are glossed, thin description of complex events where the “point” is the
respondents’ reaction to the experience. I was personally present for some events described in
narratives; others I was definitely not present for; and a few I am literally not sure about.
Throughout the following, I will deliberately elide any personal impressions I have of events
described. Though in some cases additional description on my part may be enlightening, my
choice of “relevant” detail and interpretation would superimpose a prior account of spontaneity
upon the narratives in the same way I have tried to avoid by refusing to give respondents
information on what I “mean” when asking about spontaneity. Consequently, I will limit
description of narrated events to features included in the collected narratives themselves, using
the narratives’ exact language as much as possible. The unprompted inclusion of explanatory
comments by respondents serves as a valuable resource for overcoming this limit of description.
I will also set aside considerations regarding my own “positioning” with respect to
respondents. All respondents are known to me personally, and I have performed improv with all
of them to some extent, in some cases for many years in an ensemble. It is difficult to believe
that our personal and professional relationships did not influence respondents at least at the level
of choice of examples put on the record; however, specific accounts of influence would be, at
best, highly challenging to identify. Again, here I focus on the specific language and features of
the narratives.
Finally, it should be noted that some narratives specifically identified other performers,
including others in the respondent sample, either by name or with distinctive identifying details.
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As a matter of privacy, excepts from the narratives below will be edited in such a way as to
remove names and identifying details of individuals mentioned other than the narrator.

#1) The Experience of Spontaneity in Improv Performance
Eleven of twelve respondents answered the question, “Can you share a story or example of a
time when you felt especially spontaneous when performing improv with Cult of the Stage
Monkey?” Two responses were actually that the narrator could not provide an example, with
David Sarton elaborating:
I will forget most of the scenes that I do. The rush of being on stage, combined with the fact
that the improviser's job is to come up with something on the spot, adds up to the point where
I can never remember exactly what happens on stage. So, I can't think of any particularly
spontaneous on-stage moment for myself.
Others provide examples of particular shows, scenes, moments, or their own sustained
accomplishment across a show. This account of inability to remember are associated with one
significant narrative theme, variations of the experience of “being caught up in the moment.”
Henri Dugas describes a scene playing one of two assistants at a Banana Republic retailer, both
assisting the same customer, as “I was just caught in the flow of the scene because it was moving
so fast that going with it was the only way to keep the flow.” Similarly, Tim Massoth describes
a highly physical scene of fleeing from pursuers after robbing a soda machine, stating:
I like this scene because we all worked together in a physical sense without the need for
explicitly stating what we were going to do…I was able to silence my mind and bounce ideas
with the other members. Instead of worrying about how this scene made sense in a practical
sense, we all just had fun and enjoyed the insanity of the moment.
Lauren Auverset also narrates losing herself to “the moment” during her audition:
I had never really done improv before, and I was told that I was on Mars, and also a giant
space penguin. The combination was so surreal and unlike anything I had anticipated, and I
think my brain didn’t have the time or space to process it cognitively. I remember
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specifically NOT thinking, just reacting…I stood up really tall, held my arms very stiffly at
my sides, and waddled while exclaiming, “WHAHH!”…At that point in my life I never
would have imagined that I would willingly do something like that in front of an audience.
Jason Petitjean describes a sudden tone shift triggering a “caught in the moment” experience. In
a duo performance, he and his partner immediately followed a “sad…humbling, depressing scene
with a touch of anger” with a scene of “two buddies discussing how funny it was when people
beg for their life but are murdered anyway.” The sudden shift was so “jarring” that:
…there was almost no option but to just let the scene be as over the top and robust as it could
be. I felt lost in my character, narrating the deaths of these innocent people at my hands but
in a way that suggested my character thought the whole thing was funny...Having to
disregard the nature of the scene and simply embracing what it was (especially in comparison
to the previous scene) allowed me to feel a freedom in spontaneity rarely matched my other
experiences on stage.

Respondents Sarah Brown and Elaine Kibodeaux both associate an experience of spontaneity
with playing a sustained character outside of their “normal” range. Brown states:
I love when a character emerges from me that is outside of my comfort zone, and that I
wasn’t expecting. It’s additionally pleasing when I am able to maintain that character’s
motives and inner life…[In one memorable longform] I think I started with a posture, or
perhaps an emotion. What emerged was a moody teenage boy who had a difficult
relationship with his father. I was able to maintain his postures and manners throughout the
show. I certainly had no plans or scripting when deciding to play that character. It was
spontaneous, and especially memorable for it.
Elaine Kibodeaux, having earlier discussed a strong aversion to “anything sexy on stage” during
her first years with improv, describes a longform during her third year where she was partnered
on stage as the wife of a powerful Roman politician. Drawing from historical practices:
He was a powerful leader in society, and you know, no one brings their wife out, that’s not
respectable…So he was going to dress me up as a concubine, so he could take me out
because he didn’t want a concubine. And I embraced it fully that…I was the sexiest thing on
stage, and I had one boob out…It was completely out of my box, I don’t know where it came
from, but that was a big turning point for me when it comes to spontaneity on stage, because
I was finally a character that wasn’t Elaine.
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Another theme is that of “aptness” or “appropriateness,” action that “works” in making a
performance successful. Rick Manual describes a small-cast longform where two scenes started
in an office setting and a fantasy world:
…and [another player], who we later found out had no knowledge of World of Warcraft,
managed to tie in very organically that the fantasy world was an online game we were
playing in the office world, and our manager kind of picked it up and it became this teambuilding exercise where the fantasy world were avatars of ourselves in the office…It fit, and
it clicked along, and we just had some great energy through the whole show…[We were
able] to feel out each other’s energy and each other’s motivation.
Laura Kibodeaux, writing from the perspective of an improv lighting operator, sees one role for
her spontaneity as “an audience member with the power to end a scene whenever I feel it needs
to be cut;” usually, “when a nice, memorable line of dialogue or action comes out of one of the
performers, then I will end the scene by turning all the stage lights off at once.” Moments she
associates with spontaneity also include using color and brightness to create emotional or
weather effects, and at the end of a competitive show where she flashed the red and blue lights to
support the celebration of a tie between the Red and Blue teams.
Matthew Titsworth gives three examples with different perspectives on spontaneity. He also
evokes the theme of aptness, describing entering a rhythmic mining activity “doing this sort of
scat cat break up the monotony thing where I suddenly went "Bang! Bang miners! Bang!"
Suddenly this became the band "Bang Miners!" and off it went.” Later in that same show,
Titsworth and another character have fallen down and mine shaft and are injured, express their
feelings for each other, and kiss. However, he elaborates:
On both of those occasions though I would not call it just pure spontaneity. [In the mineshaft
scene] things became inevitable, but the kiss was absolutely in the moment. In the bang
miners I had an agenda going in, but the line popped out and that was that - sort of more a
surprise that is apparently spontaneous after the fact. As far as just feeling spontaneous and
not knowing where antyhing was going to go from moment to moment, I've probably never
felt that more, though, than in the 2006 DC Barrel Schizologue performance. I had absolutely

237

no idea what was going to happen with that or where it was going to happen. I don't even
really remember most of it. But it certainly came out of nowhere.
Titsworth was the only repondant to this question to distinguish between levels of spontaneity,
contrasting a “pure spontaneity” with the spontaneity of aptness. His language for the
Schizologue he references (where he played seven characters solo for 15 minutes) is more
suggestive of “caught-in-the-moment” spontaneity as the “pure” type.
In addition to these themes, most respondents seem to associate some level of surprise with
their examples of spontaneity, with language like “I don’t know where it came from,” “it came
out of nowhere,” or “I never would have imagined that I would willingly do something like that.”
Respondents also often associate spontaneity with the “suppressed areas” of the imagination, like
Johnstone, as in E. Kibodeaux’s example of sexuality, or references to “enjoying the insanity”
(Massoth) or Auverset’s “space penguin.” The theme of “aptness,” in turn, aligns with
Johnstone’s concept of “ordinariness.” These narratives emphasize different associations with
spontaneity, some locating it in concrete moments and others in sustained action, some with
individual choices and some with collective accomplishment. The primary themes throughout
reflect a nebulous “being in the moment,” sustained accomplishment of behaving out of one’s
“comfort zone,” an “aptness” reflecting the appropriateness of choices and their effective
integration into ongoing action, and a level of surprise at one’s own choices or their outcomes.

#2) The Observation of Spontaneity in Improv Performance
Eight of the twelve respondents answered the question “Can you share a story or example of
a time when you observed performance by other members of COSM that seemed especially
spontaneous to you?” These narratives include the only instance of two respondents both
referencing the same incident, when another performer became the autistic adult brother at the
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center of a longform about a troubled family, which Auverset calls “beautiful” and Titsworth
describes as “a holy-shit moment.” Titsworth also identifies a moment where a “scene about a
documentary interviewing trans people having difficulty coming out became an entire long
form” when the documenter placed his hand on the repressed trans-woman’s shoulder and said “I
had trouble too”: “It was very much a moment when things changed all of a sudden because of a
single instantaneous remark.”
This theme of instantaneousness was common in these narratives. Brown notes being
impressed with the “elaborate and unusual” use of language by other players under “duress.”
Massoth gives an example of news anchors discussing an animal breakout at the zoo:
What I remember most about that scene was how they connected different people
involved…and how others in our group quickly jumped to the stage and adopted these
characters on the spot. I believe one of them was an animal-rights activist, another was a
crazy person who enjoyed the chaos this scene causes, and so on. And everyone was just so
quick in jumping on the stage and turning into these characters, while still anchoring the
scene around the general plot… part of the scene was led from the anchors, but it was the
group members who embodied these people spur of the moment and made the scene count.
The theme of “cohesion” as indicative of spontaneity was mentioned explicitly. Sarton
describes:
We would have theme shows, loosely connected by a narrative strand but ultimately a set of
short-form games. It was our first real experiment with long form in performance. The other
members of the group quickly adapted to the format, maintaining a cohesive narrative in
spite of the quirk-centric games. This combination of old information (the knowledge of the
games' rules) and new information (the addition of a story that connected all those games)
helped the group to provide a cohesive story.
Dugas qualifies his amazement at fellow cast members' ability to create a deep backstory out of
nothing by noting that he does “build in story” for himself while watching improvisation.
However, “if it’s truly spontaneous in a cohesive pattern, I feel that it allows the audience to
build story for themselves instead of trying to backtrack and put the pieces of the scene together
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to ‘make it make sense’.” Benelli finds spontaneity in the cohesion of a scene with broader
events in the community. In the last scene of a show on the theme of “dreams” performed a few
days after a local mass shooting, “the deceased husband is communicating to the wife through
her dreams through an intermediary angel, spirit, whatever you want to call it…It seemed to fall
into place…in that particular week, with the things that had been going on…around that time, to
kind of hit everybody…”
As with the above scene, and the earlier scenes about the autistic brother and the trans
coming-out documentary, a disproportionate number of these narratives cite examples of noncomedic improv. Manual makes this theme explicit in his example:
Early on…I had only thought of improv as something that was comedic…[Two performers]
did a game…where they were moving back and forth in time along the relationship of these
two people…and just fell into place as this psychic and her client, and it was just this
beautiful relationship…it was just like a normal relationship between two people, and it was
gut wrenching, and heartbreaking at the end when we went to the day when one of them
passed away and I remember the audience…you could feel people on the edge of crying, and
I didn’t know that improv could do that.
These themes on observing spontaneity somewhat parallel those about experiencing
spontaneity from the first question, with “instantaneity” related to themes of “being caught in the
moment” and “surprise,” and “cohesion” associable with “aptness” and “sustained
accomplishment.” In addition, the set of examples derived from non-comedic improv is almost
certainly disproportionately high compared to the prevalence of such improv in respondents’
overall performance experience.

#3) The Experience or Observation of Non-Spontaneity in Improv Performance
Ten respondents answered the question “Can you share a story or example of a time you felt
especially non-spontaneous when performing improv with COSM, or observed a performance by
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other members that seemed especially non-spontaneous to you?” The narratives generally
connect with four distinct themes: Trying to “force” something, “overplanning” for improv,
doing something that they’d “done before,” and personal discomfort.
Benelli identifies a moment like this for himself, where in a longform “things were
stagnating a bit, and I was trying to push the storyline ahead and force things along…trying too
hard to make something happen that would be entertaining in that moment, rather than just
letting it happen naturally.” Petitjean similarly finds himself “forcing” connections between
storylines in a longform:
There were instances when I would walk into a scene to simply establish how some other
scene tied into it, never for that particular scenes sake but for the sake of [making the
longform work and]…me worrying how the scenes would be arbitrarily tied…Scenes would
die for the sake of an arbitrary rule, and I would no longer focus on allowing scenes to
develop unhinged. I was almost scripting.
Dugas eschews examples, simply saying “numerous times,” and launches into an explanation
that also draws a line between appearance and reality of spontaneity:
I’m not engaged (internally), I’m awaiting the right time to land a joke or inject a plot point
or plot twist. Sure, from the outside this may look spontaneous, but if I’ve had time to
formulate the thought AND wait for a perfect time to deliver it, then it is not spontaneous in
the purest sense.
Manual describes problems with trying to force a format:
We had a tradition at the point of doing a particular style of Halloween show, and…even
though there were only three of us, we tried to do this really large format that worked better
with a big cast…It got really far away from our original style, where we would just come in
random Halloween costumes and we got characters assigned to us…by other performers
based on their impressions of our costume, and this was “I’m developing my own
character”…and it just didn’t work.
Brown also describes a “murder-mystery” structured show as impeded by overpreparation: “We
had pre-established some basic elements of our characters…I don’t think that pre-devised

241

characters are necessarily something that would kill spontaneity, but in this case, the overly
complicated structure…caused most of us to fall back onto our bag of ‘tricks’.”
Among this “bag of tricks” she identifies “falling onto one of my crutches as being a ‘femme
fatale’ type of character, which bored me even as I made the audience laugh,” an example which
also highlights a distinction between a successful improv performance (for the audience) and the
successful generation of spontaneity, and implicates laughter with reinforcement of nonspontaneity. Auverset similarly accounts how, when faced with an unfamiliar suggestion, her
“go-to in those situations was always to ‘try to take over the world’ *insert mad-scientist forearm
gesture here*…I have no idea why that was my default panic choice, but it was. Maybe it got big
laughs the first time and I remembered that?” While Massoth does not implicate laughter, he
shares a similar explanation in a story about not knowing what to do after starting a solo scene in
which he was painting in silence and “couldn’t think of anything to say”:
I made my decision to use a planned character trait that had worked for me in earlier shows:
act completely crazy. So out of nowhere, I started smearing the paint all over my face and
body…As you can imagine, it didn’t turn out very well…Even if something worked before,
whether it’s a joke, a character trait, etc., it doesn’t mean it will work all the time. The
craziness worked beforehand because it fit with the prior scene and corresponded with the
character at the time, not just because someone was acting crazy.
Massoth’s repetitive choice was pushed by a sense of discomfort with the scene. E.
Kibodeaux also identifies personal discomfort, at the level of scene content. Expanding on her
early aversion to sexual portrayal on stage, she says it is something she has worked on, and
claims greater comfort now, but “it’s gotten to the point where nobody tries anymore; so I don’t
know how I’d react to that now.” Titsworth identifies discomfort working with a performer
whose choices to him “felt like damage control” and would “push [their] agenda regardless of
whatever happened,” also tying into the theme of “forcing” scenes. Finally, Sarton identifies
“alcohol” with physical discomfort as stymying for himself and fellow cast when, the morning
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after drinking at an improv festival, “during the workshops and shows, we were very hung over,
to the point where we completely forgot suggestions that had just been given by the audience and
froze on the spot, leaving the stage quiet for several very awkward seconds.”

#4) Spontaneity-Encouraging Practices of Improv
Nine respondents answered the question “Can you share a story or examples of COSM
ensemble practices that you believe especially encouraged spontaneity in yourself or other
members?” The reported narratives partake of a diversity of themes. Petitjean and Massoth both
identify practices that create “permission” to not worry about aspects of performance. Petitjean
cites a rehearsal where the cast did
scenes on the worst/most offensive/vulgar suggestions we could conjure. After the shock of
some of the suggestions disappeared, the play felt liberating…[Normally,] Grasping porn star
penises and inseminating cows is repulsive as far as scene work goes and thus discourages
exploration in the scene, but overcoming our notion of vulgarity led to some amazing work.
Massoth singles out a game where players clap a beat, and describe doing actions in turns, stating
that “I was encouraged to say things that wouldn’t always work in a scene. You didn’t have to
worry about continuity or spacial relations: you just said a line and you were done.”
Auverset and Dugas both identify practices involving a theme of “rapid changes.” Auverset
identifies the game Minor Characters, where the scene “follows” any character that exits, writing
“You could never get too attached to any one character, and sometimes you would be so caught
up in the scene and leave the stage…only to get offstage and remember, ‘Shit! It’s minor
characters!’ and head right back onstage with no forethought as to what you were about to do or
say.” Dugas describes the exercise “Four Corners” wherein one person in the middle answers
four different types of questions (Basic math, colors, basic history, personal history) all being
asked at once from four questioners, with questions repeated until they are answered. He states
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that “This exercise prevents me personally from planning, and there is so much information to
keep track of that my planning mind goes away, and I go into strict active listening and rapid
response without thinking.”
Benelli and Manual give examples of “emotion work,” especially with focus on “building
relationship between characters” as Benelli puts it, stating, “that heightening of the emotional
stakes gives more room for the natural spontaneity to happen between the characters.” Manual
gives an account of a “no-laugh rehearsal” he led:
We were getting into a block with some members where the assumption was that improv had
to be comedic, and to me that’s not real spontaneity because…you’re just forcing the joke.
So we did a rehearsal where the goal was genuine human interaction and not any kind of
comedy…that was a really trying rehearsal on a lot of us, really pushing us outside our
comfort zone…we started to get comedic toward the end of the rehearsal, but it was very
natural…not all “I’m gonna tell you this joke now!”
Brown expands her criticism of overstructuring from Question #3, expressing preference for
“loose structures without many preconceived notions” that “leave us enough flexibility for
spontaneous events to occur.” Sarton, in addition to citing simply adding more rehearsal time as
encouraging spontaneity, offers a counterpoint to Brown, writing:
I found that my most spontaneous moments came from when I was required to follow some
sort of restriction. Being told…that I have some rule that must be followed helped me to be
spontaneous by giving me something that I can bend and, at times when the scene required,
break. Granted, these restrictions can inhibit the growth of a scene and overall spontaneity,
but that's if the scene hangs on the quirk, rather than having a scene with an incidental quirk.
In Brown and Sarton’s explanations, we see examples of both less and more structure claimed as
encouraging spontaneity.

#5) Spontaneity-Inhibiting Practices of Improv
Nine respondents answered the question “Can you share a story or examples of COSM
ensemble practices that you believe especially inhibited spontaneity in yourself or other
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members?” The theme of “overstructuring” shows was repeated by both Brown and Manual,
referencing shows with plot-heavy structures where they felt the complex format pushed
performers “into their heads” and to “fall back onto bad habits.” Both Auverset and Sarton
single out the structure of “guessing” games (where one performer who is missing information
about the scene must figure out the missing information, led by hints from other characters) as
inhibitive of spontaneity, Auverset noting that though they are “audience favorite game[s],” she
“always felt as if I was trying too hard to follow the clues and that didn’t leave too much room
for character work.” Sarton argues that “When the game took focus over the actual improv, our
group became less about creating spontaneous art, and more about inspiring cheap laughs.” A
guessing game in particular:
does not promote any sort of scene building, as the scene itself almost always comes prebuilt. The improviser has no need to come up with a motivation, as the prime directive is
already in place. Even the characters are essentially pre-determined by their quirk…and most
of the time, when we play a guessing game, the interpretation of the character is the broadest,
most absurd one the improviser can manage.
Dugas offers a variation of this theme with his critique of an exercise where two performers each
present the other with an object and a problem, then each must immediately use their object to
solve the other’s problem.
It seems like spontaneity, and in the moment it is, but if you build that muscle and use it in a
scene where you have time to plan something out and wait, then that actually works against
the spontaneity of the scene and becomes scripting…Not everything needs to be solved, and
thus, I feel like this game which is supposed to promote “spontaneity” really builds poor
muscles of “solve everything”. And indeed, when I see scenes after this game, more often
than not people are solving problems that are really the legs of the scene.
Three other respondents offered stories on the theme of “practices which undermined group
trust and cohesion.” While it is not clear they are referencing the same occasion, both Titsworth
and Benelli identify exercises where tennis balls were thrown at performers for “failing” to
accomplish the exercise’s objective. Benelli elaborates:
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There was an exercise brought in that I believe was originally geared to foster
spontaneity…someone would take the stage solo and they were instructed to be entertaining;
that was the scope of the instruction, was “be entertaining.”…The rest of the troupe
was…armed with tennis balls and instructed to throw balls at the person if they were not
entertaining enough…It had the opposite effect of what was intended, and people became
scared to not be entertaining.
E. Kibodeaux relates two instances of undermined cohesion/trust related to sexualization:
I don’t know what brought it on, but we all decided we needed to be more comfortable
together, and so somebody took their shirt off, and they decided this was a thing…everyone
is ripping clothes off, and I’m fidgeting at the edge of my shirt, and [the one other performer
who was not undressing] grabbed my hand…It made us look bad, like we didn’t trust them,
because we were outnumbered…For the rest of that rehearsal, I felt very picked on, because I
kept getting suggestions I was uncomfortable with that maybe I would have been more
comfortable with if we hadn’t just stripped down.
She narrates another event where her co-director, looking to push the comfort limits of several
new members (less than a month with COSM), gives the emotion “orgasm” for one exercise;
everyone was uncomfortable and “it just broke the spirit of the rest of the rehearsal.”
I couldn’t “no” him at that point because we were co-directing, if I “no”d him in front of
everybody it would have started a schism…It’s good to push your comfort levels, but you
really have to know which comfort levels you can push before you push them…It’s really
gonna put them in their heads and go “are these the people I want to be with?”
The examples given on this theme identify practices that are spontaneity-inhibitive in part
because of their relation to interpersonal relationships and organizational structures, leading into
themes identified from the last two guiding questions.

#6) Spontaneity-Encouraging Organizational/Relationship Features of Improv
Eleven respondents answered the question “Can you share a story or examples of relationship
dynamics and interpersonal behaviors among members of the ensemble that you believe
especially encouraged spontaneity in yourself or other members?” A few responses gave
examples that reference practices rather than relationships as such, e.g., Auverset’s positive
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response to a policy that no one ever sit down during rehearsal (unless in a scene), or Massoth’s
praise for “someone who doesn’t lead or control the direction of the scene; instead, they focus on
the finer details of making the setting or characters come alive.” Petitjean emphasizes
“professional trust,” elaborating, “many of us are well grounded in improv theory and have the
troupe (not simply themselves) in mind. There is something we all admire about each other and
we seem to be mindful of the troupe’s performance as a whole as well as our individual
performances.”
However, the overwhelming preponderance of responses were variations on the theme of
“developing friend relationships outside of improv time,” though a variety of reasons were given.
Brown emphasizes the “longevity” of both improv and personal relationships among
Silverbacks, which “in itself creates trust.” E. Kibodeaux develops this “trust” reason with her
praise of
getting to know one another as a major part of the group dynamic, it’s just as important as
rehearsal…it helps me trust my own decisions on stage more, because I know that even if I
make a crappy decision, [someone] will be all like, okay, we’re working with that!...There’s
something to be said for improvising with strangers, but it’s comforting to know that I can be
completely random with these people, and have that trust in them…It’s not that I know what
to expect, it’s that I know we will find a way through it together.
E. Kibodeaux also associates “comfort” with trust, and this associated theme of “comfort” is
mentioned by several others. Sarton notes that “As a result of our time simply relaxing
together…we feel comfortable enough around each other to trust each other and follow whatever
impulse strikes us.” Benelli, though noting that it is not “necessary…to have a good
performance ensemble…it helps, just from a comfort level standpoint” to have close personal
relationships with fellow improviers: “To have that dynamic to where you can open up on stage
really makes it easier to have those deep, relationship based scenes.” Ben Zaunbrecher waxes
poetic on the “family”-like character of his ensemble, writing:
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Once you are a Stage Monkey, it is a given that you will remain one for the rest of your life.
This acceptance, this complete lack of judgment one feels is instantaneous…It’s really an
astounding sense of comfort—just being who we are and knowing we are family allows you
to be free to be your own crazy, silly, serious self without restrictions.
Despite E. Kibodeaux’s assertion that “it’s not that I know what to expect,” both Dugas and
Manual associate the value of close personal relationships with insight into each other’s practices
on stage. Dugas suggests “Get to know the media they watch, the news they consume, the books
they’ve read, their interests…you’ll just discover little things that creep in that they can pick
up…and become this major plot point or story arc that, without this intimate knowledge of one
another, those connections would not have been made.” Manual has lived with three fellow
COSM performers over the years, and describes how, through that closeness, “We learned each
other’s tells, and body language, and thinking patterns…it really made us able to divest ourselves
of having to concentrate on that, and it was really automatic, and it made our relationships
stronger on stage.”
Manual connects this theme of personal closeness with another theme addressed by a few
respondents to this question, regarding style of and relationship with directors in ensembles:
We’ve had varying types of directorship styles…more authoritative…more familial, or
sometimes just more on the ground level, like, hey, I’m one of you guys…I think that the
most effective stuff we’ve had is when we had very strict, structured rehearsals where we’re
really there in a business mindset to get something accomplished. But then that’s probably
facilitated by the fact that later on, we’re spending time together…if we weren’t getting that
recreation time in, that authoritative directorship might not be as effective.
Titsworth offers a narrative of helping another cast member whom he was directing in a jam
session attended by the cast:
[He] was having difficulty getting out and onto stage. As the last scene of a set, I grabbed
him and brought him out with me leading off with something like "BASE jumping isn't as
scary as it seems." The rest of that scene was us discussing the finer points of performing
improv in front of an audience including statements to the effect that I, as his director, was
there with him and that it was part of my job to be his safety net at this juncture. As things
crept along we got closer to the edge of the stage and he became more comfortable - not just
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in character but also as a performer in that situation. By the end we jumped off and it was all
well and good, but that did a lot to teach him about being fearless on stage and taking risks,
and his ability to be spontaneous and take risks significantly improved afterwards.
In contrast, Sarton gives an example of how even a problematic director can have positive
influence on an ensemble, citing a director with an “aggressive leadership style” including:
anger whenever anybody questioned one of his ideas, relentless stage hogging whenever he
felt the need to say something, and a passive-aggressive attitude towards improvisers he did
not like. Perhaps in an attempt to spite him, several of us bonded closely and became better
improvisers. While I would never recommend an improv director to be so aggressive and
megalomaniacal, having a common enemy did inspire us to work harder in regards to
improv.

#7) Spontaneity-Inhibiting Organizational/Relationship Features of Improv
Ten respondents answered the question “Can you share a story or examples of relationship
dynamics and interpersonal behaviors among members of the ensemble that you believe
especially inhibited spontaneity in yourself or other members?,” though two respondents’
answers were to disavow any such experience with the COSM organization. Auverset simply
writes “Honestly…not really…COSM was overall an amazingly free and spontaneous
encouraging experience,” while Brown provides contrast with another setting: “I would say the
closest I ever was to that was taking improv classes in Chicago, where everyone is trying to
impress the teacher. Everyone is basically freaking out, all the time.” Massoth and Petitjean give
examples that more reference onstage practices than group relationships as such. Massoth is
concerned with performers starting or developing a scene with “a set idea” (“forcing” scenes),
while Petitjean sees both a performer trying to be the “star” of a scene, and one “scared to
embarrass himself/herself,” as symptoms of “someone who is not mindful of the scene before
they are mindful of themselves.”
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Other responses give variations on the theme of interpersonal conflict negatively affecting
ability to work with others onstage. Not identifying any particular event, Dugas enjoins
improviers to “Leave your baggage at the door…If you come to rehearsal mad or bitchy or with
an attitude, you are going to kill the atmosphere. When threatened, no one wants to be original
and no one trusts anyone to be there for them, they want the stress to be removed…Know your
limits and if you can’t let your baggage go before rehearsal, just don’t show up.” Benelli
identifies times where “people did not see eye to eye, whether on a personal level or a
professional performance level,” and
External drama was introduced into the shows and rehearsals in a way that caused arguments
and infighting and bickering…if you find yourself on stage with somebody that personally
you just do not like for whatever reason…it can be kind of a natural response, no matter how
professional a performer you may try to be, to on some level kind of shut down, and not give
everything to that person in the scene.
E. Kibodeaux shares a similar story, in which conflict over finances with her roommate/coperformer:
Would’ve been fine if it had just been between me and him… he and I could act brilliantly on
stage but as soon as we were off we wouldn’t speak to each other. It’s that other people in
the group kept bringing it up, and bringing it up, and I stopped trusting them on stage, and
wouldn’t even jump on stage to save them if they needed it, because I knew the gesture
would not be appreciated…If I got on stage with them, I was thinking about “what can I do
to not offend this person?”…I didn’t trust them to not take everything I said personally, and
so I would go onstage and be in my head the entire time.
Sarton particularly locates within-group romantic relationships as a catalyst for group conflict:
Such relationships, in my experience, cause the two members to instinctively pair off in
scenes, preventing the two from developing any chemistry with the other group members and
making their interactions with the others stilted and awkward. Even worse, when those
relationships end…the group would either side strongly with one person, thus alienating the
other person, or the group would split down the middle and bad feelings would come
between the members for a while.
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On the other hand, Manual cites “dynamite scenes” between romantically-involved couples
in an ensemble, “even during a bad breakup,” and argues that “all relationships are good for
improv, because you have something to build off of:”
Even when I’ve had difficulty with castmates on a personal level, that tension actually leads
to good dynamics on stage. Maybe we’re overcompensating. But the only relationship I’ve
had where I feel it harmed our spontaneity was where we were distant, and that I didn’t work
or spend any time with that cast member…that I didn’t know them, and I think that affected
us poorly.

Overview and Analysis of Emergent Themes
Responses to the first three questions, regarding the experience and observation of
spontaneity/nonspontaneity, clustered around two types of theme. Positively associated with
spontaneity are themes of “instantaneousness,” “being in the moment,” and “surprise.” A second
type of theme positively associated with spontaneity expresses it in terms of “cohesion,”
“aptness/appropriateness,” and “sustained accomplishment.” To some extent, these two
directions of theme are in tension with each other. Though some narratives show overlap
between, for example, “surprise” and “appropriateness” (e.g., Manual’s example of the office
team and their fantasy online world), others seem to emphasize one direction or another. At least
part of this difference appears to relate to the scope of the account: Examples emphasizing
“being in the moment” type themes tend toward accounts of particular, vividly memorable
moments in scenes, while examples emphasizing “appropriateness,” “sustained
accomplishment,” etc., tend toward longer-scale accounts across a show.
Accounts of nonspontaneity typically express themes opposite of these positive associations:
“Overplanning” and “repeating what was previously successful” both go against the grain of
themes such as “being in the moment” and “surprise,” while “forcing scenes” aligns against
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“appropriateness” and “sustained accomplishment” (by others). Nonspontaneity is also
associated with “personal discomfort,” whether discomfort physically, discomfort with scene
content, or discomfort with the behavior of fellow performers. However, the positioning of
performers toward “comfort’s” relationship with spontaneity is ambivalent; note that the
examples of “sustained accomplishment” offered by Brown and E. Kibodeaux also include the
element of sustaining a character outside of the performers’ comfortable range. This
ambivalence toward comfort is developed further in later questions about improv practices and
ensemble relationships; while many examples are given of situations where discomfort
negatively impacted spontaneity, we also have Sarton’s and Manual’s counterexamples, giving
accounts where even sour relationships had a positive impact on improv.
Some themes from questions four and five, about spontaneity encouraging/inhibiting
practices, also connect with these clusters. Spontaneity encouraged by “rapid changes” supports
“being in the moment” and “surprise,” while “emotional and character relationships” encourage
the spontaneity of “appropriateness” and “sustained accomplishment.” Flexible show/game
structures are held to encourage spontaneity, and even more commonly, “overstructuring” of
games and shows is commonly held to inhibit spontaneity. This theme against overstructuring
also connects to themes of “instantaneousness” and “surprise”—though Sarton again offers a
counterperspective with his account of rules and restrictions as spontaneity-encouraging. The
theme of “comfort” returns, especially regarding practices which negatively impacted “trust” as
being spontaneity-inhibitive. Finally, a theme of “permission” is mentioned, in which practices
help a performer experience the “freedom” to try new and different things, related to
“unconstrained” valuations of spontaneity.
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This theme of “permission” to explore is repeated in questions six and seven, about
interpersonal relationships and organizational features, in Titsworth’s example of a directorial
moment of “creating permission” to take chances. The theme of “trust/comfort” dominated
responses to these questions. Close, long-term relationships between performers are viewed as
encouraging spontaneity due to their promotion of interpersonal trust and comfort, while
inversely, distant relationships or interpersonal conflict are associated with loss of trust and
comfort, and so also spontaneity. There is also the somewhat different relationship of
“professional trust” identified by Petitjean, to be mindful of the ensemble’s show as a whole,
which he juxtaposes against both “trying to impress” and “trying not to be embarrassed.”
Another reason given for the value of close relationships was “learning others’ behaviors,” which
on stage helps support “aptness” and “cohesion.”
I identify three clusters of themes emergent from this overview, each strongly associated with
or indicative of spontaneity across the sample of narratives and examples. The first marks
spontaneity as “being in the moment” and “instantaneous,” indicated by “surprise,” and
supported with “rapid changes” and flexible structure. This cluster also negatively associates
spontaneity against “repeating” and “overplanning/overstructuring.”
The second cluster relates spontaneity to “sustained accomplishment,”
“aptness/appropriateness,” and “cohesion,” all longer-term formulations that view spontaneity
less as momentary, and evaluate it more regarding its role in a larger performance. In this
cluster, spontaneity is negatively associated against “forcing” scenes, and viewed as supported
by emotional- and relationship-centered scenework practices, and by increased personal
knowledge of fellow performers.

253

The third theme-type clusters around language of “trust,” “comfort,” and “permission.”
Unlike the other two themes, it is not directly indicative of spontaneity, but features prominently
in supporting both other aspects of spontaneity identified above; inversely, the lack of these
qualities is held to inhibit spontaneity. Such trust and comfort is promoted primarily through
quality of personal relationships, especially outside of “improv time” where the group acts
primarily in their roles as ensemble performers. Petitjean’s identification of the “professional
trust” relationship is the only specific given for ways that trust and comfort are actively
supported within improv time, but a number of examples are given of “breaches” that violated
trust and comfort in this context (the tennis ball exercise, sexualization, interpersonal conflict
affecting onstage work, etc.). The theme of “permission” also associates with practices within
improv time. These practices support spontaneity through the sense of freedom they convey, and
so are somewhat different from formulations of “trust/comfort” as spontaneity-promoting.
However, I categorize “permission” themes with this cluster through their similarity in upshot to
themes of trust/comfort in narratives of interpersonal relationships, which often couch the value
of such relationships for spontaneity in the “freedom” that personal closeness provides to take
risks and have deeper emotional connections between characters. Unlike other major themes, no
obverse is presented for the theme of “permission” as spontaneity-encouraging; i.e., no examples
were given that appear to narrate an occasion where a sense of “lack of permission” is identified
with the inhibition of spontaneity.
Considering these themes through the lens of the analytic dimensions for spontaneity
identified in Chapter Two and applied to textual improv methodology in Chapter Three, many of
the same areas of consensus and divergence emerge. Respondents tend to treat spontaneity as a
matter of both behavior and experience, but rarely at the same time, emphasizing either overt
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action or their experiential interpretations. Positing of a relationship between the two is not
made explicit, though it is implied in some examples, such as one performer’s “surprise” at their
reaction to another performer. To some extent this tendency may be an artifact of the way the
questions are presented, especially with Questions One, Two, and Three worded in ways that
suggest an observed-behavior/individual-experience distinction. Respondents appear to treat
spontaneity as gradable, though only in a very vague way not quantifiable by any particular
measure; certainly, no account above appears to treat spontaneity as an absolute, present-orabsent quality. This also may be an artifact of the questions’ wording, particularly with use of
the phrases “especially spontaneous,” “especially non-spontaneous,” “especially encouraging
spontaneity” and “especially inhibiting spontaneity” connoting distinctions of degree. Whether
or not resulting from the questions’ wording, spontaneity and non-spontaneity are treated as
single-continuum opposites by respondents, with the themes associated with non-spontaneity
generally giving examples reflecting the opposite of spontaneity, rather than a separate
continuum as in the work of David Kipper and his various collaborators (Chapter Two). Themes
regarding the behaviors/experiences indicative of greater or lesser spontaneity are synthesized in
detail through the first part of this section.
Certainly, spontaneity is treated as a normatively positive quality, and not merely descriptive.
Again, this may be an artifact of my own assumptions as reflected in the presentation of
questions. While I made every effort not to steer respondents toward a particular interpretation
of spontaneity, the very status of the questions as intelligible to their respondents implicates the
treatment of spontaneity as foundationally criterial to improv, and thus normatively valuable for
anyone who values improv. As a normatively positive quality, respondents treat spontaneity
primarily as a productive force for effective improv, which in turn may have a productive
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influence on the personal relationships among performers—improv is commonly cited as a
reason for deepening interpersonal relationships—or on their behavior in everyday life.
Respondents generally do not address spontaneity outside of the context of improv performance,
but certainly nobody indicates a context where spontaneity is less desirable or detrimental, and at
least one narrative draws explicit parallels between the value of spontaneity in improv and that in
other contexts. Rick Manual, in an aside not attached to any guiding question, states:
I originally was going to be a tech, and run lights, and I was terrified of being on stage,
couldn’t maintain eye contact with people, couldn’t hold a conversation, I was very shy and
reserved, which I think most people who know me now would never guess that…Improv has
been great for me to come out of my shell, express myself, deal with people…career skills,
just being able to get through a job interview…being able to handle the craziness that comes
through the door with aplomb…Improv has been a very strong force for me.
Respondents do not generally appear to treat spontaneity as a potentiality or an end in itself.
This may also be a result of question wording, as questions are directed toward specific observed
or experienced accomplishments of spontaneity in improv, and the practical/relational means of
producing such accomplishments.
Certainly, all respondents who answered Question Four, at the least, view spontaneity as
something that can be increased in frequency/intensity for individuals and groups, and give
examples of means to do so. No respondent describes inherent subject characteristics as a basis
for greater/lesser degrees of spontaneity, except perhaps regarding level of experience with
improv, or literal physical discomfort. Nor are environmental features indicated as affecting
spontaneity. However, a significant role is ascribed to learned behaviors, especially practical
improv skills, and to relational characteristics, especially depth of relationships outside of formal
improv time. Though various examples ascribe both spontaneity and nonspontaneity to both
individuals and groups, no explication of a relationship between individual and social
spontaneity is given. Spontaneity is identified and recognized in both individuals and groups
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through the presence of various features interpreted as clustering about the themes of
“instantaneousness” and “aptness/appropriateness” discussed above.
Compared to the set of improv methodologists, a relatively unified sense of spontaneity
emerges from the above narratives. However, this may be, as I show above, a result of the
“positioning” of respondents to cues in the wording of the questions. Future research in this
direction may yield a different array of spontaneity-accounts among a similar pool of
respondents with reworded questions; however, rewording may in turn implicate different
positioning toward spontaneity in provided narratives. For example, removing the continuumimplying “especially” from questions may position respondents in orientation to a more binary
interpretation of spontaneity. Crafting several versions of the questions, addressing the areas
identified above as potentially influenced by wording, and distributing the versions at random
among a similar and larger pool of respondents may offer insight into the degree to which
question wording shapes respondents’ interpretations of spontaneity and/or choice of narratives.
Questions might also be added that specifically prompted an orientation to elements such as the
encouraging/inhibiting impact of environmental/situational features or personality characteristics
on spontaneity. While these areas are seemingly less significant than the behavior and
relationship characteristics, their elision from responses prompted through a deliberately vague
sense of “spontaneity” may not indicate that such features are not relevant to practical
applications of spontaneity in this community, and prompting them may reveal additional
features of spontaneity as a working concept. While my prompting in the questions called for
descriptive narratives, certain critical features also emerge from these narratives, implicating
many of the concerns raised in Chapter Four. In the final section of this chapter, I consider these
narratives through the lens of Critical Narrative Theory, with respect to those concerns and to
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ways in which narratives of spontaneity can themselves exhibit features which enable, inhibit,
and/or enforce those practices of “contestation, deference, euphemization, or self-censorship”
(Myles 893) impacting concrete persons in improv practice.

Critical Narrative Theory and Narratives Judgments of Spontaneity
Narrative as a practice is wrought with opportunities and pitfalls for a critical viewpoint that
considers narrative from the perspective of how it enforces, challenges, or reveals relationships
and orientation to structures/practices of privilege and oppression. On one hand, the practice of
narration has significant liberatory potential. Jennifer Lapum et al. identify storytelling as at the
center of practices for a Critical Social Theory class for Nursing students to “conceptualize and
interrogate our own positionality within a social justice agenda in nursing” (28). Such
storytelling, joined with their poetic practices of presentation, offers “the possibility to cultivate
cognitive capacities beyond the rational, but also include emotive ways of understanding human
experiences” (29). Reflecting the importance of personal relationships for improv among my
respondents, they write that “Social justice in nursing requires an understanding of both self and
other and the social structures that shape who we are…embedded in a social justice agenda is
developing the capacity to know someone…By peeling back the layers of oppression, we begin
to see self and other” (40-41).
However, they also recognize the limits and recursive complexity of this approach, going on
immediately to note “But these layers and the social world that shaped these layers is also part of
us” (41). Gene Combs and Jill Freedman locate their practice of narrative therapy in having
clients re-view and reinterpret their own narratives: “rather than viewing people themselves as
problematic or pathological, narrative therapists look at the relationship that people have with
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problems” (1039). Oppressive narratives are both an individual byproduct and a central tool of
hegemony, for
Modern power, instead of coming from a central authority, is carried in discourses…We
don’t usually notice the powerful influence of these discourses—certainly not in the way we
would notice a public flogging. Modern power recruits us into policing ourselves…We tend
to try to live up to dominant discourses, to compare ourselves to what they deem good, or
normal, or successful, and to judge ourselves through these comparisons (1038).
Though Combs and Freedman associate oppressive narrative practices more with a
macrostructure of dominant discourse, Anne Rawls and Gary David offer an
ethnomethodological account of “narrative” that illustrates its problematic role in specific,
concrete interactions. In a broad pluralistic society featuring everyday interaction between
groups of differing beliefs, shared trust in the mutuality of everyday practices of interaction is
essential to shared intelligibility of everyday functional interactions (470). Successful
interactions involve
an other who reciprocates with a self in the doing of a shared practice in such a way that the
two share significant symbols requir[ing] that both self and Other be – in just and only the
ways that commitment to a particular interaction requires – the “same.”…The process of
situated interactional “Othering,” by contrast, reveals – or constructs – ways in which
persons are not “the same” (that is, not committed to the same practices, not committed to
one another’s performances within a practice, not giving one anOther the benefit of the
doubt, not sufficiently competent to perform). This process in turn threatens self and practice
and prevents actors from engaging in mutually oriented and intelligible interaction (473).
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They understand the breakdown of interactions brought about by failures of trust in shared
practices to instantiate not as exclusion from groups, but from those “situated interactions”
wherein “the essential economic, political and social transactions take place” (474). Such
“boundaries of Otherness within differentiated societies prevent the very forms of social
engagement that the society at large has come to depend on” (475). They summarize the process
of Othering as “the speaker now and henceforward rejects any interpretations the hearer may
make of them in subsequent turns, while at the same time claiming the right to make
interpretations of the Other that the Other is not allowed to assess” (480). The employment of
narrative in interaction is a significant practice contributing to this process, for
narratives represent the beliefs of the individual who is speaking, and may or may not be
shared by the Other. Narratives, unlike practices, are shared by members of demographic
groups, specific worksites, or institutional memberships, not members of
situations…Choosing a narrative account that is unknown or offensive to the Other, and
treating the Other’s recipiency of the interpretation as irrelevant, treats the Other as the
Object of interpretation rather than as a recipient. Far from providing a basis for meaning in
situated interaction, the use of narrative – when it is not shared and not open to reflexive
assessment–threatens…mutual orientation and trust (480).
Such Othering practices are self-reinforcing, tending toward a “vicious circle” wherein “the
stronger the narrative becomes, ironically, the more often interactions will fail because the
narratives are invoked. The more often interactions fail, the stronger the narrative accounts will
become” (490). Both in specific and repeated interactions, this Othering takes the form of “a
process of driving someone outside of practice, either because of problems that emerge over the
course of interaction or by invoking excluding categories even before problems arise” (490).
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This process is reinforced and enforced through shared narratives which are invoked to exclude
the Othered party from taken-for-granted inclusion in the order of shared practices.
Narratives as a practice can thus be seen as both liberatory and problematic, as a means both
of enabling and stifling expression, and as a means of both deepening connections and
deepening alienation from oneself and from others. Narrative is thus infused with an almost
inevitable ethical character that forms one dimension against which recipients of narratives form
“narrative judgments.” Biwu Shang identifies “narrative” broadly as the telling that something
happened, in a particular situation and for a purpose, and “narrativity” as involving the dynamics
of both telling and audience response (198). Narrativity calls the audience to both “observer”
and “judgment” roles, with the first usually necessary to facilitate the second, but not necessarily
leading to it. Judgments can be broadly typologized as relating to interpretive, ethical, or
aesthetic judgments (198).
While these categories are intertwined and inseparable in actual practices of narrativity, they
reflect real distinctions of emphasis and entrance to narrative judgments, with questions of
critical analysis falling toward the “ethical” category. In an ethnomethodological turn, Shang
argues that “the rhetorical theorist does not do ethical criticism by applying a pre-existing ethical
system to the narrative”, but rather “tries to reconstruct the ethical principles upon which the
narrative is built” (200). Various “ethical positions” can be posited as the subject of analysis for
such reconstructing, identified as “(1) that of the characters within the storyworld; (2) that of the
narrator in relation to the telling, to the told, and to the audience; (3) that of the implied author to
the telling, the told, and the authorial audience; and (4) that of the flesh-and-blood reader in
relation to the set of values, beliefs, and locations operating in positions”, as well as “the ethics
of the rhetorical purpose”, i.e., the ethical character of the specific narrative act itself (201). All

261

such dimensions may be relevant when making narrative judgments, a process bound up with
any critical analysis, of the narratives collected for this chapter. Despite warning against
imposition of prior ethical systems, Shang also acknowledges that “the rhetorical theorist does
bring values to the narrative”—though these must be subject to questioning and revision in the
process of engagement with the narrative itself (200)—and that “individual readers need to
evaluate the ethical standards of individual narratives, and they are likely to do so in different
ways” (202).
In other words, though prior ethical frameworks need yield in rhetorical theorists’ judgments
to elucidation of the ethical dimensions of the narrative itself, the practical act of individual
engagement with a narrative inevitably calls for a “starting point” of ethical consideration on the
part of any critical analyst, for the audience’s own positioning with respect to values remains an
important dimension of any narrative judgment. Indeed, “both narrative progression and
narrative judgements constitute the key elements of narrative experience” (208), and narrators
must count on audience’s practices of narrative of judgment for the intelligibility of narratives.
For example, in my set of narratives from Cult of the Stage Monkey, narrators depend on my
own practices of narrative judgment to imply the “point” of stories, i.e., what does the story
express about their own value-positioning with respect to spontaneity. Accordingly, I will
critically assess these collected narratives from a starting point of value-positioning that extends
the topics of critical concern raised in Chapter Four: the positioning of concrete bodies to the
hegemonic problematics of both groupmind and individual production of spontaneity; the
neutralization of bodies and tacit enforcement of ableism; and the critical problematics of the
comedy bias in improv.
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COSM’s Narratives of Spontaneity: A Critical View
Within the set of narratives and themes derived from them can be seen several examples
reflecting critical concerns detailed in Chapter Four. One obvious example is the prevalence of
“instantaneousness,” “in the moment” themes in connection with quick action, frenetic energy,
and immediate response, in opposition to “in your head” experience. This aspect of spontaneity
runs into the concerns addressed above regarding ableism and capacity for such “instant”
response, as well as those regarding the comedy bias to which I address my critiques of
“unmindfulness” versus “thoughtfulness” and “joy” versus “jouissance.” A second such
reflection of established critical concerns can be seen in Elaine Kibodeaux’s narratives of
sexualization. In her story of group undressing, we have an example of “groupmind”-like
practices serving to marginalize some persons while establishing inclusivity among others.
Similarly, her experience of feeling unable to “call out” her co-director when the orgasm
exercise was introduced, because “no-ing” him would “started a schism,” illustrates a
problematic case of “the right to say no” being contested in improv practice.
With respect to issues of ableism in particular, the issue is silent from the narratives; none of
the respondents addresses ability-based features of themselves or others at all in their accounts of
spontaneity (it should be noted that equally absent was respondents’ explicit address of their
improv experience in relation to gender, race, or other social identity characteristics; even E.
Kibodeaux’s sexualization narratives are focused on her individual discomfort with
sexualization, not with her role as a woman as such in those situations.) However, an interesting
trope emerges in connection to ableism through some respondents’ use of the language of mental
illness in association with spontaneity. Massoth, for example, praises the experience of “the
insanity of the moment” in an effective scene, and later gives an example of a non-spontaneous
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scene in which he uses “a planned character trait that had worked for me in earlier shows: act
completely crazy.” Titsworth relates a narrative from improv rehearsal in which he was arrested
while “wandering the halls and getting lost in playing a psychotic episode,” which while “not for
the good,” he associates strongly with encouraging spontaneity in his response to Question Four;
elsewhere, he titles his seven-character/solo-performer longform the “Schizologue.” In these
cases, language that is commonly used perjoratively with reference to mental illness (crazy,
insanity, psychotic, schizo) is linked in positive association with spontaneity for improv.
However, this positive association is problematic in its appropriation of such terminology.
While Essya Nabbali offers many examples of the reappropriation of terms like “mad” among
self-identified psychiatric survivors, no such process is at work in improviers’ appropriation of
such language to describe successful improv. Instead, I would argue that the opposite is at work:
such use of language reinscribes the marginalization of mental disability, whether we treat such
disability as physiological or socially-constructed or anything in between. Accounts associating
effective spontaneity in improv with “craziness,” etc., appropriate the exoticized, “taboo,”
aspects of mental disability, placing them on display in a “safe space” for the gaze of largely
hegemonic audiences to be entertained by such simulated performance of “craziness”—a sort of
behavioral blackface of broad cultural stereotypes of what “crazy” people are like.
Granted, only a tiny portion of improv portrayals are directly implicated in this process
through their presentation of characters marked as “crazy” or mentally ill, and at least some of
these portrayals are probably more “honest” in presenting their subjects as characters rather than
stereotypes whose amusement value is derived from their “craziness”—for example, the
performance of an autistic adult character cited by both Auverset and Titsworth. However, a
general conceptual association of spontaneity with “madness” in some form does not operate in
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improv by serving as an example of, say, the arbitrariness of social constructs of mental
disability. Rather, by locating “crazy” behavior in “safe,” “obviously sane” performing bodies,
such a conceptual association allows for commodification of the display of “insanity”—while
“actual” “insane” persons, those socially marked as mentally disabled, are subject to control,
ostracization, and medicalization, and their so-called “crazy” behavior constrained and hidden
from public view through both self-censorship and formal enforcement.
This same problematic is found in at least one methodologist, Keith Johnstone, who
associates loss of spontaneity with fear of being thought “psychotic.” This approach,
encouraging students to express thoughts they might censor as “psychotic,” has great expressive
liberatory potential, but does not undercut the basis for students’ fears in the first place. It gives
students a frame to express “psychotic” thoughts and to learn that this does not mean that they
are psychotic themselves. Of course, the same “mad” behavior from a socially-marked “actual”
psychotic person—perhaps even on an improv stage—would invite restraint and sanction.
Improv performers are invited to appropriate behaviors they deem “psychotic” for entertainment
without questioning the basis for their deeming of such behavior as “psychotic.” Also left
unexamined is the connection of improviers’ notions of “psychotic” expression with the concrete
experience of actual persons marked as mentally disabled, from whom such interpretations about
what is “psychotic” are ostensibly derived. In this linguistic framing, the spectacle aspects of
socially-marked mental disability are marked as “spontaneous” and presented to the audience in
such a way that their expression is associated with freedom and skill. While other authors did
not tie “craziness” in its various forms as clearly to spontaneity, a valuable direction of future
rhetorical research on this subject might examine examples of effective improv in other
methodologists to determine to what extent such language is associated with these examples.
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This problematic dynamic with “craziness” is of course also reinforced by improv audiences,
who tend to accept “insane” expression within the same “discourse of enfreakment” critiqued by
Jennifer Eisenhauer for its role in reinforcing normative barriers in ableism generally. Several
respondents also implicate the audience more explicitly as a stymying force on spontaneity. In
particular, critiques of the comedy bias are implicated in examples where audience laughter is
said to reinforce non-spontaneous improv. Massoth’s “crazy painter” narrative is one such
example, where Massoth acts in a nonspontaneus way that had “worked in earlier shows,” i.e.,
had previously elicited positive audience response (presumably laughs, though he does not
mention “laughter” explicitly), in response to “dead silence” from the audience. Auverset
describes “guessing” games, which she associates with inhibiting spontaneity, as nevertheless
“always a good audience favorite.” She also associates laughter more directly with reinforcing
her “mad-scientist forearm…default panic choice…Maybe it got big laughs the first time and I
remembered that?” Sarah Brown also implicates audience reinforcement of a performance she
experienced as nonspontaneous: “I found myself falling onto one of my crutches as being a
“femme fatale” type of character, which bored me even as I made the audience laugh.”
In these examples, audience behavior, as well as performers’ own responses to audiences,
serve to stymie spontaneity among performers. Through the role of audience laughter, we can
see another mechanism of enforcement of improv’s comedy bias. Interestingly, the set of
narrative examples given by respondents implies a certain level of backlash to the comedy bias
in their working concepts of spontaneity, just as with many methodologists. Auverset, Benelli,
Brown, Dugas, Manual and Titsworth all cite examples of non-comedic improv in association
with experience, observation, or encouragement of spontaneity. In addition, Sarton opposes
“making spontaneous art” against “inspiring cheap laughs,” and Benelli identifies more serious
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work and focus on in-scene relationships as encouraging of spontaneity, while Manual explicitly
narrates a “no-laugh” rehearsal as a spontaneity-encouraging practice. Given the high
preponderance of examples of more “serious” improv, it seems there is a genuine strong
association among these subjects between spontaneity and non-comedic improv. However, as I
addressed in concerns about methodologists’ treatment of this subject in Chapter Four, this
preponderance may also mask a reinforcement of the comedy bias as the “normal” of improv, by
marking these examples of non-comedic improv as “exceptional” and “extraordinary,” or by
tokenizing non-comedic improv by such practices as a special “no-laugh” rehearsal.
Finally, the single most consistent theme among respondents, that of personal closeness
encouraging spontaneity, can be seen as problematic in light of Rawls and David’s critique of
practices and narratives. Despite its value in encouraging spontaneity, such practices do
inevitably lead to exclusionary “Othering” practice with respect to those not “in the ensemble” or
with an unclear relationship to it, as the in-group ensemble develops the sort of shared
“narratives” that operate in one function to establish and enforce membership boundaries—and
thus access to what in-group members view as positive, effective practices of encouraging
spontaneity. This practice of intertwining social and performance relationships, in other words,
can reinforce such “narrative” practices as Rawls and David critique as “Othering”, in this case,
shutting down access to transactions of spontaneity through membership boundaries enforced in
part by shared narratives.
Rawls and David would of course advocate an orientation toward shared practices rather
than narratives. An interesting case may be seen in one of Jason Petitjean’s narratives, where he
cites spontaneity as inhibited when
working with those new to the improv scene…when my stage partner is only looking out for
himself/herself…whether the stage partner wants to be the star of the scene at everyone’s
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expense or perhaps the stage partner is too scared to embarrass himself/herself and thus will
not make bold choices, having to work with someone who is not mindful of the scene before
they are mindful of themselves makes spontaneity difficult.
Here we see an example of this sort of narrative Othering; Petitjean narrates his stage partners’
behaviors as violating the order of shared practices (through “incompetence” with those practices
in this case) and, rather than turning to the reinscription of such shared practices to reinstate the
shared social transaction, instead narrates the “Other” out of the transaction, as a party who
cannot participate in the shared practices—who “makes spontaneity difficult.” A similar
dynamic can be seen in other respondents’ examples of inhibition on stage with partners with
whom they have interpersonal conflict or clashing styles of performance. In these examples we
see reflections of the conversation in Mary Scruggs and Michael Gellman where Geoffrey
describes the offensive and thoughtless behavior of a partner in an improv audition scene, and is
rebuked by his former teacher for claiming the partner wasn’t “playing a character.” The teacher
replies “according to you…because you chose to judge his performance instead of responding to
what he was creating” (17). Though the teacher agrees that the partner’s work was “bad”
improv, she reminds Geoffrey that the path to success with spontaneity lies in the return to
accepted shared practices—in this case response to what is being created—rather than turning to
“Othering” practices involving the narrative positioning of an Other as incompetent at improv
practices, in the process alienating both self and other from the shared transaction of spontaneitygeneration through improv.

Conclusion
In this chapter, I have examined the rhetoric of spontaneity as expressed in specific narrative
examples by a set of individual improviers. The accounts of spontaneity offered in these
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narratives, often supported by unprompted explanations from respondents, tended to cluster
accounts of spontaneity around the two themes, in tension to some extent, of
“instantaneousness,” “being in the moment,” and “surprise,” on the one hand, and
“aptness/appropriateness” and “cohesion” on the other. In addition, central spontaneitysupporting tenets of “trust,” “comfort,” and “freedom” were couched mostly in accounts relating
to personal relationships among performers, and the ways in which relationships were affected
by improv practices and vice versa. I have provided a broad synthesis of these narratives as if
they were collectively a textual account of improv along the lines of my ideographic-analytic
dimensions of “spontanteity” from Chapters Two and Three. I have also considered how these
accounts include features relevant to critical analysis, and how examples from these accounts
illustrate concerns over power, access to expression, and the rhetoric of spontaneity as discussed
in Chapter Four. Such a grounded account of spontaneity offers insight into the practical selfanalytical process by which improviers “make sense” of “spontaneity” when prompted to give
account of this vague but clearly important and value-laden term for their improv practice. Such
narratives can never offer direct access to “what spontaneity is” for respondents. But they do
help us understand how improviers construct their own working operationalizations of this
important principle that criterially grounds their practice of recognizably doing improv as such.
The very act of prompting these narratives, of course, also constitutes a breach of those
accepted methods of spontaneity, by calling to account in concrete terms something that
functionally operates through methods of blind obedience. Some effects of the “bewilderment”
induced by this breach may have affected the final respondent pool, with at least four potential
respondents who signed consent forms and received the questions never offering narratives, but
all taking the time to reply with variations on the theme of “whenever I try to think of examples,
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I just can’t do it,” sometimes months later. Other respondents whose narratives were included
also expressed difficulty in identifying examples.
The breach of prompting examples is itself a component of these narrative acts, itself subject
to ethical narrative judgments, as it calls to respondents to account for aspects of their practice
that work by being taken-for-granted. Explicit methodologies like those examined in Chapter
Three are synthesized from exactly such moments by improviers in concrete practice, who at
moments explicitly recognize the organizing practices underlying what they do, and turn to other
methods of analysis and account to answer the question “So how are we doing what we are
doing?” That it can induce bewilderment is a testimony to the efficacy of such taken-for-granted
methods of spontaneity in everyday improv practice. A similar dynamic, presumably, is at work
among the other areas discussed in Chapter Two where explicit invocation of a principle of
spontaneity is operationalized. Where functional, taken-for-granted methods of blind obedience
leave off, methods of analysis, account, and narrative take over. From this leap of breach and
recognition, methodology has its origin, as illustrated in these improv narratives from one small
corner of one ideographic community in a vast sea of culture that uses principles of spontaneity
for different purposes all the time, but rarely notices. Which means they must be working.
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CHAPTER SIX
CONCLUSION

Soooo…how is spontaneity done? And what difference does it make?
Well, it still kinda depends on what you mean. But in making the conceptual shift from a
realist account of spontaneity to an account that treats it as a social practice, that “what you
mean” changes. Realist accounts of spontaneity are brought into the fold of an
ethnomethodological perspective, as cases of practices where treating spontaneity as a “real”
thing is part of the way that spontaneity functions in concrete social interactions. An
ethnomethodological account of spontaneity instead asks how spontaneity is recognized and
utilized by social actors in such concrete interactions. As the “what you mean” by “spontaneity”
shifts to consider these features of ethnomethodological interaction, so what it “kinda depends
on” is actors’ orientations toward their shared activity—the “what they are do-ing together.”
Spontaneity, like other tacit social practices, operates through orientations ranging from blind
obedience to purposeful breach. Blind obedience to shared practices might be called the “normal
state” of orientation to them, when they are operating effectively and all parties to an interaction
share an orientation to what-they-are-doing. But it is in breaches, interactive moments where the
effective practices break down and participants experience bewilderment, that such tacit social
practices become amenable to be made-account-of.
One method of breaching social methods involving language is through the explicit rhetorical
deployment of ideographs. These vaguely-defined but highly normative terms operate by
channeling and constraining commitments to action, rather than by having clear shared
denotative meaning. Indeed, their contestability is one of their key features, though they are still
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associated with methods of blind obedience to hegemonic social structures underlying the
practical use of an ideograph in a culture. Shared practical mastery of the methods of acting in
blind obedience with reference to an ideographic term is what constitutes an ideographic
community within a broader culture. Within an ideographic community, any explicit
deployment of the relevant ideograph, even to uphold hegemonic uses, is a form of breach in its
disruption of the methods of blind obedience that are criterial for the identity of the ideographic
community.
Explicit analysis of the term “spontaneity" is one such breach. In Chapter Two, I identify a
number of areas of scholarship where spontaneity is explicitly analyzed, and in some cases,
contested. These cases yielded a set of “guiding questions” regarding the various ways that
principles of “spontaneity” can be put to use, and the sorts of questions that analyses of
spontaneity explicitly or tacitly seek to answer, i.e. (one more time!): Is spontaneity a quality of
behavior, or of experience, or of some relationship between the two? Is it binary—either present
or absent—or can it be divided into degrees of greater/lesser? If divisible, can it be quantified?
What is the relationship between spontaneity and non-spontaneity? What behaviors and/or
experiences are indicative of greater or lesser spontaneity? Is spontaneity treated as simply
descriptive, or is it a normatively positive quality? If positive, is it a potentiality, a productive
force, or a valued end in itself? Can it be increased in frequency and/or intensity in an individual
or group? Why would it be valuable to increase it? If it can be increased, how? Is it always
desirable, or only valuable in certain contexts? What makes a context more or less appropriate?
Are greater and lesser degrees of spontaneity due to inherent subject characteristics, learned
behavior patterns, or environmental/relationship characteristics? Is there a distinction between
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individual and social spontaneity, and if so, what is the relationship between them? How is it
identified and recognized in individuals and groups?
The accounts in Chapter Two provide an array of examples of how such questions are
addressed. However, with the exception of psychodrama, in none of these areas is orientation
toward the ideograph “spontaneity” necessary for the identity of practices. The practice of
improvisational theatre, however, offers a site of investigation where spontaneity is not merely a
valued or interesting feature of orientation to practices, but is recognized as criterial by those
engaging in improv—i.e., improv performers cannot understand themselves as “doing improv” at
all unless they are “being spontaneous,” or at least trying to be. The deployment of the term
and/or concept of spontaneity in improv methodology texts, and its synchronic association with
other terms and with practices, is the sort of breach enacted by explicit analysis. The same is
true of narratives offered by improviers when prompted to make explicit examples of their
experience and observation of spontaneity and influences on its effective enactment.
In the rhetoric of improv methodologists, the particular role and use of the term
“spontaneity” varies widely. For some it is explicitly criterial and analyzed as such. Others
background the explicit use of the term, and it emerges as criterial through its synchronic
associations with related ideographs of improv. Napier all but absences the term completely,
refocusing on improv as the practice of “play.” Salinsky and Frances-White treat spontaneity as
the foundational skill of improv, but not necessarily something that improv as a broader practice
aims for at every moment—a move echoed rhetorically in the structure of Scruggs and Gellman,
where the term disappears once Geoff begins the workshop. On the whole, the term
“spontaneity” is subject to less conscious explication over time. However, the synchronic
associations connected to the term, and the practices of enacting it, continue to change,
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indicating that the gradual reduction of explicit attention to spontaneity in improv is not the
result of the practical use of the term becoming “fixed” in the analytic days of Spolin and
Johnstone. The trend may imply a decentralization of the term as improv methodology becomes
more focused on practices that build from spontaneity, but do not necessarily implicate
spontaneity themselves. It may also reflect a sedimentation of the criteriality of “spontaneity” to
improv’s identities of practice, as such criteriality comes to be more and more “taken for
granted.”
All methodologists agree on the learnability of spontaneity as applied to improv, and share
other common themes. Almost all writers oppose spontaneity to “control” in some form, and
sometime associate it with “freedom” or “loss of control.” Spontaneity is also positioned in
opposition to various forms of “thinking.” Most writers connect spontaneity with expression of
some sense of a “self.” All writers directly associate spontaneity either with “play” or with
ideographs strongly associated with normative-positive senses of “play.”
Some divergence occurs with respect to spontaneity’s value—whether it is derived from
“freedom,” expression of some fundamental “self,” or the expression of cultivated skill.
Similarly, improv’s status as an end in itself, a productive force, or a potentiality is also disputed.
While significant overlap exists, different writers give greater primacy to relationship
characteristics, learned skills, or inherent subject characteristics as the basis for greater and lesser
degrees of capacity for enacting spontaneity. Most writers seem to treat spontaneity as additive
from individuals, but Spolin and Halpern et al. treat it as emerging from interaction.
Similarly, when specific examples and narratives of spontaneity and factors that influence it
were elicited from my interview respondents, a collective text emerged that indicated features of
the “spontaneity heuristic” among this group. These features can by summarized as a tension
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between instantaneous, in-the-moment, surprising action/experience on one hand, and apt,
appropriate action that coheres through a performance on the other hand. Effective spontaneity
is supported by performance practices that are held to encourage these features, and through
personal relationships among performers that promote trust, comfort, freedom and permission to
take risks.
With respect to both broad principles of spontaneity and specific examples of rhetorical
practices among the sets of both methodology texts and narratives, these practical accounts of
spontaneity also have critical implications. The way in which “spontaneity” is used rhetorically
and recognized/understood in improv practice contributes to structures of privilege and
oppression, both within improv and reflecting the larger culture in which improv communities
operate. Practical concepts of spontaneity in improv have material impact at the levels of access,
representation, and accepted expression for participants in improv.
Among the issues emerging from this perspective are practices of spontaneity that serve to
reinforce white-heterosexual-male hegemonic representation and expression in improv,
particularly the double-bind in the problematics of treating spontaneity as produced-ininteraction versus treating it as individually additive. The first connects with Amy Seham’s
critique of practices such as groupmind that reinforce the most easily accessible archetypes,
stereotypes, and forms of expression, and naturalize them as “truth” emergent from shared
consciousness, ignoring their socially constructed and often hegemonic character. The second
naturalizes the standing order of access and expression in improv, and demands that others
conform to this order of accepted improv expression. Responsibility for failure is placed on the
individuals who fail, but the normative order that sets the terms for failure is left unquestioned,
and the ultimate answer to disputes over approaches to improv is the glib capitalistic response
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that improviers should make their own opportunities if the established communities aren’t
working out for them. While, following Seham, I mostly consider this double-bind with respect
to women and gender issues in improv, Seham indicates that the same structural problematic is
relevant with issues of race, sexual orientation, etc.
Though Seham indicates the power of these homogenizing practices of spontaneity to
marginalize other perspectives and experiences, she does not explicitly state that the hegemonic
white-heterosexual-male body is treated as the “neutral” body in improv practice. However, I
believe this is a reasonable conclusion to draw from her research, and supported by the practice
of “neutralizing” bodies in improv methodology. The bodies presented in examples are almost
universally neutralized, and thus inevitably hegemonic, but this practice of neutralizing masks a
pervasive ableism. Exemplar bodies are treated as neutral, but the examples and accounts of
spontaneity presented by methodologists strongly reinforce tacit ableist ideals at least regarding
mobility- and sensory-disabilities. Accounts strongly emphasize visual, auditory, and tactile
engagement and almost always quick, immediate bodily action, inherently limiting the capacity
for spontaneity as recognized in these accounts for bodies that take greater time and effort to
communicatively act and react.
Unlike issues of gender, race, etc., which are at least recognized as issues among improviers,
even if often addressed thinly and problematically, ableism in improv does not even seem to be
considered among the research, methodology texts, and personal narratives that make up my
sample of accounts and examples of spontaneity for improv. In the absence of a more critical
practice, improviers with disabilities are subject to larger cultural forces of ableism as they are
positioned within social discourses of “enfreakment,” between perspectives that view them as
either pitiable and in need of accommodation or as “heroic” for performing improv. Also of
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concern are methodologies and narratives that appropriate the language of mental illness in
positive association with effective improv, and in doing so exoticize, idealize and commodify
“madness” in improv practice without reference or concern for the experience of persons actually
socially marked as mentally disabled.
Such commodification of “madness” is often done in the service of upholding improv’s
comedy bias, a practice that contributes to the various factors that stymy access, representation,
and expression for marginalized groups as discussed above, and which further limits improv’s
capacity for accepted expression more generally. This bias is recognized and criticized in
improv methodology, but is never questioned as the “natural state” of improv. Method-text
critiques of this bias tend to reinforce it, by juxtaposing improv categories as “comedy” versus
“everything else” and by undermining their own critiques of comedy’s limits and pitfalls by
consistently asserting that non-comedic approaches are valuable in large degree because they
ultimately make improv “funnier.” Even critiques like Seham’s focus on broadening access
opportunity to and accepted expression of comedy, without questioning the comedy bias’s own
contribution to the very social problematics in improv she criticizes. After all, many of the
examples and organizational dynamics she criticizes can be read as implicating sexism, racism,
homophobia, etc., as a result of their unquestioning orientation toward comedy; i.e., the valuation
of comedy in improv production can be understood as the ideographic justification for improv
practices that Seham identifies as oppressive.
Methodological accounts of spontaneity reinforce the comedy bias in several ways. First, by
emphasizing immediacy of action and response, these accounts of spontaneity push improv
expression away from emotions and modes of experience that literally take time to experience
and express, for such forms of expression, when forced into the mold of immediate response,
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tend to fold back into comedy through the incongruity of their forced chronemic expression.
Similarly, the alignment of “thinking” against “spontaneity” in these accounts forecloses the
more “thoughtful” emotions and modes of improv expression. The opposition of “thinking” to
“spontaneity” also largely limits improv’s potential as a critical medium to satire, employing and
critiquing only the most broadly-recognized and -shared hegemonic expressions. More nuanced
critical expression is truncated where thought is rejected and comedy valorized, for such deeper
critical engagement calls for both thoughtfulness and pain on the part of performers and
audiences. Finally, almost all methodological accounts of spontaneity associate it strongly with
behavior and experiential states that are emotionally positive, evocative of laughter, and tending
toward frenetic energy, in the process dissociating spontaneity from the vast array of human
experiences and ways of acting that do not readily fit this mold. This tendency is also reinforced
through the use of examples in methodology texts, which are almost uniformly comedic in tone.
Interestingly, the set of narratives collected from respondents showed unusually heavy emphasis
on examples of non-comedic improv in association with spontaneity, compared to method texts.
While this may mark a backlash to the comedy bias, it may also be read as reinforcing the
comedy bias as “normal,” by marking such non-comedic improv as “extraordinary” or “heroic”
for overcoming improv’s “natural” comedic orientation.
In challenge to the comedy bias, I offer two conceptual shifts in improv’s orientation toward
spontaneity. The first, from “unmindfulness” to “thoughtfulness,” seeks to understand
“thinking” not as pejoratively opposed to spontaneity, but as itself within the field of shared
social behavior that also includes emotion and overt action. Certain cognitive behaviors can
indeed be reasonably viewed as destructive of spontaneity in improv, just as certain overt
behaviors can; but thinking is not in itself any less spontaneous than the behaviors that method
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writers oppose it to, and bringing it within the fold of recognized “spontaneity” opens up vast
potential for expression and critique stymied under an improv perspective that treats thought as
inherently antithetical to spontaneity. The second shift, from “joy” to “jouissance,” challenges
the centralization of modes of behavior associated primarily with “play,” “fun,” and “pleasure”
in operationalizations of spontaneity for improv. The centrality of this association tends action
recognized as spontaneous in improv toward gleefulness, “randomness” of behavior, quick
action, bizarreness, and exaggeration. In contrast, orientation toward “jouissance” in association
with spontaneity invites a richer and more diverse “economy of pleasure” in improv expression,
recognizing deep, rich experience—including of sadness, fear, anger, injustice, oppression, and
so on—as equally spontaneous. Such a sense decentralizes the playful freneticism of “joy” in
recognizing spontaneity, but also folds such challenging emotions and expressive modes into the
realm of joy. Such experiences are meaningful experiences, meaningful opportunities for
expression, spaces of opportunity for improv to go beyond mere “pleasure” to the deeper—and
not at all necessarily pleasurable—experience of en-joy-ment representative of Mihaly
Csikszentmihalyi’s flow.

Upshots
From this analysis of spontaneity as a social rhetorical practice, I hope to offer several key
takeaways for academic scholars and for improv practitioners. For academics, I first call
attention to the theoretical connections I draw between ethnomethodology, ideographic rhetorical
theory, and critical theory. As discussed above, the centrality of concrete description of situated
practices in ethnomethodology seems at first glance to be at odds with the analytic focus of
rhetorical theory. However, I strongly advance that concrete rhetorical practices are very much
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within the realm of ethnomethodology. Indeed, rhetorical analysis is itself a situated concrete
social practice, no less subject to being viewed ethnomethodologically for being carried out most
visibly through the production of artefactual texts distant from the original situated observations
and experiences that occasioned them.
Similarly, ethnomethodology’s injunction toward a strict descriptive approach seems a poor
match for critical approaches that start from or turn toward analyses of power as a structural
social phenomenon. But again, such critical approaches are well within ethnomethodology’s
purview, though it would begin with concrete description rather than recognized social structures
of privilege and oppression. Power, after all, is a practice, engaged in through rhetorical
behavior and everyday social interactions. Critical approaches can be themselves treated
ethnomethodologically, as social practices of analysis and power in much the same way as
rhetorical analysis. But ethnomethodology also has much to offer to critical theory in the form
of an approach that begins with concrete description of rhetoric and social interaction, and
describes power as practical accomplishment of privilege and oppression. While a few writers
have developed connections between these theoretical approaches, I would call on others
following my work to continue this development, and to more consciously use these differing
approaches to complement each other.
I also call for increased awareness and communication among the divergent areas of
scholarship that use spontaneity as a heuristic or operationalized principle. As noted in Chapter
Two, a wide number of fields use spontaneity in this way, but with few exceptions, none of these
sources ever cite or seem aware of the others. Analysis of spontaneity is provincialized into
various scholarly ideographic communities, each operationalizing the term more or less
independently and for their own purposes. As far as I know, this dissertation is the first work to

280

recognize spontaneity as a shared but divergent ideograph, and to identify practical and
conceptual connections among disciplines that use it this way. Surely, dialogue between these
disciplines would help all inform each other by offering new perspectives on their shared
ideographic term “spontaneity.”
Extending this point, I would also call for consideration of the practical use of “spontaneity”
in areas beyond those I have collected. My sample included only explicit analyses of the term,
i.e., breaches. Far more results of the initial search were not included because their use of
“spontaneity” was done unproblematically, i.e., with a stance of blind obedience to the practical
shared methods of using and recognizing the term in the context it is deployed. To ask “what do
you mean by spontaneity?” of such uses would be to breach the methods allowing the term to be
deployed as something of which competent members of the ideographic community can say
“you know what I mean.” Nonetheless, accounts of the practical use of the term “spontaneity”
can be derived from such unproblematic examples through descriptive analysis of their concrete
uses and synchronic associations, as an emergent order that makes such unproblematic use of
“spontaneity” possible in the relevant ideographic communities. The list of questions I
synthesize from examples of explicit analysis in Chapter Two provides a helpful starting point to
guide other researchers in describing such emergent orders of spontaneity as an everyday
rhetorical practice.
More broadly, my general approach in this dissertation of shifting the ground of analytic
discussion of spontaneity from a realist to a practice-based view may offer a helpful theoretical
direction for making sense of other vague but value-laden terms. By treating use of the term
“spontaneity” as an ideographic rather than descriptive practice, we can sort out the wide range
of uses it applies to by refocusing on how the term works as a practical method and/or

281

recognized accomplishment. While all ideographs of course have a “descriptive” component in
their diachronic histories that establish the ideograph’s range of recognizable uses, this
description is subject to challenge and change through social practice. Unlike descriptive terms,
such challenges do not so much alter the meaning of the ideograph as instead expand it among
more and wider fields of contestation over its power to shape and constrain commitment.
Argumentation or analysis of the “correct” or “appropriate” meaning of an ideograph (a
realist perspective, however tacitly) is part of the social contestation process by which
ideographs thrive; when social contestation over the “meaning” of an ideograph ceases, the term
effectively becomes fully descriptive in practice, and ceases to be an ideograph. This social
contestation need not take the form of direct conflict between parties or ideographic communities
over differential ideographic practices. While such overt conflicts provide the most visible
examples for researchers, I would argue that social “contestation” over the meaning of an
ideograph is overwhelmingly grounded in the simple fact of difference between ideographic
communities. Different communities share the same resource of an ideographic term, but have
different purposes and practices for their use of the term in concrete interactions among members
of an ideographic community. This creates inherent “conflict,” but typically in the form of
everyday breaches that generate “confusion,” “bewilderment,” and the “need-to-make-accountof” a shared situation when ideographic practices are not shared, or when they break down. But
within ideographic communities, ideographs are used effectively and unreflexively, except in the
rare occasions of breaches of explicit deployment or analysis.
The question for ethnomethodology is how both unreflexive use and breaching are
accomplished through social practices within and between members of ideographic communities
in concrete interaction. Artifacts of rhetorical practices are one such concrete interaction. The
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practice-based approach I here apply to the term “spontaneity” has much potential for
researchers seeking a deeper understanding of the “meaning” of ideographic terms, for such
meaning emerges not through “accurate” descriptive analysis, but rather precisely in the
dynamics of differential concrete practices for “making use” of the shared term by varying
ideographic communities. The use of “spontaneity” may also be subjected to deeper critical
analysis beyond the field of improvisational theatre where I have considered it here, by the same
approach. For example, what practices of power, privilege, and oppression are emergent from
the rhetorical use of “spontaneity,” and the social practices for recognizing it, in the fields of
politics or cultural theory?
Finally, I would like to call critical researchers’ attention to the challenging dynamics posed
by what ethnomethodology understands as practices of blind obedience. The term is unfortunate
in many ways: with its ableist language, and its implications of ignorance and lack of agency.
However, the term is not pejorative in its ethnomethodological function. Indeed, it is viewed as
a practice, fully agential, and indeed foundational in accomplishing interaction. Shared practices
allow for blind obedience, rather than blind obedience compelling shared practices. Critiques of
hegemonic social structures tend to treat hegemony from the latter perspective, whereby the
“automatic response” to ideographs and other practices upholding hegemony is viewed as
involving ignorance and loss of agency. Ethnomethodology, on the other hand, views practices
of blind obedience to shared structures as an accomplishment by social actors who are highly
competent in such practices—if they were not, such interactions would swiftly break down under
breaches.
Viewed from a perspective of power, privilege and oppression, such accomplishments are
often highly problematic, needless to say. But these exact same methods of blind obedience also
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allow for the accomplishment of all manner of everyday social orders by which people’s needs
are met—for food, shelter, affection, respect, integrity, and on and on. Spontaneity is a special
case of a practice for which blind obedience is criterial for the identity of practices. However, in
a very real sense all practices are like this; while blind obedience may not be criterial as such in
most other areas, it is foundational to the ongoing shared functioning of every social order. After
all, from an ethnomethodological perspective, awareness of practices by participants practicing
them is the most fundamental form of breach, the most basic indication that shared practices are
breaking down. And as Anne Rawls and Gary David explain (Chapter Five), it is in the
breakdown of shared practices that participants are mutally “evicted” from concrete social orders
of interaction, creating the ground for segregation and oppression. It is in the breach that
practices change—good thing we also have practices for negotiating changes of practice—but
not always for the better, from a critical perspective.
Moreover, such methods of blind obedience are themselves integral to all sorts of social
practice a critical perspective would likely view as positive. Spontaneity in improvisational
theatre, for all the problematics I identify above, is nonetheless something I would argue to the
grave is extremely positive, and rife with critical and liberatory potential and accomplishment.
And for all the problematics of blind obedience to hegemonic practices, it is also true that there
are vast ideographic communities whose members have an equally automatic response of
negative reaction to practices they recognize as “sexism,” “racism,” etc. Not that this doesn’t
have its own problems; there are obvious reasons for encouraging greater reflexivity by all about
ideographic practices that challenge hegemony, as well as those that support it. But it would be
hard to argue against the value of blind obedience in such cases from the perspective of David
Coonan’s “materialist rhetoric.” I encourage critical researchers to take these offerings from
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ethnomethodology into consideration, and to see what insights can be gained from examining
how methods of blind obedience operate toward critical and liberatory ends, as well as
oppressive ones.
This dissertation also offers several key takeaways for improv practitioners and teachers.
First, I would like to call attention to the variety of spontaneities alluded to through their
differential treatment in various texts and narratives. Despite its shared criteriality for improv
practices, spontaneity is associated with many different values, roles, practices, and
operationalizations amongst concrete improviers, as evidenced by the variety only among
method texts, where a great deal of practical synthesis and selection of uses of “spontaneity” has
already occurred. Due to both its central criteriality and its special relationship with blind
obedience, spontaneity has been largely “taken for granted” in improv even as it looms large
over the concrete ways that improviers and audiences engage with improv. However, as I have
shown in both rhetorical and critical analysis, operationalizations and practices of spontaneity
have consequences and possibilities, and these emerge as differences in improviers’ practical
relationships with spontaneity. I would encourage improviers to give more awareness to their
own practices of how they recognize and do spontaneity, and the consequences of their own tacit
operationalizations: how does your own relationship with spontaneity enable and limit you as an
improvier, and how does it affect others with whom you perform? I would also encourage
improviers who have taken this first step to go further, and consider experimenting with
“spontaneities” in their practices—to treat spontaneity not as a given, but as a differential, indeed
manipulable dimension of improv practice, where experimentation and exposure to varying
approaches to spontaneity can expand and enhance improv skills and reveal new possibilities for
practices. These same comments apply, of course, to improv ensembles and organizations.
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In the process, improviers should also recognize that spontaneity as concrete improv
practices involves power relationships. Our practical methods of recognizing and enacting
spontaneity in improv have consequences, in the ways I have described above and no doubt in
others, and our spontaneity practices both challenge hegemony, and also uphold and reflect it, in
complex ways. Spontaneity is rightly championed and celebrated by improviers, but let us not
forget it has a dark side, and can be used as a practice to exclude and silence as well as to express
and connect. In my call for greater reflexivity about spontaneity by improviers, I also advocate
that this reflexivity include honesty and dialogue about our spontaneity practices with respect to
this dark side. In particular, we should address spontaneity’s implications for the issues
discussed above: Its role in differential demographic access, representation, and expression in
improv; its problematic relationship with ableism; and its deep association with improv’s
comedy bias. The strong association of spontaneity with personal relationships that emerged in
Chapter Five’s narratives is also a double-edged sword, operating through practices of exclusion
as well as connection.
The short of it is, if we take these contrasting analyses and critiques seriously, we are caught
in a quandary as improviers. We need to be able to take spontaneity “for granted” to accomplish
improv. Yet only by not taking-it-for-granted can we address the problematics emergent from
our spontaneity practices, and create new possibilities for ourselves as improviers by exploring
the range of spontaneities—to really make spontaneity something we do, not just something that
happens to us when the moment is right. I offer no solution. But I also argue it would be a great
step forward for improv, recognizing that we’re playing this game anyway, to go ahead and
really play it.
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Directions for Future Research
Like all research, this dissertation is but a start. Future research would start by expanding the
scope of the studies above, including more improv method texts and study of similar texts such
as the many applying improv principles to business practices. Study on narratives of spontaneity
can also be greatly expanded through a larger interview subject pool, or one drawing from a
greater diversity of individuals and improv organizations. Manipulation of question wording to
assess its positioning effects would also be informative; I identify a few specific examples in
Chapter Five. In addition, this same template of questions can be easily edited to apply to other
groups or social practices, creating a standard interview tool for assessing senses of spontaneity
in settings beyond improv.
At the risk of reifying the comedy/everything-else binary in improv, I also call for further
research into explicitly non-comedic improv, i.e., improv that explicitly takes something other
than comedy as its expressive aim. This has long existed in such forms as Augusto Boal’s
Theatre of the Oppressed (which also more fully integrates cognitive action and critical thought),
but in practice these forms are exploratory and pedagogical; the performance is a means, not the
end. Attention to such forms in the improv tradition this dissertation focuses on has been scant,
and my impression is that such practices are rare in improv, even as scripted forms readily
balance comedy productions with drama, romance, mystery, fantasy and myriad other modes and
genres. I would first call simply for the gathering of examples of improv that explicitly ignores
or challenges the comedy bias, whether long-term ensemble practices or “experiments” by
ensembles working primarily in a comedy mode. Drawing further from these examples, we may
offer practical insight for improviers seeking to challenge the comedy bias, asking such questions
as: How do ensembles working in non-comedic modes identify and recognize their expressive
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aims, and why? How are these aims enacted and enhanced through improv methods? How is
successful accomplishment operationalized and recognized? How do the expressive methods of
such ensembles interface with and react against “traditional” improv practices oriented toward
comedic production?
Given its thorough elision in the literature I have considered, I also call for explicit research
into improv, disability, and ableism. The obvious place to start here would be to ask improviers
who identify as disabled about their experiences with improv, fellow performers, and audiences
through this lens. Also valuable would be to research the experiences of improviers who do not
identify as disabled regarding working with those who do. It is likely that many improviers have
never performed with a self-identified disabled person, and of course, a wide spectrum of
disability exists, so the experience of those who have is likely to be highly limited in scope.
Interviewing improviers who do not identify as disabled about their reactions to the prospect of
performing with persons identifying with various forms of disability would doubtless be
revealing for this issue. Given improv’s problematic commodification of “madness,” I would
also encourage such research to attend to forms of disability identified with mental illness.
Given the narratives’ strong emphasis on personal relationships among improviers affecting
spontaneity, I would encourage more attention to this aspect of improv by researchers, improv
method writers, and practitioners alike. The interpersonal aspects of improv are little discussed
in improv methodology; these texts focus on “onstage” behavior and address improv problems
through improv practices. Little consideration is given to the practical interpersonal workings of
an ensemble: the taking on of roles and organization of influence, managing personal conflict
between members, negotiating divergent visions or approaches, or simply how to be friends as
well as improviers. Not all of the shared practices that hold the improv together are improv
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practices per se; an ensemble’s improv practice is founded on interpersonal and organizational
practices that both influence and emerge from onstage improv behavior. I advocate that improv
methodology writing, in particular, undertake a deeper look at the interpersonal dynamics of
improv and how these are related to onstage practices and outcomes.
Finally, I would like to call for more research and methodology that considers improv from
the perspective of the audience. My analysis of spontaneity above has been highly performercentric, but many, probably most, improviers would argue that improv also doesn’t really
become improv without an audience, even if that audience is only fellow ensemble members in
rehearsal. Treatments of the audience in improv literature are thin, from Spolin’s inviting but
ethereal audience as “co-experiencers” to the nebulous concepts of audiences as an abstract
consuming body that “wants something,” to which improv practices are shaped as a practical
response to the problem of drawing an audience, a requisite for the performance as end-in-itself.
Many improviers and improv directors and teachers speak throughout the literature, but nowhere
have I found a contributory voice that speaks primarily from the perspective of an audience.
Improv audiences are variously treated as entitites to be tolerated, appreciated, or educated,
but an ethnomethodological view treats audience members as fully involved, independent actors
in the social transaction of an improv show, highly competent in their own methods of
involvement. These methods go beyond generic cultural “good audience behavior” and overt
participation like giving suggestions, and involve all the methods involved in experiencing-aperformance-as-an-improv-show, interpreting behaviors by performers and other audience
members through this lens and responding accordingly. Among other aspects of performance,
this lens involves reading the performance as criterially spontaneous, with methods for
recognizing spontaneity and its breach in this context. Improv method writers, and myself in this
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dissertation, have largely ignored the audience in assessing spontaneity, viewing spontaneity
through the lens of improv practitioners. However, audience members, including those with
little or no experience in improv, of necessity still have methods for recognizing and interpreting
spontaneity in improv, almost certainly with methods emergent from their methods of treating
“spontaneity” in other social settings. Future research on spontaneity in improv should include
this perspective, and ask audience members about their own practices for recognizing
spontaneity. Improv methodologists may also take advantage of this perspective, going directly
to audience members to ask how they recognize and identify other valued qualities of improv.

Curtain
So that’s a few ways spontaneity gets done, a few ways it gets used, a few connections it has
with other things. It’s still extraordinary; a certain antiscientific “magic” that resists description
seems to be part and parcel of doing spontaneity, however much we operationalize it. It’s still
pervasive and ignorable, precisely because we are so good at doing it. It’s still slippery, even
when you look for it where everybody knows it has to be. It is still valuable and enticing; it also
still poses real problems and concerns. But we now have a conceptual framework for
spontaneity that allows us to watch the slipperiness slip, a lens that allows us to view spontaneity
not as frozen identifiable moments but as a process and practice that changes through concrete
social interaction, whose slipperiness is no small part of what makes it usable in the methods of
the social actors who do it. The taking-for-granted of that slipperiness is what allows us to do
spontaneity in the first place; in the breach of that taking-for-granted, by asking “so how do we
do spontaneity?” we find the methods by which we may begin to accomplish knowing-what-wewere-doing-in-the-first-place.
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